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THE POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CONTROL:
AN EXPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL CRISES,
APRIL 1993 TO OCTOBER 1994

Richard Anthony Rita, Ph.D.
University of Connecticut, 1996

The Russian Armed Forces will almost certainly play a key role in Russia's political future. Events in 1993 and 1994--the April 1993 referendum, the October 1993 crisis, the December 1993 legislative elections, and the 1994 military budget debate--indicate that the Russian military is not a politically interventionist organization, despite high politicization rooted in the Soviet era. Its leaders and officer corps, while truly worried about the fate of Russia, the armed forces, and their personal circumstances, are inhibited from intervention through a combination of professionalism, fear, disunity, and political values. A military figure who emerged as a key political figure in this period is retired General Aleksandr Lebed.

The military's inhibition is eroding, and a key dynamic in Russia's political future will be the interaction between the erosion of the inhibition against intervention and events, such as political and economic disarray and military disintegration, which are impelling military intervention.

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APRIL 1993 TO OCTOBER 1994

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Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CONTROL:
AN EXPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF KEY EVENTS,
APRIL 1993 TO OCTOBER 1994

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
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INTRODUCTION

An armed, disciplined body is, in its essence,
dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is ruinous
to society.

Edmund Burke¹

Much as the first decade of this twentieth century found Imperial Russia careening toward an unknown fate, the century's closing decade finds post-communist Russia lurching fitfully toward some national destiny, the characteristics of which remain unclear and disputed among the world's many Russia experts. Some argue that Russia is moving toward a new authoritarianism, while those more optimistic profess to see democracy in Russia's future. Still others worry that this former superpower will sink into chaos, fragmentation, and perhaps even civil war.² Whatever Russia's fate, one institution--the Russian Armed Forces--will almost certainly play a critical role in determining that country's ultimate future.

Indeed, we have already seen the military crucially involved in the most consequential post-communist political crisis in modern Russia's short history, viz., the October 1993 violent suppression and disbanding of the standing

legislature, the Supreme Soviet. In October 1993 Yeltsin's parliamentary enemies and his own Vice President incited an uprising in Moscow to seize government buildings after Yeltsin unconstitutionally disbanded the Supreme Soviet. The military, with great reluctance and only after a face-to-face showdown between the High Command and Yeltsin, stormed the "White House," the seat of the legislature, and fought a pitched battle to arrest Yeltsin's political opponents.³

Besides such decisive intervention in politics, the Russian military has also played a role, on occasion quite significant, in more mundane politics and policies.⁴ As will be seen below, the military has helped to shape the dynamics of Russian politics, governmental institutions, and political decisions. Moreover, individual senior officers, such as the now-well known retired General Aleksandr Lebed, also have had an important impact on Russian political processes, institutions, and policies. Some of this military influence derives from classic bureaucratic politics: the Russian military is a government institution struggling against, and with, other government institutions for resources, and also seeks to shape government policies of interest to it. Some of the military's influence, however, has also sprung from its situation and condition. Disintegrative tendencies within the military have made it a very fragile institution.⁵ Politicians, including Yeltsin, have had to consider

carefully the impact their decisions could have on the military. For example, the Russian Government, while drastically cutting the overall military budget, has sharply raised military salaries several times over the past four years. One likely explanation for this is that politicians recognize that many in the military had become politicized and radicalized and that the military, or elements within it, could spin out of civilian control if military officers perceive the government to be uncaring toward "bread and butter" issues such as pay, housing, and other benefits that many in the armed forces have come to see as their due.⁶

Thus, one of the more important issues facing scholars of Russian affairs is the nature of, and developments in, Russian civil-military relations since the December 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the military's past role in political crises, its everyday role in the Russian Government, and the possibility that Russia will experience more political crises, the topicality and significance of research in this area are obvious. And yet, aside from a few articles in scholarly journals and internal US Government analyses, no major, in-depth study on this issue has yet been published. This dissertation is an attempt to partially fill this scholarly void by seeking to illuminate and address the following questions: what is the nature of early post-communist Russian civil-military relations, and what are

their characteristics, and trends?; how is the military likely to influence Russia's political development?; will the military be a positive force in Russia's democratization, or is it more likely to hinder or help terminate that country's progress along the path toward democracy?

The Research Problem:

Relevant Literature and The Conceptual Framework

The literature on the general topic of civil-military relations is massive. Many studies have been conducted and major works published, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, dealing with such civil-military relations' issues as military participation, military influence, and military intervention in politics; military politicization, military control, and military coups; and military corporatism, praetorianism, and professionalism.⁷ These works generally concerned themselves with the militaries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia which played crucial roles in advancing or, more often, retarding the process of democratization in the developing world.

Some of the most important theoretical works and comparative studies in the field of civil-military relations emerged from this period. Two to three decades later, these

works still provide the generally accepted paradigms, definitions, and analytic frameworks used by scholars in the field. Thus, it seems appropriate to begin this investigation of Russian civil-military relations, in a time of transition from communist authoritarianism, with an extensive review of the works of the leading theorists in the field at large: Samuel P. Huntington, S. E. Finer, Eric A. Nordlinger, and Amos Perlmutter. Such a review is undertaken in Chapter One.

The literature on Soviet civil-military relations is also rich and is likewise an important subject upon which to base a study of early post-communist Russian civil-military relations. Moreover, the field of Soviet civil-military relations incorporates many of the theories, terminology, and analytic frameworks found in the field at large. There are, of course, significant differences between the now defunct Soviet military and its successor, the Russian military, especially on the issue of political control structures, as will be noted below. Nonetheless, the Russian Armed Forces, *mutatis mutandis*, were officially created in May 1992 primarily from Soviet military units based in Russia when the Soviet Union disintegrated into its constituent republics at the end of 1991.

By 1990, five years into General Secretary Gorbachev's attempt to rebuild and re-energize a declining Soviet Union,

three theoretical models held sway in the field of Soviet civil-military relations.⁸ A quarter century earlier, Roman Kolkowicz set the stage for all contemporary debates on Soviet civil-military relations with his theories advanced in the mid to late 1960s. William E. Odom and Timothy J. Colton responded a decade later with their respective theories, thus providing the three main schools of thought. Chapter Two delves into these leading theories and paradigms of civil-military relations in the Soviet period and describes the state of those relations in the last years of the Soviet Union and the first year of independent Russia.

Beginning with Chapter Three, this study attempts to describe and explain those events and issues which have had a critical impact on the nature, characteristics, and development of post-communist Russian civil-military relations. Put differently, this study will explore events in the first two years of post-communist Russia that importantly helped to frame civil-military relations in modern Russia. Three of those events occurred in 1993: the first major political crisis between Russian President Yeltsin and the legislature, the Supreme Soviet, in April, in which the military declined to intervene; the violent dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in October, in which the military played a decisive role; and Russia's first-ever free parliamentary elections, in December, in which military

voting played an important role in shaping the political coloration of the legislature. As will be seen, these three events provide the framework which helps to explain the events and attitudes surrounding the first post-Soviet annual military budget debate in 1994 (Chapter Four), the emergence into politics of Russia's most popular military officer, now-retired General Aleksandr Lebed, proclaimed by his supporters as Russia's future savior (Chapter Five), and the views of servicemen on civilian authority by fall 1994 (Chapter Six).

To be sure, the Russian military created by presidential edict in May 1992 was not a tabula rasa upon which outside political forces worked their will. Other, earlier important events provide a foundation for later developments in Russian civil-military affairs. Indeed, the birth of the modern Russian military was attended by severe complications which still continue to handicap that institution almost five years after its founding. First, many in the officer corps had become politicized during Gorbachev's tenure as they came to believe that perestroika would lead to the military's and country's collapse.⁹ This growing military politicization in the Gorbachev era--that is, direct participation in politics by officers, increased and direct involvement in internal policing functions, and open disagreement and defiance of civilian authority--helped set the stage for the failed August 1991 coup.¹⁰ After that

debacle for hard-liners, the unplanned breakup of the Soviet Armed Forces, beginning in the fall of 1991, further placed tremendous strains on servicemen through early 1992.

The Soviet Union's collapse four months after the coup immediately put the Soviet Armed Forces at the center of a critical issue: to whom did they owe allegiance? The fifteen Soviet republics declared their independence and most claimed ownership of all former union property and institutions, including military units, on their respective territories. Some, such as the new Central Asian states, agreed to negotiate the status of former Soviet units in their countries in the framework of a Russia-led defense alliance within the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Others, most importantly Ukraine, claimed ownership of all forces and agreed only to discuss the status of "strategic" forces (strategic included nuclear strike units as well as conventional forces considered strategic formations such as the Black Sea Fleet). For several months, Russia--with the strong backing of the military hierarchy--avoided formally creating a Russian Armed Forces in the hope that other former republics would agree to a supranational CIS Armed Forces and thus prevent the fragmentation of the Soviet Armed Forces.¹¹ In the meantime, however, some newly independent states began to nationalize former Soviet forces which, in some instances, led to fights within units and

fears of a complete breakdown of military discipline in these units.¹² By May 1992, hope faded in Moscow that a CIS Armed Forces were possible and Russia laid claim to all former Soviet forces on its territory and other former Soviet units outside Russia not claimed by another state.¹³

To many officers, the creation of the Russian Armed Forces in May 1992, promises of legal and financial support from the government, and the strong leadership of Yeltsin gave hope that the dissolution of the nation and military, and the deterioration of military living standards, would be arrested. Nonetheless, by the spring of 1993, after the first full year of the Russian military's existence, many in the military began again to express great doubt about the survival of the nation, its armed forces, and their own increasingly penurious situation.¹⁴ Economic reform had led to runaway inflation, poverty levels had sharply increased, several regions in Russia were pressing for greater autonomy or even outright independence from the central Moscow government, and the political leadership was mired in deep division and confrontation over competing visions and efforts to revive the country. Less than a year and a half after the December 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, and after a year of radical economic reform pursued by the Yeltsin government, the Russian military found its disintegration continuing, its impoverishment deepening, its internal cohesion splintering, and consequently, its politicization reaching ever higher heights. According to one observer of the military, the

Russian Armed Forces had been "transform[ed] . . . into an institution of high social risk."¹⁵

Thus, as a consequence of the Gorbachev legacy, the haphazard Soviet military breakup, and social, economic, and political turmoil caused by radical economic reform, it seems clear that, at the outset, the Russian officer corps was a considerably politicized, radicalized, and angry group. Many officers had become impoverished, embarrassed over their plight, confused about the country's future, and contemptuous of what they saw as venal and incompetent political authority. It is within this milieu that post-communist Russian civil-military relations began its development.

The Research Question and Methodology

Reduced to its essentials, the central research question of this study is this: how did Russian civil-military relations develop in the immediate post-communist era when radical economic reform was introduced and central questions concerning the nature of the political system and division of political power were in bitter dispute among Russian political elites? As noted by most observers, this period began with the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and more or less ended by December 1993 with the abandonment of radical reform and the election of the first

post-Soviet legislature.¹⁶

This study investigates this question by examining the relevance to Russia of existing paradigms of civil military relations which could help make sense of the seemingly chaotic and disjointed developments in Russian civil-military relations. As pointed out by one Russian scholar, events in her country only seem chaotic, dramatic, confused, patternless, and disjointed.¹⁷ This study, therefore, does not so much test a hypothesis, as it is a traditional research effort to comprehend, arrange, and interpret the large amount of data now available on post-communist Russian civil-military relations.

From a comprehensive survey, categorization, and content analysis of large numbers of Russian media stories, interviews, memoirs, events, and some survey research data, this work aims to explicate emerging trends and patterns in Russian civil-military relations up to the fall of 1994. Certainly events since then--the still-inconclusive and costly war in Chechnya, the December 1995 parliamentary and June 1996 presidential elections, for example--also play heavily in the development of civil-military relations in Russia. Nonetheless, some point needed to be selected to end this project and take stock of the results. It seems to this author that the war in Chechnya represents an important break in post-communist civil-military relations. Up to the fall

of 1994, the focus in developing Russian civil-military relations were questions of political control, civilian oversight, and adequate civilian support for military equities in a period of radical economic and political reform. After the initiation of war in Chechnya, while these questions were (and are) still important, the focus shifted from the influence of radical reform and political uncertainty to the influence of the war on civil-military relations.

A Note On Sources

Like previous studies on Soviet civil-military relations, this study of Russian civil-military relations depends heavily on a textual content analysis of episodic records such as books, diaries, and memoirs; official Soviet and Russian records where available; survey research data, where available; and Western and Russian mass media. Access to episodic records and the media is readily available through such sources as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the Joint Publications Research Service, LEXIS/NEXIS, and RFE/RL Research Reports. Some survey research data can be found in the above sources, secondary sources, and data bases such as the Index to International Public Opinion, Statistical Masterfile, and Soviet Statistics

Since 1950. As is often the case in dealing with the episodic record and the mass media, the most time-consuming task has been collecting the data. In this case, it took several years. Serendipitously, as a government Russian affairs analyst by profession, this author is generally aware of government research and analysis in this area and was able to garner further insights to help guide research and analysis. The author is also indebted to several colleagues who, through lively discussions, helped to shape his approach and thoughts on developments in post-communist Russian civil-military relations.

¹Quoted in Michael Howard, ed., Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), 11-12.

²For an excellent tour d'horizon of the parameters, assumptions, and implications of the contending visions of Russia's future, see Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, Russia 2010 and What It Means for the World (New York: Random House, 1993). For the current debate over Russia's political future among scholars, see Michael McFaul, "Why Russia's Politics Matter," Foreign Affairs 74 (January/February 1995): 87-99; Anders Aslund, "Russia's Success Story," Foreign Affairs 73 (September/October 1994): 58-71; Jacob W. Kipp, "The Zhirinovskiy Threat," Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994): 72-86; Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russian Reform Is Dead," Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April 1994): 21-26; Stephen Handelman, "The Russian 'Mafiya'," Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April 1994): 83-96; Jessica Eve Stern, "Moscow Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?," International Security 18 (Spring 1994): 40-65; Stephen Sestanovich, "Russia Turns the Corner," Foreign Affairs 73 (January/February 1994): 83-98; and Dimitri Simes, "The Return of Russian History," Foreign Affairs 73 (January/February 1994): 67-82.

³The role that the military played in this political crisis is discussed below in greater detail. At this point, I merely wish to remind the reader that the military was crucially involved.

⁴See for example, Benjamin Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1995): 93-95. Chapters Four and Five below provide a detailed examination of the impact of the military and senior officers on internal politics and a security policy issue.

⁵Ibid., 86-93.

⁶These points as well will be covered in greater detail in the study. I raise them here to give the reader a sense of some of the various interacting factors which play a role in Russian civil-military relations. For a short, comprehensive discussion of the military's day-to day influence on defense and security policies see Brian D. Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations After the October Uprising," Survival 36 (Spring 1994): 15-18.

⁷Prior to this period, Harold Lasswell's theory of the garrison state, developed in the 1930s, dominated the field of the study of civil-military relations. By the 1950s, Lasswell's theory was under serious attack by Samuel Huntington (of whom, more below) and others such as Morris Janowitz. The modern era in the field is generally considered to have begun with the works of those--especially Huntington--who raised the challenge to Lasswell. See Amos Perlmutter, The Military And Politics In Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) xiii-xiv.

⁸Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 11-14.

⁹There have been many studies of civil-military relations during the Gorbachev era. For a recent, concise review see Yang Zhong, "The Transformation of the Soviet Military and the August Coup," Armed Forces & Society 19 (Fall 1992): 51-58.

¹⁰Ibid., 65-67.

¹¹John W. R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup," World Politics 44 (July 1992): 567-568.

¹²Dmitriy Volkogonov, "News Conference By the Chairman Of the Commission To Set Up A Russian Defense Ministry and Armed Forces," Ostankino Television Network, 14 Apr 1992. FBIS-CE-92-078, 27-29.

¹³Ibid., 28-30.

¹⁴Sergei V. Ianin, "Factors of Social Tension in the Army Environment," Sociological Research 33 (September-October 1994): 23-49.

¹⁵Ibid., 41.

¹⁶See, for example, Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution or Continuity?," in Gail W. Lapidus, ed., The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 22-26.

¹⁷Ibid., 5.

CHAPTER ONE

RELEVANT LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Professionalism and Military Intervention In Politics

As noted in the Introduction, the three theoretical models which held sway in the field of Soviet civil-military relations were heavily influenced by Samuel P. Huntington's pathbreaking 1957 work The Soldier and the State.¹ Huntington rejected the dominant civil-military relations theory of the time--the "garrison state" hypothesis--identified with the work of Harold Lasswell, which posited the inexorable militarization of civil society as a consequence of the Cold War.² Based upon his study of the development of European and American militaries, Huntington advanced a theory of civil-military relations with the central premise that the modern military officer is a member of a professional group characterized by expertise, responsibility, and group identity/loyalty (corporateness). He also argued that military institutions--or simply, militaries--are shaped by both a functional imperative driven by security threats and a societal imperative arising from

social forces, ideologies, and other dominant institutions.³

As Huntington noted, the principal nexus of civil-military relations is the officer corps where conflicts between functional and societal imperatives come to a head: the officer corps leads the military, while the state leads society and allocates resources. The political and economic relations between the military and society normally reflect the nature of the relationship between the officer corps and state. Thus, in order to analyze civil-military relations, one must first define the nature of modern officers and officer corps.⁴

Military Professionalism and Politics

At this point Huntington lays out the fundamental thesis of his book, namely, that the modern officer corps is a professional body and the contemporary officer is a professional in the modern sense.⁵ All modern professions, noted Huntington, are a special type of vocation characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The goal of any modern profession is to provide expert service; responsibility means following a code of conduct which is accepted and demanded by society; corporateness means self-consciousness as distinct group.⁶

Like other professions, the modern officer corps possesses specific skills uniquely applied to conduct its functions; undertakes specific duties vis-a-vis its functions and follows a code of conduct in carrying out those duties; and has developed a corporate identity which molds individual officers into an autonomous social unit and gives rise to institutional interests.⁷

The military profession's expertise resides in the direction, operation, and control of an organization whose primary function is to apply violence (an attribute of combat or line officers, not technical specialists within the military). Its responsibility is to provide for the military security of society to the exclusion of all other ends, and to play the role of the state's expert adviser bound by a code of conduct. The modern military's corporateness is reflected in its existence as an autonomous social unit as well as a bureaucratic profession and bureaucratic organization.⁸ Several measurements exist to assure military professionalism: officer corps entry requirements, means of advancement, character of educational system, nature of staff system, and the general esprit and competence.⁹ For Huntington, the most effective, professional militaries are those loyal to the ideal of professional competence--that is, to the ideal of the "best soldier" or to the traditions and spirit of units.¹⁰

While the above attributes are inherent to modern military professionalism, they are not enough to assure the professionalism of a military. Factors external to the military, in particular, what others such as S. E. Finer have called the political culture (see pp. 24-26), also play a major role in the professionalization of the military. As put by Huntington:

Where there are competing authorities, or competing ideas as to what ought to be the authority, professionalism becomes difficult if not impossible to achieve. The conflict of constitutional ideologies and governmental loyalties divides the officer corps and superimposes political considerations and values upon military considerations and values. The nature of an officer's political loyalty becomes more important to the government than the level of his professional competence.¹¹

The professionalism of a military is thus severely handicapped if basic political questions remain unsettled and political structures are fluid or weak. Again, to let Huntington tell it in his own words:

Professionalism . . . requires the removal of party strife and political conflict one step away from the military forces themselves, and the channeling of political influence upon the military through some accepted formal institution of government. Some minimum degree of constitutional consensus is thus essential to military professionalism.¹²

The Military Mind

Huntington also posited that the military professional

is marked by a military ethic or mindset which he labeled "conservative realism." This mindset includes the following attributes:

- a belief that human nature is essentially evil; this **Hobbesian view** of mankind's nature leads to an emphasis on the magnitude and immediacy of security threats and the need to maintain ready, standing military forces to repel aggression;
- a belief that the individual needs to be subordinated to the group in order to accomplish the goal; this **communal view** of human relations manifests itself in the military's emphasis on hierarchy, tradition, esprit, and community values. Also, loyalty and obedience are considered the highest military virtues. A legal order from an authorized superior must be obeyed instantly with no argument, hesitation, or substitution of one's own views;
- a belief that history provides important lessons for the future; this **historical view** of events results in a heavy stress on the study of history for there is little opportunity to gain experience in the profession except in war;
- a belief that the state is the basic unit of political

organization; this elevation of the nation-state as the critical unit in international relations and concomitant high stakes in interstate war makes the military inherently conservative on foreign relations. Often, militaries oppose the extension of international commitments and involvement in war unless victory is certain.¹³

Ideology interacts with the military ethic in different ways. Liberalism, fascism, and Marxism are at fundamental odds with the principles of the military ethic noted above, while classic conservatism is basically similar to, and compatible with, the military ethic.¹⁴ Ultimately, the distribution of political power, and the level of military professionalism and civilian control vary with the compatibility of the military ethic and a society's ideology. From his study of Western militaries, Huntington concluded that militaries would sacrifice professionalism if, by doing so, the military's political power would be increased in a liberal, fascist, or Marxist system. Officers who become involved in politics in these systems are removing themselves from their profession: they become nonprofessional military men, and include such examples as Charles DeGaulle and Douglas MacArthur, according to Huntington.¹⁵ Thus, the price of political power for the military is related to the gap between the military ethic and the national ideology.¹⁶

The Military Ethic and Civilian Control

Huntington therefore believes that the "participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself."¹⁷ Only if officers abjure politics and remain motivated by the military ideal of maximizing professional competence will civilian control be assured.¹⁸ For civilian authorities, however, relying upon the officer corps' recognition of this critical point is too risky for ensuring civilian control. Huntington thus posited that civilian authorities choose to guarantee control either through "subjective" or "objective" control mechanisms.¹⁹

Subjective civilian control seeks to minimize military power toward civilian groups by maximizing the power of dominant civilian groups in relation to military. This is the only form of civilian control possible in a non-professional officer corps. Subjective control presupposes conflict between the civilian and military spheres as a general condition and is achieved through government institutions, social class restraints, or constitutional mechanisms.²⁰ In the subjective model, in short, civilian leaders control the military by creating and ensuring the operation of formal control mechanisms throughout the

military. In this way, civilian authorities maximize their power in relation to the military, and conversely minimize the power of the military in relation to themselves.

Subjective control thus denies the military an independent or autonomous sphere in society or politics within which its leaders could determine policies and actions.²¹ There exists a paradox in subjective control, according to Huntington: the more capable the military is in securing and ensuring a nation's security, the less civilian control is likely to be present.²²

Objective civilian control seeks to establish civilian control by maximizing military professionalism. Political power is distributed between military and civilian groups thereby leading to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior in the officer corps.²³ In the objective model, the civilian leadership seeks to control the military by ensuring its professionalization. The military is granted substantial autonomy in its primary function, preparing for the use of force against external enemies. In this model, the officer corps concentrates on its professionalism, and the more professional officers become, the more their behavior exhibits the modern military ethic. For its part, modern militaries prefer objective civilian control since it recognizes autonomous military professionalism. Officers accept the supremacy of civilian

authority, become "politically sterile and neutral," and follow the orders of whichever civilian group secures political legitimacy without the need for invasive control mechanisms.²⁴ Objective control thus reduces the military's political power but maximizes the likelihood of a nation's security.²⁵

Huntington saw these two models as essentially antithetical. Moreover, the subjective model assumes an inherent conflict between military professionalism and civilian control. In many states, a military autonomous in its own sphere and politically neutral is seen as dangerous because it owes no allegiance to the governing elite. Thus, the military is potentially an unreliable or disloyal armed force in any possible power struggle. Consequently, civilian authorities in these states try to limit military professionalization and seek to secure, above all else, military loyalty through propaganda and control mechanisms. Huntington posited that this could create the very situation that civilian authorities were seeking to avoid: a more politicized military more heavily involved in political processes.²⁶ According to Huntington, the subjective model of civil-military relations dominated communist systems.²⁷

Military Political Power and Influence

In an attempt to measure the political power of the military in any given society, Huntington posited that the military can have both formal and informal powers. The "formal" political power of the military, its legal authority and the scope of that authority, depends upon the military's place in the governing hierarchy and the unity of the military, according to Huntington. "Informal" military power depends upon unofficial relationships usually based on personality, wealth, friendship, and the like. All militaries dispose of some informal political power since such power is a manifestation of qualities that inhere to individuals or groups regardless of formal authority.²⁸

Political power is not political influence, however, and measuring political influence is hard to do. First, one needs to look at the particular relationships between the military and other societal and governmental groups. Second, influence can flow from the proportion of economic and human resources devoted to the military--generally, the higher the proportion, the more influence a military is likely to have. Third, influence can be determined by looking at the prestige and popularity of the officer corps. Fourth, influence can be measured by looking at whether military officers occupy non-military governmental positions or if civilians occupy

military positions of consequence.²⁹

Patterns of Civil-Military Relations

From these theories on professionalism, control mechanisms, and potential military political power, Huntington constructs five patterns of civil-military relations with the following characteristics:

- anti-military ideology, high military political power, and low military professionalism. This pattern is generally found in "primitive countries" or more advanced countries facing a sudden, severe threat;
- anti-military ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism. This pattern exists in totalitarian states;
- anti-military ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. This pattern is found in advanced countries with few outside threats;
- pro-military ideology, high military political power, and high military professionalism. A pattern found in countries with continuing outside threats and a dominant conservative ideology;

- pro-military ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. A pattern of civil-military relations found in countries with a low level of outside threat and a dominant conservative ideology.³⁰

Of these five patterns of civil-military relations, Huntington asserts that the most common in history has been the pattern of anti-military ideology, high military political power, and low professionalism. With regard to Western societies, Huntington found the anti/pro military ideology, low military political power, high military professionalism patterns to be prevalent. Communist nations were apt to exhibit the anti-military ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism pattern.³¹

The Man On Horseback--Or Is That A Mule?

S. E. Finer has contributed perhaps the best work on when, why, and under what conditions militaries intervene in politics. First published in 1962, his The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics sought to relate militaries and their associated political cultures to types and levels of military intervention.³² From his study of history, Finer observed that overt military rule in the form

of a military dictatorship is usually quite rare and, when present, short-lived. Rather, a military, if it decides to intervene in politics, more often prefers to influence the government behind the scenes in lieu of establishing an overt military dictatorship. This often takes the form of some kind of quasi-civilian facade for the government.³³

Before discussing the various modes of military intervention, Finer first points out that militaries in general have both potentially significant advantages and crippling weaknesses which play important roles in any decision to intervene in politics.³⁴ The "political advantages" are three: (1) organizational superiority over civilian organizations; (2) a highly emotional symbolic status; and (3) a monopoly of arms. At the same time, most militaries also have two crippling political weaknesses which, save in exceptional cases and for brief periods, preclude any military from ruling without civilian collaboration and openly in its own name: (1) a technical inability to administer any but the most primitive society; and (2) a lack of legitimacy, "the moral title to rule."³⁵

The interplay of these advantages and weaknesses is very dependent upon the political sophistication of a country, according to Finer. For example, the more primitive a society, the easier for a military to believe that it can

overcome its lack of governing and economic expertise (technical inability) and thus think that it could run society better than the incumbents. Moreover, the more primitive a country's political culture (measured in Western terms; see below), the easier it is for the military to overcome any questions of legitimacy. Conversely, the more economically and politically advanced a country, the more difficult it is for a military to sustain any claim to legitimacy if it were to intervene in politics. In the most mature political cultures this lack of legitimacy cripples military intervention. In countries with a maturing political culture, though, this recognized lack of legitimacy often causes military rulers who came to power through force to claim theirs is a "caretaker" or "transitional" government.³⁶ Thus, from Finer's perspective, the first critical factor in any military's calculus as to whether or not to intervene in politics is the complexity of the society and the level of the country's political culture.

The second critical factor is military professionalism. Generally speaking, Finer, like Huntington, concludes that professionalism can inhibit the desire to intervene, but unlike Huntington, Finer believes that high levels of professionalism do not preclude military intervention in politics.³⁷ Indeed, Finer observes that Huntington's definition of professionalism is the weakness in the latter's

theory: given Huntington's narrow definition of professionalism, he is correct in tying professionalism to reluctance to intervene militarily. But, wrote Finer, the generally accepted definition of professionalism, which stresses competence and expertise in the art of war, would include the interventionist pre-World War II German and (to an even greater extent) Japanese Armies. Huntington, in short, had defined out those examples which would weaken his theory.³⁸

Finer averred that there are three tendencies flowing out of professionalism which could push militaries to collide with civilian authority and possibly to intervene. In other words, professionalism could inhibit or induce military intervention in politics.³⁹ First, militaries, which consider themselves as professional, often see themselves as servants of the state or nation, not of particular civilian authorities.⁴⁰ A professional officer sees himself above partisan politics, a patriot protecting the nation from its enemies. It is not necessarily a long step from that attitude to military intervention. Indeed, one of the prime rationales for military intervention in politics is to save the nation from some perceived calamity brought on, or poorly handled, by civilian authority.

Second, both professional or non-professional

militaries are likely to intervene when their existence is threatened. Professional militaries try to avoid being forced to choose between existence or intervention by establishing and constantly reinforcing their bureaucratic autonomy.⁴¹

Third, professional militaries could intervene or disobey orders when they feel civilians are misusing them-- such as ordering them to conduct internal security, pacification, or repression operations. A professional military officer is likely to judge that his honor has been sullied when forced to carry out such orders.⁴²

These tendencies which might engender intervention by professional militaries are offset by a number of inhibitors. All militaries worry about the likelihood of success and the consequences of intervention. Potential interventionists fear that the military's fighting capacity will be undermined if it becomes involved in non-military tasks such as running an economy. They also fear for the future of the armed forces if intervention were to fail. In some cases, the likelihood of provoking a civil war could weigh heavily in the decision to intervene.⁴³ In short, Finer is claiming that the particular circumstances often play heavily in any decision to intervene--a rather trite observation, but one which must be made if one is advancing a general theory to

explain military intervention in politics.

That said, Finer posited that the "most important factor" inhibiting intervention by the professional officer, whatever the circumstances or cost/risk analysis, is the internalization of principle of supremacy of civilian power.⁴⁴ Servicemen who accept that major government policies or programs are decided by politically responsible civilian leaders--which has nothing to do with professionalism, but rather with political sophistication--are those unlikely to intervene in politics.⁴⁵ Professionalism, together with an acceptance of civilian supremacy, best inoculates a military from the virus of political interventionism, concluded Finer.

The Shot Fails--Sometimes

From his scrutiny of historical case studies of military interventions, Finer concluded that intervention is usually based upon some admixture of the following motives which overcomes any inhibitions that might be present.⁴⁶ First among these motives is "manifest destiny," that is, intervention to save the nation in the midst of a crisis. Usually, though, military officers must be sufficiently politicized before they would contemplate acting.⁴⁷ This motive is closely related to the second, "custodianship,"

that is, military intervention to protect the nation's interests from civilian decisions perceived to threaten them. This motive can lead to intervention with goals ranging from an attempt to arbitrate among political factions, the exercise of a military veto, or other direct goals up to the establishment of overt military rule.⁴⁸ Militaries also intervene to protect particularistic concerns such as regional, class, corporate, ethnic, confessional, or personal interests.⁴⁹ Indeed, wrote Finer, one of the most powerful and widespread motives for military intervention is corporate--to protect the military's autonomy. This motive often springs from professionalism and is also often masked as intervention to protect the nation.⁵⁰

According to Finer, events in 1950s through the 1960s show, both by case studies and statistical analysis, that military intervention is quite often motivated by corporate interests, especially "resource grievances" over pay, promotion, the military budget, and general military policy. All told, this motivation accounted for 1 out of 3 coups--the most extreme form of military intervention in politics. "Positional grievances"--the other major category of corporate interests which include concerns about internal autonomy, the integrity of hierarchical organization, the military's monopoly of force within the state, cohesion, honor, and political position--accounted for 1 out of 10

coups.⁵¹

Finer also concluded that motives alone do not an intervention make and that another critical element needs to be considered: the military's mood. Mood, always difficult to measure quantitatively, translated motives into action.⁵² Finer noted that any military has self-awareness and only two elements many times need be added to that quality to induce a mood to intervene: a sense of overwhelming power--nothing can prevent military at that moment from doing what it wants, and some kind of grievance--political, emotional, and so on.⁵³

The transmutation of mood to intervention also requires, of course, a capacity to intervene. Finer posited that the ability of a military to maintain secrecy, effect surprise, and neutralize fence-sitters are critical. Importantly, and somewhat counterintuitively, fissures within the military, especially generational, need not necessarily inhibit intervention. This is an important point for it still remains true that, with regard to coups, the "military" is essentially the officer corps.⁵⁴ That said, according to Finer, events in 1960s and 1970s showed that the more inchoate and divided the military establishment, the greater the number of coup attempts.⁵⁵

Finer observed that militaries nurturing the mood to intervene tended to act predictably within a narrow range:

(1) they become angry and humiliated; (2) they then project blame to politicians thus rationalizing this reaction; and, (3) they resolve the problem by taking it out on politicians.⁵⁶ Different armed forces have different "flash points" based on self-esteem--how strongly it is felt compared to civilian self-esteem; how the military considers itself vis a vis civilians--inferior, equal, superior?; and how humiliated, both for the organization and for the nation, the military feels.⁵⁷

Intervention also depends upon opportunity: the motive and mood might be present, but opportunity must also present itself because most militaries rationally calculate the risks and benefits before they move to intervene. The military's opportunity to intervene is maximized when civilian power is abnormally dependent upon military authorities and military popularity is enhanced while civilian authority is depressed.⁵⁸ For example, civilian dependence upon the military during a war or to achieve vital foreign policy goals provides opportunity. Civilian dependence on the military for domestic considerations--such as the need to use the military as a police force in an overt political or social crisis, in a (most common) latent crisis to stay in power, or in a power vacuum--obviously provides militaries with an excellent opportunity to intervene.⁵⁹ A popular military compared to civilian authority generally seen as

corrupt, incompetent, or as political intriguers also provides opportunity. Military intervention can have the approval from the population, especially if the military is regarded as a savior or deliverer.⁶⁰

From this discussion, Finer developed a matrix of intervention possibilities:

- neither disposition (motive, mood) nor opportunity;
- both disposition and opportunity;
- no disposition, but opportunity;
- disposition, but no opportunity.⁶¹

A Definition of Military Intervention

Having looked at reasons for, and inhibitions to, military intervention, we are still left with the question: what is military intervention? The term generally has a negative flavor about it and usually conjures up images of tanks in the street and military officers in dark sunglasses overthrowing an elected civilian government. This, of course, is but the most infamous type of military intervention in politics which can run the gamut from threats to act to various types of actions. For Finer, military

intervention in politics is "the armed forces' constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities."⁶²

Finer posited various levels of military intervention in politics. Finer's levels, or spectrum, include: (1) influence upon civil authorities; (2) pressures (blackmail); (3) displacement; and (4) supplantment.⁶³ **Influence** represents the minimal level of military intervention in politics, although the military's influence at any given point in time could be great. It is exercised through constitutional channels and, in societies based on interest group politics, often involves collusion and competition with civilian groups, including civilian authorities. Military pressure, or **blackmail**, goes beyond simple collusion or competition. Inherent in this level of intervention is a sense of compulsion based on the military's ability to bring raw power to bear. Thus, this level involves intimidation and threats of noncooperation laced with the specter of violence against civil authorities.

In the remaining two levels of intervention the military exercises political power directly or indirectly. The military **displaces** civilian authority by coercing that authority to act in the desired manner. For the military, displacement means to indirectly rule through threats,

including threatening to refuse to defend civil authority against violence and civil disorder. It also means that the military can and does replace elements of civilian authority, cabinet ministers, for example, at will. Civilians still rule, but only at the sufferance of the military. Finally, we come to **supplantment**, wherein the military removes civilian authority and rules in its stead. The act of supplantment can take two general forms, both based on violence: (1) the coup d'etat (golpe de estado), in which the military qua military seizes and eliminates the head of state and replaces the government; and, (2) the barracks coup (cuartelazo), in which elements of military seize power in the hope that the rest of the military will follow suit. In both forms, a failure of military unity coupled with strong resistance usually triggers a civil war.⁶⁴

According to Finer, the level to which a country's military pushes its intervention is strongly related to the level of that nation's political culture; generally speaking, the higher the culture, the lower the level of intervention.⁶⁵ In his work, Finer posited four levels of political culture: mature, developed, low, and minimal.⁶⁶

Mature political cultures have procedures for transferring power which are widely approved throughout society. Moreover, agreement over who or what constitutes

legitimate authority exists and cohesive private associations check and attenuate governmental power. No breach of the accepted procedures for the transfer of political power, that is, a move against legitimate authority, is acceptable. In mature political cultures, military intervention in politics is limited to attempts to exercise influence, which sometimes can edge into blackmail.⁶⁷

Developed political cultures are less sure about legitimate authority and accepted means of power transfer. Both are often in dispute throughout society and are still to be settled. Nonetheless, interest groups are well organized and are important public actors. Militaries in developed political cultures can go beyond the simple exercise of influence: they do not shy away from blackmail. On occasion, they resort to displacement, but, according to Finer, displacement is doomed to fail.⁶⁸

Low political cultures are mired in disputes over legitimacy and the transfer of political power. Interest groups are weak and public opinion does not necessarily reject military rule. Militaries in low political cultures intervene by exercising influence, undertaking blackmail, and displacing, often successfully, civilian authority. They are often successful because (1) existing institutions are discredited; (2) governmental gridlock exists; and, (3) the

military is seen, at least at first, as a savior.⁶⁹ Sometimes these militaries move beyond displacement and choose to supplant civilians.⁷⁰ In "high" low political cultures, the military finds itself in something of a paradox: resistance to a military move induces the military both to return power to civil authority and to take full powers. Similarly, in "low" low political cultures, the absence of resistance to a military move pushes the military to take full power even if it does not desire to do so.⁷¹

Countries with a **minimal political culture** are countries in which those who have power rule with little regard for the political sensitivities, if any, of society. In such countries, supplantment or violent displacement is the norm.⁷²

In summary, Finer advances the hypothesis that five factors separately and conjointly form the necessary conditions for military intervention:

- **Professionalization.** Unlike Huntington, Finer believes that professionalism cuts both ways and could impel military into politics;
- **Nationalism.** This sense of identity provides the military with a civic religion, an overriding set of values. It also provides an ideology or program,

assures the military's identification with, perhaps becoming the symbol of, the nation. In effect, nationalism separates the nation from a particular government, thus allowing the military to believe it can be loyal to the nation while being disloyal to the government;

- **Popular sovereignty.** Those who can claim popular support can claim to represent the will of the people;
- **Tradition of military intervention.** This tradition is especially strong when the military's roots are those of an insurrection army which fought victoriously against the old regime;
- **Deep fissures in society.** When society is rent by important divisions but a strong central government exists to control the consequences of those fissures, militaries could be induced to intervene if the government falters.⁷³

Of the five, Finer concludes that nationalism and popular sovereignty are the primary factors which create conditions for intervention while the other three are derivative from them.⁷⁴

Moderators, Guardians, or Rulers?

Eric A. Nordlinger entered the fray in late 1977 with his book Soldiers In Politics: Military Coups and Governments.⁷⁵ He sought first to categorize and define the phenomenon of extensive military involvement in politics and then, from that reference point, develop a general theory of military involvement in politics. Thus, Nordlinger began his work by conceptualizing "praetorianism." The concept, drawn from the role played by Imperial Rome's Praetorian Guards in Roman politics, describes that situation in which military officers play a major or predominant role in politics, as actors, because of their actual or threatened use of force.⁷⁶ Nordlinger admits that there has been little systematic study of praetorianism, thus limiting most descriptive or explanatory generalizations to the realm of hypothesis rather than well-tested valid propositions. Nonetheless, according to Nordlinger, generalizations about praetorians appear valid on their face. These generalizations include: (1) military officers become praetorians when they threaten or use force to enter or dominate the political arena, and (2) praetorians justify their coups by heavily underscoring the performance failures of civilian authorities while at the same time claiming that they will repair the country's politics and economics.⁷⁷

For Nordlinger, while praetorians share the

generalizations noted above, they also differ in important ways. First, praetorians differ in the extent of governmental power they exercise, that is, in their level of intervention. Second, praetorians differ in the ambitiousness of their objectives. On the basis of these differences, praetorians could thus be divided into three groups: moderators, guardians, and rulers.⁷⁸

- **Moderators** dispose of a veto power over the actions of civilian authorities. They do not control the government themselves, but pressure civilians to act as required under the threat of intervention--which they sometimes carry out. Often, the political and economic objectives of moderators are simply to preserve the status quo.⁷⁹
- **Guardians** take over the government, usually for a period of 2-3 years. These praetorians are reluctant interventionists: they see no choice but to act as the nation's saviors, to correct what they perceive to be dangerous errors or trends caused by misgovernment, or to remove incompetent or venal politicians. Guardians want to return to some status quo ante.⁸⁰
- The last category of praetorians, **rulers**, do just that, very often indefinitely. They have very ambitious political, economic, and social objectives which

together represent an attempt to reconstruct or rebuild the country. To do this, rulers seek to dominate all spheres of society and tend to destroy other power centers. Contrary to general assumptions about praetorians, rulers are but a small percentage of praetorians, about 10% according to Nordlinger.⁸¹

The Road To Praetorianism

Nordlinger believes that four sociological characteristics bear strongly on the propensity of military officers to turn into praetorians. **Communalism** can induce or inhibit praetorianism. The existence of communal differences and in what proportions are important considerations: while the military tends to instill the unifying forces of cohesion and nationalism among its members, it is not always the case that these unifying forces can overcome fissures caused by communalism.⁸²

The **bureaucratic nature** of militaries influences praetorianism. Militaries are highly organized, hierarchical organizations with standard operating procedures. Obedience to authority is a powerful motivational force. Officers have a high estimate of their self image: they often feel superior to, and more competent than, others in society. They exhibit

a "can do" attitude and often hold that all problems are solvable. The elan and organizational strength of militaries, thus, often places them among the most powerful actors in any society.⁸³

Professionalism is a critical characteristic for determining a military's propensity for praetorianism. Officers put an extremely high value upon internal autonomy, expertise, and exclusiveness. A perception that civilian authority is threatening its autonomy or exclusiveness, by creating other armed groups, for example, generates powerful interventionist motives within militaries. Such a threat is seen as hurting career interests and morale, diminishing competence, perverting the chain of command, weakening internal unity, or even imperiling the very existence of the military.⁸⁴ Like Finer, Nordlinger questions Huntington's thesis that the more professional a military, the less interventionist it is likely to be. According to Nordlinger, his study of military interventions led him to conclude that, while professionalism can induce or inhibit intervention, it more often induces: professionalism breeds a high self image which, in turn, is more likely to propel a military to intervene.⁸⁵

Finally, the **political attitudes** of officers have a pronounced impact on the propensity to praetorianism.

Generally, military officers place an inordinately high value on political order. They tend to dislike raucous or highly competitive politics even in stable societies. Such politics and their practitioners are seen as purposely or inadvertently fostering divisiveness and disorder and are thus dangerous to the nation. Militaries also usually exhibit a distaste for bargaining and compromise. Officers often believe that they clearly see the national or public interest and so can others; that these others engage in bargaining or compromise shows that they lack principles or are weak. This approach to politics springs from the military propensity for hierarchy and order and militaries' fear that they could get sucked into interventions to put down internal unrest, a mission generally seen as demeaning.⁸⁶ Nordlinger also cautions that, while most military officers tend to be middle-class within their societies and tend to act on middle-class interests, those interests do not necessarily inhibit praetorianism. Middle-class interests can be a force for change or for the status quo. When those interests, political or economic, are thought to be threatened, officers can act--and, depending upon the society, they can act as praetorians.⁸⁷

So Why Act As Praetorians?

Nordlinger posited that three interacting conditions translate the propensity to act as praetorians into praetorian behavior. First, praetorian attitudes can lead to praetorian behavior when the above characteristics act mutually to reinforce each other. Second, the extent of military socialization, that is, the internalization of military attitudes, plays a role in translating propensity to actual behavior. Third, conformist pressures within the military can induce waverers to go along with those who would act, given the military's premium on hierarchy and cohesion. Working together, these conditions greatly increase the odds that propensity will transmute into action.⁸⁸

But the question still remains: why intervene? Nordlinger turned to the work of William R. Thompson to answer this critical question. In his The Grievances of Military Coup Makers, Thompson surveyed 229 coup attempts in 59 countries from 1946-1970.⁸⁹ From this work, Nordlinger posited that a military will act as a praetorian first and foremost when its corporate interests are perceived to be at stake.⁹⁰ These interests include an adequate budget, internal autonomy, exclusiveness, and existence. Often, individual interests--pay, promotion, career concerns--closely correlate with corporate interests. Of these corporate and individual

interests, the history of coups suggests that the failure to maintain an adequate budget, in the eyes of the officer corps, is the chief motive for military intervention. Close behind this motivation, however, are the other interests: civilian intervention in the military's autonomy almost invariably leads to military intervention, as does the creation of other organizations empowered to use force. To be sure, praetorians believe that they are acting to protect the national interest. But, wrote Nordlinger, they usually end up equating their interests with the national interest.

Corporatism Is The Key

In 1977, Amos Perlmutter set forth perhaps the most ambitious model of civil-military relations up to that time. His model was best described by Samuel Huntington as "a comprehensive general framework for the analysis of modern civil-military relations."⁹¹ Based upon his study of the development of professional Western militaries and post-World War II civil-military relations in Africa and Latin America, Perlmutter developed and advanced the "fusionist theory" which intertwined the professional military officer and the modern bureaucratic civilian policymaker into one actor. For Perlmutter, this meant rejecting the "deterministic dichotomy between 'civil' and 'military'."⁹² Perlmutter's framework was

based on two assumptions. First, he asserted that the modern professional military is a new social type, and second, that the political participation of the military involves combinations or modifications of the three "orientations" of corporate professionalism found among military officers: the professional soldier, the praetorian soldier, and the professional revolutionary soldier.⁹³

As with Huntington before him, Perlmutter develops his theory of military professionalism and corporatism upon which he later bases his overarching thesis. Like other professions, wrote Perlmutter, military professionalism results from a mix between control mechanisms which govern and preserve values, conduct, and standards and apposite skills which mark the military profession.⁹⁴ Importantly, Perlmutter contends that modern military officers must develop managerial and bureaucratic skills. Thus Perlmutter could argue that:

The modern soldier is corporate (in terms of exclusivity), bureaucratic (in terms of hierarchy), and professional (in terms of sense of mission).⁹⁵

Moreover, contrary to the "classic" theory of military professionalism which removes politics from its definition of professionalism, the fusionist theory does not. The modern officer finds himself ineluctably drawn into politics as the military seeks to protect its professional autonomy in a

bureaucratic milieu. Consequently, the military is a politicized organization--it must be in order to survive in a modern nation-state. The central civil-military relations questions, according to Perlmutter, are not if and why militaries actually intervene in politics, but how and to what degree:

As a bureaucratic profession, the military is in politics to the degree that it is a key partner of civilian politicians and bureaucrats . . . ⁹⁶

This fusion of the bureaucrat and professional in military officers, what Perlmutter labeled "corporate professionalism," involves the military in a "symbiotic" relationship with the state. The military and civilian authorities thus become interdependent and less distinct, according to Perlmutter. Cleavages and political alliances cut across military and civilian lines as bureaucratic politics plays itself out over various issues. It is thus corporate professionalism which best expresses the civil-military relationship, and it is the nature and role of corporate professionalism which is "the most significant explanation for military interventionism and for political strains existing between the civilian and the military." For Perlmutter, topics such as military discipline, honor, cohesion, hierarchy, size, structure, and budget are peripheral to any explanation of the military as a political actor.⁹⁷

Corporate Professionalism and Military Orientations

As noted above, Perlmutter's fusionist theory distinguishes among three military orientations: the professional soldier, the praetorian soldier, and the revolutionary soldier. Perlmutter's professional soldier very much resembles Huntington's professional officer on the surface. He accepts Huntington's view that the officer corps' of modern nation-states are professional corporate groups. Unlike Huntington, Perlmutter argues that this corporate professionalism is both a source of non-intervention and intervention in politics.⁹⁸ In short, military corporatism, this unavoidable merging of military professionalism with bureaucratism, fatally undercuts Huntington's thesis that the more professional a military, the less likely it is to intervene in politics.

Perlmutter considers corporate spirit (group solidarity), secularity, skill, social mobility, ideology (the military mind), and clientship to be important attributes of military professionalism.⁹⁹ The last two attributes crucially shape the corporate nature of any given military, and it is these two attributes upon which the development of a country's civil-military relationship will depend. Perlmutter argues that highly professional

militaries, such as those of pre-World War II Germany, France, Japan, and the USSR, were no less professional because of their particular relationship with civilian authority, a relationship heavily influenced by the military mind and clientship.¹⁰⁰

Of the two crucial attributes, clientship is the more crucial, but its nature depends upon the military mind. The military mind informs officers' acceptance of legitimacy, acceptance of a patron, and their perception of power and stability in a political system. These views correspondingly determine the clientship orientation of any particular military. Clientship expresses the idea that the overriding responsibility of the military officer cum bureaucrat is not to the nation or any specific ideology, but to the regime in power. As put by Perlmutter, "(l)ike the rest of the bureaucracy, the military's corporate identity depends upon its loyalty to the group in power."¹⁰¹ The military's clientship orientation, not its level of professionalism, determines its political behavior, while its corporate integrity, its existence and level of autonomy, determines the loyalty of the officer corps to the principle of clientship. Thus, Permuter concluded that the degree of the military's commitment to corporatism, not professionalism, determines the level of military political intervention.¹⁰²

Praetorians At the Gates

"Modern praetorianism," wrote Perlmutter, "is the praetorianism of the professional soldier."¹⁰³ The modern praetorian officer usually arises from political systems that are still developing, a society that is in the throes of modernization, and a civil-military relationship in which civilian authorities have tended to try to control the military by formal control mechanisms and by minimizing the military's power in relation to civilian authority (Huntington's subjective model). States vulnerable to praetorianism are those which lack social cohesion, have weak state structures, a weak or absent middle class, or which fail to mobilize material resources to adequately support modernization. Within this milieu, military officers contemplate political intervention when civilian authorities lack legitimacy or strong support within society and when civilian regimes are considered ineffective, especially in the wake of failed social, political, or modernizing revolutions. Military intervention in such regimes can also follow from a challenge by civilian authorities upon the military's corporate identity. The military, in short, challenges the legitimacy of incumbent political authorities and seeks to establish a new political authority.¹⁰⁴

Perlmutter argues that officers become praetorians in such environments precisely because the modern military officer is a fusion of the bureaucrat and the professional (in terms of skills) military officer. In any society which exhibits the attributes noted above and in which officers are politicized because of those attributes, a praetorian army may develop. Whether it--or elements of it--acts, averred Perlmutter, depends upon many other conditions, the most important of which are the military's cohesiveness and power relative to other groups, the presence of activists within the military, and various proximate causes which trigger the decision to intervene.¹⁰⁵

Like Finer, Perlmutter distinguishes among military interventionists by types and characteristics. When the praetorian army intervenes it is generally of two types: (1) a "ruler" army (Finer's "direct military rule") which seeks to supplant civilian rule, maximize military rule, and reconstruct society, and (2) an "arbitrator" army (Finer's "indirect military rule") which intervenes to rectify a perceived problem, but which generally accepts the existing social order and intends eventually to return to the barracks.¹⁰⁶ Perlmutter also distinguishes modern military praetorian rulers by subtypes: autocratic, oligarchic, and authoritarian. Reduced to their essentials, military autocracy is military rule by one man, military oligarchy--

military rule by several, while authoritarian praetorianism is "military-civilian fusionist rule."¹⁰⁷ While all three depend upon the military for their supremacy in the political arena, their external forms can differ. Authoritarian military rule can tolerate some democratic practices such as elections, parties, and pressure groups. Some power sharing might also be present in such a system. Nonetheless, in all cases, ultimate power remains with the military.¹⁰⁸

The Revolutionary Professional

The last major military orientation advanced by Perlmutter is the professional revolutionary. Unlike the classic professional or professional praetorian, the professional revolutionary military is a politicized entity from the start. It exists to overthrow political power, not by military coup, but through conflict waged on behalf of a revolutionary group openly seeking power. Its corporateness differs from that of the other orientations as well, inasmuch as such militaries perceive themselves to be more as integral elements of the revolutionary group rather than members of an exclusive elite. In this sense, professional revolutionary militaries can be ranged along a spectrum of corporateness, from anti-corporate to non-corporate. Moreover, the professional revolutionary military, while prizing

professional military skills and hierarchical military relationships, is often radical in its organization and structures.¹⁰⁹

Perlmutter divides professional revolutionary militaries into four types: romantic, Marxist national liberation, Maoist, and Zionist.¹¹⁰ For the purposes of this study, only the first of these types, romantic, has relevance and need be explained.¹¹¹ Romantic professional militaries, the most prominent examples being the various inter-war German military and paramilitary groups such as the Freikorps (Free Corps) and the SA (Storm Troops), are ideologically dedicated to political violence and terror against centrist and leftist political entities and actors. They seek to overthrow established political order and install a fascist, anti-modern regime. They are skilled in the art of war and often many members of romantic professional revolutionary militaries are former junior officers and servicemen of the established military. In their early stages professional revolutionaries are often nihilistic and anarchic but, if the revolution is successful, they can transform into a critical, loyal pillar of the revolutionary regime--as did, for example, the Nazi Party's SS. They do not become classic professionals, however; given their roots in terror and violence and their fanatical devotion to a revolutionary ideology and its leader or leaders, romantic revolutionaries

never integrate into military structures (as the SS, for example, never became part of the Wehrmacht despite its considerable military capabilities), becoming, in essence, the personal army of the ruler or the ruling regime. Thus, they retain their anti-corporate, revolutionary ethos even as they seemingly emulate the classic professional.¹¹²

Military Intervention Depends Upon Civil (Dis)Order

Perlmutter concluded his work by noting that,

military professionalism in itself is neither a hindrance nor an asset to stable civil-military relations and to the stability of the political order. Both of those depend primarily on the internal strength of the civil order.¹¹³

Thus, the author in the end rejects the argument that professionalism is a sure inhibitor to military intervention in politics. In fact, he rejects any direct monocausal relationship between the two. For Perlmutter, one needs to add the heretofore analytically missing attribute of the professional officer, namely, his sense of corporatism, to the mix in order to explain military intervention or nonintervention. Moreover, Perlmutter would add, like Finer, the political and social "maturity" of a nation as another variable. All in all, a more complicated basic paradigm of military intervention in politics is the result:

professionalism, corporatism, and political/social culture are the independent variables which, as they interact, determine the role played by the military in the politics of a nation. Among the independent variables, it is clear that Perlmutter considers corporatism as the one which has the greatest influence on military attitudes toward political authority. Nonetheless, the extent to which a military involves itself in politics is more dependent upon a country's political/social structure. To move into the discussion of the Soviet/Russian military, Perlmutter noted 20 years ago that

civilian order must depend upon its own institutional integrity. . . . Even though five decades of Leninism-Stalinism had produced corporate docility into the Red Army, its newly won independence [from the Stalinist yoke] was not a permanent guarantee of noninterventionism.¹¹⁴

¹Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

²Ibid., 345-354.

³Ibid., 2.

⁴Ibid., 3.

⁵Ibid., 7.

⁶Ibid., 8-10, 20.

⁷Ibid., 7-18.

⁸Ibid., 11-18. Enlisted personnel, noted Huntington, are specialists, not professionals. They apply violence, not manage it as does an officer. They, in short, are tradesmen.

⁹Ibid., 20.

¹⁰Ibid., 74.

¹¹Ibid., 35.

¹²Ibid., 36.

¹³Ibid., 62-70, 73.

¹⁴Ibid., 93-94.

¹⁵Ibid., 95-96.

¹⁶Ibid., 94-95.

¹⁷Ibid., 71.

¹⁸Ibid., 74.

¹⁹Ibid., 80-85.

²⁰Ibid., 80-83.

²¹Ibid., 84.

²²Ibid., 84-85.

²³Ibid., 83-84.

²⁴Ibid., 83-84.

²⁵Ibid., 84-85.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., 85-88.

²⁹Ibid., 88-89.

³⁰Ibid., 96-97.

³¹Ibid.

³²S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. 2nd ed., rev. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 1st ed.: 1962.

³³Ibid., 4.

³⁴Ibid., 5-12.

³⁵Ibid., 12.

³⁶Ibid., 12-19.

³⁷Ibid., 20, 26.

³⁸Ibid., 21.

³⁹Ibid., 28.

⁴⁰Ibid., 22-23.

⁴¹Ibid., 23.

⁴²Ibid., 23-24.

⁴³Ibid., 26-27.

⁴⁴Ibid., 28.

⁴⁵Ibid., 24, 26.

⁴⁶Ibid., 52.

⁴⁷Ibid., 28-30.

- ⁴⁸Ibid., 31.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., 34, 231.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., 34, 41.
- ⁵¹Ibid., 240.
- ⁵²Ibid., 53.
- ⁵³Ibid., 54.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., 227.
- ⁵⁵Ibid., 229.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., 55.
- ⁵⁷Ibid.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., 63.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., 64-65, 69.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., 71-73.
- ⁶¹Ibid., 74-76.
- ⁶²Ibid., 20.
- ⁶³Ibid., 77-78. See also, chart, 127.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., 140-142.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., 78.
- ⁶⁶Ibid., 79-80.
- ⁶⁷Ibid., 78.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., 80, 103.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., 103-104.
- ⁷⁰Ibid., 99, 103.
- ⁷¹Ibid., 106-107.
- ⁷²Ibid., 118.

⁷³Ibid., 188-191.

⁷⁴Ibid., 200.

⁷⁵Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers In Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

⁷⁶Ibid., 2.

⁷⁷Ibid., 3-5.

⁷⁸Ibid., Table 1, 22.

⁷⁹Ibid., 22-24.

⁸⁰Ibid., 24-26.

⁸¹Ibid., 26-27.

⁸²Ibid., 39, 42.

⁸³Ibid., 43-47.

⁸⁴Ibid., 47-49.

⁸⁵Ibid., 49-53.

⁸⁶Ibid., 53-59.

⁸⁷Ibid., 36.

⁸⁸Ibid., 60-61.

⁸⁹William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup Makers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1973) cited in Ibid., 78.

⁹⁰Ibid., 66-75.

⁹¹Samuel P. Huntington in Perlmutter, The Military And Politics In Modern Times, x.

⁹²Perlmutter, xiv.

⁹³Ibid., xv, 17. Perlmutter, like other scholars of civil-military relations, defines the military as the officer corps. He also notes that civil-military relations is generally the province of mostly senior officers (colonel and above), corporately oriented officers of any rank, professional officers of any rank, and officers whose status, rank, position, orientation link them to politics and policy.

⁹⁴Ibid., 2.

⁹⁵Ibid., 3.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid., 4-6.

⁹⁸Ibid., 25-26.

⁹⁹Ibid., 35-41.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 42-84.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 38.

¹⁰²Ibid., 84-85.

¹⁰³Ibid., 93.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 93-98.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 100-102.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 102-114.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 94-95.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 205-211.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 211.

¹¹¹The Red Army of Lenin and Trotsky was romantic, not Marxist national liberation, by Perlmutter's typology. After the Russian Civil War of 1917-1921, the Red Army was, over the years transformed into a professional military. See Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces Of The USSR, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), esp. pp.7-21.

¹¹²Ibid., 211-215.

¹¹³Ibid., 281.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 285-286.

CHAPTER TWO

RUSSIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD

The Army is a copy of society and suffers from all its ills, usually at a higher temperature.

Leon Trotsky¹

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars of Soviet affairs tended, quite understandably, to approach the topic of Soviet civil-military relations in terms of Communist Party-military relations. Investigation and analysis, sparked in the 1960s by the blossoming of academic interest in civil-military relations as a distinct topic in political science worthy of scholarly research, were directed toward the particular and peculiar circumstances of Soviet civil-military relations or its larger category, civil-military relations in communist societies. The overarching approach toward the study of Soviet civil-military relations very much paralleled that taken by scholars of civil-military relations in advanced Western states: the role and influence of the military in policy formulation and execution and the likely trends in this sphere. Questions of military intervention in domestic politics, as opposed to policies,

were, for the most part, left for those studying Third World regimes.

Within these self-imposed thematic constraints, from the mid-1960s on a lively debate centered around the nature of civil-military conflict in the Soviet era, and, ultimately, three major paradigms of Communist civil-military relations were formulated. At the heart of the debate over the paradigms were conflicting views of the influence the military exerted on the formulation and execution of national security and military policies. To be sure, central to one's view of military influence was one's view of the relationship between the Party and the military and, consequently, the intellectual battleground on this aspect of the topic saw fierce fighting.

As Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost began to erode the pillars of the Soviet regime, scholars of Soviet civil-military relations retuned their focus toward that found more often in studies of Third World civil-military relations, namely, the conditions and likelihood of military intervention in domestic politics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, a few, very few, scholars had the temerity to risk their professional reputation and venture into the unknown realm of Russian civil-military relations even as events in that field moved at warp speed before things appeared to settle down,

more or less, by the summer of 1992. It is, therefore, important that we review the literature on Soviet civil-military relations, briefly survey the state of civil-military relations as the Soviet Union collapsed, and highlight important aspects of Russian civil-military relations following the August 1991 coup so as to place in context the detailed explication of the critical events in civil-military relations between April 1993 and October 1994 which follows this chapter.

Party-Military Relations: Conflictual Or Consensual?

Roman Kolkowicz re-energized the debate about Soviet civil-military relations in the mid to late 1960s with his theory, which fused earlier arguments into a coherent whole, of a conflictual relationship between the Party and the military. Later described as the "interest group" approach or the "institutional conflict" model, Kolkowicz advanced the thesis that the Soviet military was an institution with interests, values, and objectives that had much in common with other military establishments. Unlike most other modern militaries, however, it faced constant intrusion and manipulation by the ruling elite, that is, the Communist Party, who profoundly distrusted the "experts in violence."² Kolkowicz contended that this relationship was inherently

conflict-prone and a perennial threat to the country's political stability because the Party had to balance its requirement for total control to quash would-be challengers to its political hegemony with the need for an autonomous military to assure a military instrument able to defend and advance external interests .³ In short, the military represented a potential threat to the Party's political hegemony since it was a disciplined, hierarchical, well-armed entity with its own corporate, or as Kolkowicz called them, particularist interests. Reducing that threat meant weakening the military's ability to act autonomously through the sorts of measures which Huntington had called subjective control mechanisms and which Kolkowicz categorized as positive measures: impressive monetary privileges and allowances which place officers among the socioeconomic elite; prophylactic measures: indoctrination, manipulation, and the deliberate creation of unease and distrust within the ranks; and negative measures: intimidation, coercion, informers, and purges.⁴ The dilemma for the Party was that these measures, which weakened the military's ability to challenge the Party's political hegemony, also weakened the military's ability to be an effective, modern military machine.⁵

For Kolkowicz, this dilemma could be traced back to the early 1920s. Since then, Party-military relations had been

marked by "instability, tension, and conflict" despite, and because of, the Party's use of subjective control measures.⁶ Kolkowicz also asserted that this relationship had cyclical tendencies, that Party-military relations had been marked by a recurrent cycle of crises. Each cycle had a period of tranquility in Party-military relations which gave way, through rising tensions brought about by the military's efforts to assert internal autonomy or to challenge the Party's stance over various issues, to bureaucratic conflict. Eventually, this tension would be transformed into an open crisis, which ultimately would be resolved in the Party's favor, and finally would end with the introduction of a new period of tranquility.⁷ Moreover, according to Kolkowicz, this cyclical pattern was also notable in that the military was able to challenge the Party, and did so, when the Party hierarchy was weak due to internal divisions, power struggles, or under great strain from outside forces, such as occurred during World War II.⁸

Kolkowicz identified seven such cycles at the time he wrote his book in 1966: 1917-25, 1925-37, 1937-41, 1941-45, 1945-53, 1953-58, and 1958-64. The most interesting cycles were the last two, in which the military moved, as never before, to establish greater internal autonomy and a greater voice in policymaking after Stalin's death. In doing so, it intervened in Party politics to affect the outcome of a

leadership struggle. According to Kolkowicz, after the tyrant's death the military supported efforts to destroy his hated henchman and secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria, and then threw its support to Nikita Khrushchev against Georgiy Malenkov in their struggle for dominance within the Party leadership. The "military played some major role" in these events and was rewarded with promotions, rehabilitations of officers disgraced under Stalin, and the return of war hero Marshal Georgiy Zhukov to prominence, first as a First Deputy Defense Minister and later as Minister of Defense when Malenkov was finally ousted as Premier in early 1955.⁹

Marshal Zhukov, as the new Defense Minister, strongly pressed to limit party interference in the military's autonomy and to include a prominent military voice in decisionmaking. According to Kolkowicz, Zhukov's main goal was "to remove, or at least reduce, the political control structure and to erase political dogma from military thought."¹⁰ The marshal was initially successful in challenging and reducing the Party's military control mechanisms because the Party remained internally divided even after Malenkov's ouster.¹¹ But, by late 1957, after Zhukov and the military helped Khrushchev finally consolidate his power and defeat the so-called Anti-Party Group, Khrushchev and the now united Party moved against Zhukov and reinstated the Party's military control mechanisms to

regain the greater control it had exercised over the military in the past.¹²

On 26 October 1957 it was announced that Zhukov had been dismissed as Defense Minister and, for the next two years, the Party concentrated on reasserting its control over the military. Zhukov was vilified for having pursued what the leading Party ideologue labeled "a dangerous anti-Party line and . . . Bonapartist policy."¹³ Once the Party regained the measure of control it deemed necessary, Khrushchev announced, in January 1960, radical changes in the military's structure, military policies, and military strategy. His moves shocked many in the military, especially his call for massive personnel cuts, and led to the growth in military opposition to Khrushchev and his Party and military allies, first in middle and lower officer ranks, and then in the military hierarchy. In effect, another cycle began which culminated in the military's abandonment of Khrushchev in late 1964 when Leonid Brezhnev and his cronies successfully moved to oust the General Secretary.¹⁴

Kolkowicz further developed his paradigm by 1978.¹⁵ He reiterated his main thesis that the military had corporate interests which basically conflicted with those of the Party. At the same time, noted Kolkowicz, the military was not a monolithic interest group: the officer corps had deep splits on military policies, both horizontally (across services),

and vertically (through the ranks in the form of a generation gap). Also, various other cross-cutting "subgroups" existed: political, doctrinal, and specialty.¹⁶ When corporate interests were threatened, however, the military would close ranks against the interloper.¹⁷ He returned to the Zhukov case and commented that, because of Zhukov, the morale and stature of military professionals had been "permanently strengthened."¹⁸ Since that time, the military's position vis-a-vis the Party had become stronger: it was indispensable for the Party's international goals, officers were critical technicians in the military structure who could not be easily replaced, and the Party had become more tolerant of most professional groups.¹⁹ Accordingly, although civil-military relations in the late Brezhnev period were still, at their base, conflictual, Kolkowicz saw a long term internal entente between the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet Armed Forces. As long as the military accepted Party dominance and so long as the Party satisfied military interests, the system would remain essentially stable.²⁰

Kolkowicz's depiction of the military leadership in conflict with its civilian superiors and willing to press their case, whatever it may be, in times of internal weakness in civilian authority suggests that the military was more often involved in politics than was generally accepted. Moreover, the paradigm also suggests that the military was

not totally averse to delving into questions of leadership selection and, as with its role in the 1953-64 period, may not have been adverse to intervening in politics under certain, rather unstartling conditions, i.e., when it could advance its interests. Such a military contrasts sharply with the image of a submissive, apolitical military which played little or no role in internal politics, relegating itself to issues of policy formulation and execution. Put simply, Kolkowicz's Soviet Army was highly political, if circumscribed by Party controls, and, as will be discussed below, continued its conflict with the Party to the very end. Was this indeed the most accurate paradigm of Soviet civil-military relations?

The Party And The Army Are One

Not according to other scholars of Soviet civil-military relations. In response to Kolkowicz and those who essentially agreed with his paradigm (which included noted Sovietologists such as Thomas Wolfe, Raymond Garthoff, and Merle Fainsod), William Odom contended, as early as 1973, that the basic assumption driving Kolkowicz's interest group conflict paradigm, that military professionalism is antithetical to the Party's political control, was debatable.²¹ Moreover, values which underlay the professional

Soviet military were mostly congruent with those values which undergirded the Party, according to Odom. Consequently, both the military and Party elites had "an equal stake in the Soviet state and the present political order."²² Although differences undoubtedly occurred between the military and Party on specific issues, a broad, pragmatic consensus--not conflict--existed between them. For Odom, there was neither an incompatibility based on institutional ethos nor a disagreement over fundamental issues.²³ This model came to be called the "institutional congruence" approach.

In rebutting Kolkowicz's assertion that military professionalism and Party control were antithetical, Odom took issue with the definition of professionalism used by Kolkowicz, and thus, by extension, the definition developed by Huntington. An operational definition of military professionalism in the modern era, averred Odom, was probably not possible: a military's professionalism was determined more by the characteristics of the polity in which it existed.²⁴ Thus to say that the Soviet military's professionalism was in conflict with Party control structures would be a non sequitur because the Soviet military's professionalism was determined by the nature of the Soviet state. Indeed, the Party's control over the military bureaucracy (as opposed to the military profession) through, inter alia, political officers actually could have improved

the military's professional goal of greater efficiency, given the nature of the political system and the nature of the military bureaucracy in which conflict was largely intra-institutional.²⁵

Odom's paradigm thus included the following assumptions. First, the military was an executive arm of the Party and therefore not a separate, competing interest group. Differences over military policies were intra-Party differences.²⁶ Second, the Soviet military was a political bureaucracy, not some "mythical" apolitical professional military elite. As such, it acted within the system more along the lines of the classic bureaucratic politics model than those of the interest group politics model.²⁷ That is, factions or cliques within the military bureaucracy, primarily grouped between the lower and higher levels of the bureaucracy, struggled for dominance within the norms set by the bureaucracy. Corporatism was thus based more on Party than military interests. Third, given the above two assumptions, the military hierarchy was the executive agent of policy, not the framer.²⁸ Neither the Soviet nor Imperial Russian military had a disposition to usurp political power; both were part and parcel of the system to which they belonged. As Odom perspicaciously noted in 1978, some 13 years before the August 1991 anti-Gorbachev coup:

(M)ilitary participation in a political crisis,
even to the point of ordering troops out into the

streets of Moscow, could conceivably take place without the military itself being a serious contender for power. Were it to occur, it would probably be part of an intra-Party struggle in which military cliques would chose sides.²⁹

Neither Conflictual Nor Consensual, But Participatory

There appears to be a fascinating cycle operating (at least) in the fields of political science and history since the end of World War II. A dominant paradigm holds sway in some area of study within the field for 10, even 20 years. To be sure, the dominant paradigm gets modified and evolves, but its basic premises remain gospel to the cognoscenti. And then a serious "revisionist" argument is brought forth to challenge accepted assumptions. The area of study is thrown into chaos as defenders of the dominant paradigm counterattack and seek to coopt the revisionists by accepting some of their arguments. The revisionists, however, want to overthrow the dominant paradigm so many of them reject mere modification. Out of this, one might say Hegelian/Marxist dialectical, struggle, a new paradigm emerges which offers a synthesis of the conventional and revisionist arguments. Just such a phenomenon occurred in the area of Soviet civil-military relations, albeit in a shorter time frame, when Timothy Colton gave voice to the so-called "participatory model" of Soviet civil-military relations in the mid to late 1970s.

Colton first argued, in general terms and in response to Kolkowicz and Odom, that the Party's main mechanism to control the military, the political officers of the Main Political Administration, had over time become military administrators and often had views similar to regular military officers.³⁰ Moreover, political officers, just like military officers, were split along various lines depending on the issue. Thus some would ally with one group of military officials, while others would ally with another.³¹ Accordingly, contra Kolkowicz:

On most questions of military politics . . . sharp lines are not drawn between an army seeking autonomy and a Party seeking hegemony and control, or between the military command on the one hand and the political apparatus on the other.³²

For Colton, Soviet civil-military relations were therefore marked not by institutional conflict but by "structural interpenetration, broadly compatible goals, and the operation of informal cross-institutional linkages."³³ At the same time, he averred that Odom's paradigm of consensus, whose conclusions he found congenial, appeared to have some internal inconsistencies, too blithely disregarded the possibility of any civilian-military institutional boundary, and also lacked a more disciplined framework. Colton dismissed Odom's effort as not so much a developed model but an approach to spark reflection and debate.³⁴

In 1979 Colton deployed his full interpretation in

Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority, the first comprehensive work on Soviet civil-military relations (what he called Soviet military politics) since Kolkowicz's effort a decade earlier. Colton argued that the field's concentration upon the extent of Party control over the military was too narrow to capture the full range of Soviet civil-military relations. A more profitable approach was to orient research and analysis toward military participation in politics. Such an approach would avoid the a priori assumptions of conflict or consensus in Party-military relations, and concentrated on the scope of issues and the means employed by military officials interacting with civil authority.³⁵

Colton believed that, for any society, the scope of military participation in politics ranged from narrow internal military issues to institutional military issues, intermediate issues of interest to other specialized societal actors, and large-scale societal issues. The means used by the military included official prerogative, expert advice, political bargaining, and force.³⁶ One could thus develop a matrix of scope/means going from narrow to societal scope and prerogative to forceful means in order to elucidate patterns of military participation, or behavior, in politics.³⁷ In the case of Soviet civil-military relations from the late 1960s to late 1970s, Colton found that, as one introduced greater

issue scope and more forceful means one conclusion stood out in stark relief: the more general (societal) the issue, the less the military participated in decisionmaking by any means. Conversely, the more narrowly "military" an issue, the more the military decided the issue by any means, except force. For all cases, Colton found no instances of the military bargaining politically on societal issues or the military using force to decide issue outcomes of any scope.³⁸

In fact, wrote Colton, one of the more striking aspects of Soviet civil-military relations empirically revealed by his matrixed approach was the limited character of the military's participation in politics. Its participation appeared confined primarily to narrow internal military matters or to providing civilian authorities with expert advice on military institutional issues.³⁹ Thus the natural question which arose was why had the military accepted its subordinate role and maintained its reluctance to engage on larger issues across many years?

Colton questioned the dominant view that the military was constrained from participating in politics on issues of wider scope and with greater means simply because of the Party's control apparatus.⁴⁰ Colton argued that such constraints did have an impact, but that the military likely would have no need to escalate means to achieve its ends if the Party took into account military preferences in the

decisionmaking process. Nor would the military be naturally interested in expanding the scope of its involvement: as professionals, military officers would be vastly more concerned with narrow internal or institutional (corporatist) interests.⁴¹ In sum, the military and Party, although definable entities, were composed of various factions, groups, or other aggregates. Together they shared many values and goals, so various alliances could be formed on issues across institutional boundaries.⁴² As long as those in the military believed that their interests were protected by the Party, they would work within the boundaries of the system to achieve their objectives. Thus, Soviet civil-military relations were neither the product of discrete institutions in conflict nor indistinguishable institutions in general agreement; rather, Soviet civil-military relations were more the product of a complex symbiosis of shared values/goals, shifting intra- and inter-institutional alliances, and self-interested agreed rules of the political game.⁴³

Nonetheless, Colton argued that the Soviet military did have the wherewithal to increase its participation in politics, and it could do so if it were to come under political and developmental pressures existing in other, less-than-stable countries.⁴⁴ Thus, despite the military's long-standing political quiescence, the army could find

itself forced to widen the scope and means of its participation in politics, wrote Colton, "in the event of drastic disintegration of the political system," or, more probably, as a result of a "leadership succession crisis or factional struggle in which one or more of the partisans appealed to military leaders for support."⁴⁵ Colton, however, thought such military intervention or involvement very unlikely unless the military's core interests were vitally threatened.⁴⁶

For the next decade, proponents of these three paradigms debated each other. Odom's paradigm of institutional consensus began to nose out the others in popularity as many Sovietologists came to believe that the Brezhnev period epitomized a "golden age" of civil-military relations and an increase of military influence in national security policy formulation and execution. As Brezhnev and his era tottered to a close, however, Sovietologists began to see significant strains between the military and Party over resource allocations and the direction of defense and national security policy. By 1988, three years after Gorbachev became Party leader, Kolkowicz's institutional conflict paradigm was back in favor among many observers of Soviet civil-military relations.⁴⁷ Still, no one general theory of Soviet civil-military relations was accepted across the board as adequately explicative or predictive as the

Soviet Union entered its denouement.

Further, a new paradigm entered the fray, presaged in its full form in 1993 by Thomas Nichols who argued that the three contending models failed to consider another possible type of Soviet civil-military relationship. In his view, while Kolkowicz was essentially correct in placing a Party-military conflict at the center of the Soviet civil-military relationship, he incorrectly reversed the power relationship. Despite the Party's attempts at subjective control, it was the military which "became the watchdog of the Party . . . (and) attempted to exercise a kind of veto over policies that were, in any state, properly the domain of civil power."⁴⁸ Nichols argued that the Soviet Party-military conflict sprung from unique sources. These sources included an ideological dilemma which manifested itself in an officer corps which was both nationalist and Marxist-Leninist; the lack of constitutional norms regulating the civil-military relationship; the military's primary role in formulating and executing military doctrine, which in the Soviet milieu included security, industrial, and social policies; and the fact that officers held political positions on Party bodies. These sources combined to provide "Soviet officers with political privileges and options that [were] not available to their Western counterparts."⁴⁹

Gorbachev And The Soviet Military

Students of Soviet civil-military relations generally agree that the first two years of Gorbachev's rule were marked by stable, non-confrontational relations between the Party and the military. The military supported Gorbachev's efforts, in effect, to modernize society and the economy, both critical to superpower status, and Gorbachev was careful to pay attention to military concerns.⁵⁰ But tensions mounted as Gorbachev came to realize by early 1987 that his approach was not working and, consequently, as he became more radical in his efforts to rebuild and rejuvenate the Soviet Union. The High Command came to believe, correctly, that these efforts ultimately threatened the military's privileged position for resources, its virtual preeminence in formulating the country's national security and defense policies, and its prestige and honor.⁵¹ Moreover, because Gorbachev made a concerted effort to effect a leadership turnover in the upper echelons of the Party, the military found itself with fewer links to high Party officials and a weaker voice in the vitally important decisionmaking body, the Politburo.⁵²

As Gorbachev's efforts at perestroika induced greater and greater social and political unrest, the Party-military relationship came under serious strain, or as Nichols wrote, "(t)he deal was about to be called off."⁵³ Such a development

is not very well explained by Odom's consensual paradigm.⁵⁴ At the same time, no crisis in civil-military relations ensued, a development which, according to Kolkowicz's model, probably should have been manifest since the military, in his model, had in the past used periods of Party weakness to increase its autonomy.⁵⁵ Proponents of Colton's participatory paradigm championed their model as the one which best explained and predicted events. They pointed to fissures in the military and alliances among groups, including military ones, across institutions and across various issues; the military's fundamental, and apparently unwavering, acceptance of Party dominance; and "buffering," that is, systemic characteristics which lessened the impact of change on the military, as factors which meliorated against a rupture in Party-military relations.⁵⁶ Also, the military still concerned itself more with internal and institutional issues, maintaining its traditional reluctance to expand its involvement to intermediate and societal issues.⁵⁷ Many specialists wondered, though, if increasing social and political tensions would, at some point, provoke a systemic crisis in which the military would have no choice but to intervene. Some thought it all but likely, and as perceptively noted by Ellen Jones in 1990:

Thus far, the military leadership has limited its public reaction to grumbling. . . . There are no signs that the generals are actively planning more decisive action, such as a coup. . . . Military unease, however, may become important in the

unlikely but not impossible event that Gorbachev's foes within the political leadership coalesce against him. In such a scenario, the high command may be forced to choose sides. . . . In this sense, the increasing conflict between the military elite and the politicians has increased the likelihood of military intervention in politics, not as an initiator, but as a participant.⁵⁸

Radical Perestroyka And Military Politicization

As a result of Gorbachev's radicalization of his reform effort beginning in the spring of 1987, the military became increasingly politicized. To be sure, the Soviet Army had always been politicized in the sense that it was more an instrument of the Communist Party than an autonomous part of the state's bureaucracy. This "passive" politicization, as described by John W. R. Lepingwell, "served to support the regime: it educated Soviet officers and troops in the nature and values of Soviet society but did not involve them actively in the political process."⁵⁹ Radical perestroyka, however, changed the framework and processes within which civil-military relations operated. As reform weakened the Party stranglehold on political power, civil-military relations began to shift away from a Party-military focus to a "new system, a nonpartisan military subordinated to a less centralized, constitutionally based, civil authority."⁶⁰ In short, Gorbachev's efforts to decentralize political power and, ultimately, to eliminate the Party's role as the

military's overseer, fatally weakened the traditional Soviet approach to civil-military relations and gave rise to increased politicization within the military.

The politicization resulting from Gorbachev's reforms was of a type more familiar to non-Communist states: a more active politicization in which the military expanded its participation in politics in terms of the scope of issues and the means used.⁶¹ As pointed out by Yang Zhong, this definition of politicization closely follows Colton's paradigm of civil-military relations.⁶² Zhong and Lepingwell noted several areas in which military politicization had become manifest by the time of the August 1991 anti-Gorbachev coup: military participation in the political campaign to operationalize reform, direct involvement in elections and the legislative process, internal security operations to preclude and put down social upheavals, and open military commentary, often highly critical, on the policies of the civilian leadership.⁶³ Political indoctrination accompanying reform included discussions of political and social issues outside of direct military concerns. At the same time, reform had important internal consequences for the military. Under the reform rubric of democratization, in May 1989 officers' assemblies were set up in all military units. These assemblies were supposed to allow officers to better deal with the everyday concerns of military units, although

importantly some officers saw the assemblies as a means to bypass the chain of command and allow them to address military concerns to higher authority.⁶⁴

Military servicemen qua servicemen were also allowed to stand for office in the new national legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies, and its standing body, the Supreme Soviet. Although both institutions were dominated by the Party, they were not rubber stamp legislative bodies.⁶⁵ Some 82 servicemen were elected to the Congress in the spring of 1989 and 9 of them were voted into the 542 member Supreme Soviet. Although small in relation to the total number of deputies, these military politicians could articulate the concerns of servicemen and their families.⁶⁶ The High Command tried to use them as a military bloc in the Congress and Supreme Soviet but was stymied by differences among the deputies, who generally divided into two camps: a democratic pro-reform camp and a more conservative, nationalist group. Indeed, much to the dismay of the senior military leadership, several of the military deputies, from both camps, used their legislative position to criticize sharply the military leadership on a number of issues.⁶⁷

Similar military involvement in politics occurred at other political levels, to include republic and local elections. For example, in the important 1991 election for the presidency of the Russian Republic, ultimately won by

Boris Yeltsin, both major candidates selected active duty military officers as vice presidential running mates: Boris Yeltsin chose then-Air Forces Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoy, an Afghan war hero, and Prime Minister Ryzhkov selected Ground Forces General Boris Gromov, an officer highly respected in military circles who commanded Soviet forces in Afghanistan as they ended their involvement in that misadventure.

Another active duty Soviet general, Albert Makashov, ran for the presidency. Both Ryzhkov and Gromov campaigned heavily for the military vote and, although not officially endorsed by the High Command, was the preferred ticket in higher military and Party circles.⁶⁸ A key consequence of this effort by all sides to court the military vote was a more politicized and politically fragmented military.⁶⁹

This politicization and fragmentation also had its roots in greater military involvement in internal security operations. The use of regular Army troops to suppress nationalist movements, police ethnic conflicts, and head off social disturbances--all sparked by perestroika and glasnost--had deeply divisive repercussions in the military and society at large. Civilian casualties in military operations to suppress dissent in Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius, and other Soviet cities horrified most people, and attempts by civilian authorities, including Gorbachev, to claim that senior military officers bore responsibility for exceeding orders

incurred deep resentment among officers who increasingly saw themselves as scapegoats for civilian incompetence.⁷⁰ This gave rise to the so-called "Tbilisi syndrome" within the military, that is, a profound unwillingness to carry out any internal security mission which risked civilian casualties.

Moreover, many in government and society came to see the military as an economic burden the country could ill afford. Military prestige and influence consequently weakened.⁷¹ Thus, reform policies in the national security realm--Gorbachev's approach to arms control and eastern Europe, conscription changes, and cuts in the military budget--also spurred military politicization as well as internal military fragmentation.⁷² Indeed, the military was forced to wrestle with the implications of radical changes in security policies at a time when deep divisions already existed among military tacticians and strategists on future military programs, structures, and strategies.⁷³ By late 1990/early 1991, perestroika and glasnost had so internally divided and politicized the Soviet officer corps that the military's loyalty to its civilian superiors was openly questioned in the Soviet press.⁷⁴ Civil-military relations had become uncertain and fluid.

The Soviet Military and the August 1991 Coup

By time of the anti-Gorbachev coup of 19-21 August 1991, the military had become highly politicized and, for many in the military, regime legitimacy was no longer unquestioned. Moreover, the military's politicization and its fragmentation along political, rank, and generational lines were so worrisome to the High Command that it feared that any military political activity would completely fracture the armed forces. As a consequence, the military was unable to act as a unitary body.⁷⁵ As Lepingwell succinctly put it, "(t)he military could not act as a coherent political force."⁷⁶

As a result, the military, as an institution, neither instigated nor played a major, active role in the failed August 1991 coup attempt. Certainly, several important military officials, most notably Defense Minister Yazov, actively supported the coup. Moreover, as the coup played itself out, it was obvious that military support would be key to the coup's success or failure. But the driving force behind the move against Gorbachev emanated from the intelligence and security services--the KGB and Internal Affairs Ministry--in league with conservative members of Communist Party.⁷⁷

Despite having the support of the Defense Minister and some senior officers, the coup-plotters were unable to gain

the tangible support of the vast majority of military officers who, for the most part, adopted a neutral, wait-and-see stance.⁷⁸ Moreover, those who actively supported the coup hesitated to give orders which would result in servicemen firing upon civilians. Tanks and other military hardware were deployed to intimidate, but Yazov could not bring himself to order the use of deadly force, and even if he did, his subordinates were likely to disobey such orders.⁷⁹ At the same time, several key military officers rallied to Russian President Yeltsin's side who, in the absence of the imprisoned Gorbachev, led the struggle in Moscow against the coup.⁸⁰ According to Yeltsin loyalist Marshal Shaposhnikov, it became clear during several meetings of the military's highest advisory body, the Defense Collegium, that senior officers were greatly divided on what to do despite orders and personal appeals from Yazov to support the coup. Yazov was finally forced by the Defense Collegium on 21 August to withdraw military support to the coup plotters.⁸¹ "The coup fizzled," wrote Lepingwell, "as military apathy turned into opposition."⁸²

In the end, the military, despite its politicization, refused to be dragged into politics in its most extreme form; the failed anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991 was neither a military-instigated nor military-supported coup. The leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces diffidently chose

instead to support the status quo even though it had grave misgivings about the competence of the civilian leadership and that leadership's future course. Lepingwell argues that the military made this choice because first, military personnel overall were moderately conservative in their politics and views and not reactionary. This mindset partially explains the apathy and acquiescence of most military officers and their reluctance to get involved. Second, political differences within the military precluded a unified political stance or actions. Third, Yeltsin had emerged as a legitimate political force and his strong leadership stance against the coup appeared to reflect the will of society. Conversely, the coup plotters appeared weak, uncertain, and without popular support. Finally, "(p)rofessionalism . . . raised the threshold for intervention by emphasizing the apolitical nature of the military."⁸³ For their part, Meyer and Zhong explain military behavior during the coup primarily as a consequence of the political divisions within the military, and a fear that support for one side or the other would risk the total disintegration of the military and lead to civil war.⁸⁴ In short, during the coup, the Soviet military found itself trapped in a dilemma created by six years of perestroika, democratization, and glasnost: professionally apolitical, but highly politicized; fearful of intervention, but with little faith in the competence of the civilian leadership. Luckily

for the Soviet Armed Forces, Boris Yeltsin provided a way out of this dilemma.

Yeltsin And The Emergence Of The Russian Military

Yeltsin provided that way out in several ways. First, President Yeltsin exercised legitimate executive political power, having been elected president of the Soviet Union's most important constituent republic, the Russian Republic, in June 1991. In the absence of Soviet President Gorbachev, Yeltsin was able successfully to transfer that legitimacy to the Union Republic level by claiming that, until Gorbachev was released by the coup plotters, as Russian President he represented legitimate civilian authority. In a critical move, he also asserted that, as Russian president, he was the commander-in-chief of all Soviet military forces on Russian territory and ordered those forces not to obey the coup plotters. In his memoirs Yeltsin wrote that General Aleksandr Lebed (see chapter 5) urged him to take this step to unify the military in the face of growing confusion and dissension within the armed forces over who represented legitimate civilian authority.⁸⁵

Thus, Yeltsin tapped into a key determinant in late Soviet/early Russian civil-military relations: the military's sense of civilian political legitimacy. Gorbachev had

maintained the military's subordination for over six years, despite what many in the military considered ruinous policies, because he retained legitimacy--first, as Communist Party leader, and later, as Soviet president. Yeltsin gained the military's (and society's) loyalty because he came to be seen as a legitimate political leader in his own right as the Soviet Union disintegrated. Consequently, after the coup's collapse, there was no reaction within the military as Yeltsin forced Gorbachev to remove senior officers who supported the coup, or who were otherwise suspect in their activities during the coup, and replaced them with officers who had supported him.⁸⁶ In the critical post-coup period to follow, what was, in effect, a four month political struggle over the fate of the Soviet Union, the military was led by Yeltsin loyalists.

The failed coup brought about the very development that the coup plotters were trying to avoid: the Soviet Union's destruction. One by one the Union Republics, exercising their constitutional right to secede, declared their independence rather than proceeding with Gorbachev's plan for a renewed, more decentralized, union. Gorbachev tried to stave off the disintegration, but he had little political leverage; Yeltsin, buoyed and strengthened by his all-but-Olympian stature, opted for independence within a very loose confederation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).⁸⁷

To retain the military's loyalty in the face of the union's demise and to coopt the military's rejection of a partition of the armed forces along republic lines, Yeltsin promised to work to maintain a unified military under CIS auspices, to increase military pay, and to be attentive to the military's corporate concerns.⁸⁸ Combined with his political stature, Yeltsin's political posture and promises were enough to persuade the vast majority of officers to support him, despite Gorbachev's entreaties to the military to retain its loyalty to him as Soviet President.⁸⁹ As a result, the Soviet Armed Forces accepted the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991.⁹⁰

Over the following year and a half (and beyond), Yeltsin failed to live up to his promises. The Soviet Armed Forces were divided among the former republics; many servicemen did become paupers; the defense budget was slashed to half its 1991 level in 1992, to two thirds of its 1992 level in 1993⁹¹ (and yet again in 1994; see chapter 4); and the West appeared to dictate Russian national security policy, at least in the eyes of many in the military. Nevertheless, despite these direct threats to the military's corporate interests and the personal interests of most officers, there was no crisis in civil-military relations. According to Russian military sociologist Colonel Sergey Ianin, an analysis of survey research conducted in 1992 and

1993 indicates that, while the armed forces were under great stress, only about one third of servicemen were willing to engage in active protest if conditions continued to deteriorate. Even fewer, some 6%, were willing to consider using force.⁹² Nonetheless, by 1993 the military's "sociopsychological state" had become "a comparatively new factor that actively influences . . . the internal political situation within the state."⁹³ Ianin posited that, while the trend of increasing social tension in the armed forces was worrisome, an increase in political indifference among officers had arisen: *political theory* was seen as having little relevance to the everyday necessity of concentrating on bread-and-butter concerns. What mattered were government and legislative *efforts* to protect the military's interests.⁹⁴

Despite the inability of politicians, including Yeltsin, to protect those interests adequately, few in the armed forces apparently had translated their rising discomfort and anger toward civilian politicians, their motives per *Finer*, into a mood to act outside constitutional strictures. In short, between 1987 and 1992, civilian authority retained its legitimacy in the face of the Soviet Union's collapse and direct and indirect threats to the interests of the military and servicemen. It therefore appears that, despite a classic environment conducive to military intervention--as noted by *Finer*, *Nordlinger*, and

Perlmutter--which had been building in the Soviet Union/Russia since circa 1987, no such intervention seemed to be on the horizon. But 1993 and 1994 would bring serious crises in Russian civil-military relations, the first since the collapse of the Soviet Union. How did the military react?

¹Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, (London: New Park Publishers, 1967), 222.

²Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 7.

³Ibid., 11-12.

⁴Ibid., 28-30 and chapter IV.

⁵Ibid., chapter IX.

⁶Ibid., 12-13.

⁷Ibid., 33.

⁸Ibid., 36.

⁹Ibid., 78-79.

¹⁰Ibid., 116.

¹¹Ibid., 113-130.

¹²Ibid., 130-150.

¹³Ibid., 136-137.

¹⁴Ibid., 150-158.

¹⁵Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), chapter 2.

¹⁶Ibid., 17-22.

¹⁷Ibid., 11.

¹⁸Ibid., 13.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., 22-25.

²¹William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Herspring and Volgyes, chapter 3.

²²Ibid., 31.

²³Ibid., 34.

²⁴Ibid., 34-36.

²⁵Ibid., 38-39.

²⁶Ibid., 41-42.

²⁷Ibid., 43.

²⁸Ibid., 44-45.

²⁹Ibid., 46.

³⁰Timothy J. Colton, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Herspring and Volgyes, chapter 4.

³¹Colton thus disagreed with Kolkowicz and most other Soviet military specialists that the "Zhukov Affair" was a clear-cut case of a Party-military clash. In his view, Zhukov had no major quarrel with the Party per se for he shared many of its values and goals. His efforts to put his stamp on the Soviet military cut across institutional lines and ran afoul of "a combination of contingencies," such as his personality, war hero status, and the precarious leadership coalition at the time. See Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), chapter 8.

³²Colton in Herspring and Volgyes, 59.

³³Ibid., 60.

³⁴Ibid., 61-62.

³⁵Ibid., 232-233.

³⁶Ibid., 233-234.

³⁷Ibid., 234.

³⁸Ibid., 241-249.

³⁹Ibid., 248-250.

⁴⁰Ibid., 224-227.

⁴¹Ibid., chapter 11.

⁴²Ibid., 214-217. See also Edward L. Warner III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 268-271. Warner finds that the "bureaucratic politics" model well explains military attitudes and policy actions. Like Colton, he sees the military as an alliance-seeking entity that, nonetheless, has internal differences across issues.

⁴³Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority, 279-280.

⁴⁴Ibid., 279.

⁴⁵Ibid., 286-287.

⁴⁶Ibid., 287-289.

⁴⁷For a detailed summary account of the debate among Western Sovietologists over Soviet civil-military relations in the Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev eras up till 1990 see Colton and Gustafson, eds., Soldiers And The Soviet State, 25-33.

⁴⁸Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), x-xi.

⁴⁹Ibid., 7-14. For Nichols, the civil-military conflict continues today as the former Soviet and now Russian Army tries "to defend a position gained over the course of almost thirty years," See p.20.

⁵⁰A notable exception to this judgement is Nichols. His relentless, detailed, issue-oriented chronological history of civil-military relations during Gorbachev's reign based on Russian language sources truly calls into question that, at least for the first two years, Gorbachev had no major civil-military relations problem. See Nichols, The Sacred Cause, 130-161. To be sure, all agree that some in the military--including senior officers in the High Command--were wary of Gorbachev and his plans from the very beginning. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that senior officers were unhappy with the thrust of Gorbachev's first major speech to the High Command in July 1985 in which the General Secretary noted the need to place limits on the growth of military expenditures. See, for example, Bruce Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, Soldiers And The Soviet State, 77-79.

⁵¹Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations," 44-92. See also the excellent discussion in Nichols, The Sacred Cause, 162-236. Again, Nichols has Gorbachev and civilian reformers locked in a much more tense conflict with the military than other scholars.

⁵²Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations," 75-77.

⁵³Nichols, The Sacred Cause, 163.

⁵⁴Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations," 89.

⁵⁵Thane Gustafson, "Conclusions: Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?," in Colton and Gustafson, Soldiers And The Soviet State, 360.

⁵⁶Ibid., 334-364 and Parrott, 89-92.

⁵⁷Gustafson, 357-358.

⁵⁸Ellen Jones, "Social Change and Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, Soldiers And The Soviet State, 283-284.

⁵⁹Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations And The August Coup," 546-547.

⁶⁰Robert V. Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup: Departization and Decentralization," Armed Forces & Society 19 (Fall 1992): 27.

⁶¹Lepingwell, 554-559.

⁶²Zhong, "The Transformation of the Soviet Military and the August Coup," 48.

⁶³Ibid., 51-52, and Lepingwell, 554-559.

⁶⁴Zhong, 52.

⁶⁵Ibid., 52-53.

⁶⁶According to research done by David Lane and Cameron Ross, military deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies constituted 4.3% of all deputies during the period March 1990 to October 1993, that is, during the time when the last legislatures elected in the Soviet period were operative. See David Lane and Cameron Ross, "The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites," in David Lane, ed., Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York: Longerman Publishing, 1995), 54.

⁶⁷Zhong, 55.

⁶⁸Ibid., 56, and Lepingwell, 556-558.

⁶⁹Zhong, 56; Lepingwell, 559; and Stephen M. Meyer, "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military," International Security 16 (Winter 1991/92): 6.

⁷⁰Lepingwell, 551-554.

⁷¹Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations After the October Uprising," 5.

⁷²David Holloway and Michael McFaul, "Demilitarization and Defense Conversion," in Gail W. Lapidus, The New Russia, 194.

⁷³Meyer, 9-16

⁷⁴Holloway and McFaul, 194; Zhong, 57-58; and Lepingwell, 539.

⁷⁵Meyer, 6.

⁷⁶Lepingwell, 559. See also Meyer, 5-6.

⁷⁷Lepingwell, 562.

⁷⁸Lepingwell, 562-564, and Meyer, 30.

⁷⁹Lepingwell, 563-564. See also the interview of Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov in Andrey Krayniy, "This Is No Business For Generals . . . But All the Same It Is A Good Thing That The People and the Army Are United," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 27 Aug 91, p3. FBIS-SOV-91-166, 56-57.

⁸⁰Lepingwell, 562-564. See also Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. C. Fitzpatrick (New York: Times Books, 1994), 58-60, 86-90, and Holloway and McFaul, 194.

⁸¹Shaposhnikov in Krayniy, "This Is No Business For Generals."

⁸²Lepingwell, 539.

⁸³Ibid., 558-561, 563-564, and 566.

⁸⁴Meyer, 29-30, and Zhong, 65-67.

⁸⁵Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 87.

⁸⁶Ibid., 106-107.

⁸⁷Ibid., 105-121.

⁸⁸Lepingwell, 568.

⁸⁹Holloway and McFaul, 201-202.

⁹⁰Ibid. While the overwhelming number of officers supported these moves, reactions by specific units pointed to the civil-military challenge faced by Yeltsin. For example, in September 1991 the command of the Baltic Military District announced that it would not withdraw from the Baltic states as ordered until provisions were made to support the departing troops adequately at their new bases in Russia. Andrei Kortunov, "Russia, the 'Near Abroad,' and the West," in Gail Lapidus, The New Russia, 152.

⁹¹By FY96, the military budget was about half of the FY92 military budget in real terms. See John C. Gannon, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Address to the Boston Committee on Foreign Relations, "Challenges of Intelligence Reform: The Case of Russia," Boston, 10 July 1996.

⁹²Sergei V. Ianin, "Factors of Social Tension in the Army," 48.

⁹³Ibid., 30.

⁹⁴Ibid., 32-33.

CHAPTER THREE

CIVILIAN LEGITIMACY AND THE MILITARY IN 1993

Whatever the army does, we're going to be blamed.
If we go against the people, we're going to be
blamed, but if we don't, we'll be blamed for
disobeying orders.

Taman Division
Company Commander
20 August 1991¹

The Spring 1993 Constitutional Crisis

A simmering political crisis brought Russia to the brink of a political meltdown in the spring of 1993. This crisis had its roots in (1) a communist-era constitution and concomitant political structures which did not reflect the new political realities; (2) a mindset among the political elite which perceived the political struggle in Manichean terms, thus undercutting efforts to forge compromises; and, (3) a profound disagreement between Yeltsin and reformers in the government on the one side who, since January 1992, were pursuing radical economic reform and, on the other side, communists, nationalists, and other anti-reformers in the standing legislature, the Supreme Soviet, who thought the

government's free-market reforms and western-oriented democratic principles were ruinous for Russia.² After the November 1992 expiration of Yeltsin's one-year authority to rule by decree--authority which was granted by the legislature in the aftermath of the August 1991 coup--the failure to transform communist-era political structures and the existence of sharp policy differences manifested themselves in a legislative-executive branch power struggle. This power struggle centered on several related issues: the division of powers between the president and the Supreme Soviet; which branch of the national government had supreme authority; and political gridlock which all but stymied the implementation of government policies.³

In December 1992, the legislative branch forced President Yeltsin to dismiss his reformist prime minister, Yegor Gaydar, and severely limited presidential powers by voting to amend the constitution to give the Supreme Soviet the final say in appointing the ministers of Defense, Internal Affairs, Security, and Foreign Affairs. This move sparked a warning by Yeltsin that he would act forcefully to defend his prerogatives as president. The two sides agreed to hold talks to develop an agreed power-sharing arrangement in order to avoid an immediate political crisis and to hold a referendum in April 1993 on whether the people wanted early national elections based upon a new constitution.⁴

By late February 1993, the political crisis again sharpened. Talks on a draft power-sharing agreement broke down and the Supreme Soviet began to move away from its agreement to hold a referendum--an agreement which was "extorted" from a legislative branch under duress, according to Supreme Soviet Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. The referendum, averred the speaker, now carried the risk of destabilizing Russia.⁵ Further, he claimed no objective need for a new constitution or early legislative elections; constitutional change was taking place through already established procedures and regular legislative elections were scheduled in a year's time. Khasbulatov called on the Congress of People's Deputies (the constitutional assembly which met several times a year to discuss constitutional questions, and from which the members of the standing legislature, the Supreme Soviet, were drawn) to cancel the referendum and to continue its efforts in its upcoming 10 March session to strengthen legislative supremacy through constitutional change.

Yeltsin responded by declaring the political situation intolerable and hinted that he was considering emergency presidential rule by suspending the constitution and dissolving the legislature.⁶ By 2 March, Yeltsin claimed that the then-current constitution was not the one to which he swore allegiance when elected president in June 1991 and

strongly suggested that, as a "final option," he was ready to take the extra-legal step of establishing presidential rule. He declared that "(w)e should respect the constitution, but if conservatives [in the legislature] use extreme measures to destroy Russia, then to save Russia, to save democracy and reform, we must seek other paths."⁷ The next day, Yeltsin warned that the Congress of People's Deputies risked the disintegration of Russia if it did not seek an accommodation with him on a division of powers.⁸ At the same time that Yeltsin was hinting at emergency rule, his aides, in a classic media campaign to intimidate political opponents, were publicly stating that the president really had no choice but to prorogue the parliament and suspend the constitution. As put by one of the president's advisors:

Perhaps we cannot save democracy and the reforms other than by introducing presidential rule which arrogates for itself dictatorial powers. This is perhaps the only way in which we can avoid a bloody civil war.⁹

That same day, the military publicly reacted to the deepening political crisis and Yeltsin's hints of forceful action. At a Kremlin meeting called by Yeltsin to determine the mood in the armed forces, the High Command demanded that Yeltsin take steps to resolve the political crisis, according to newspaper accounts.¹⁰ This news was perceived by many as military backing for presidential rule.¹¹ Yet, according to a senior U.S. intelligence expert, the High Command had no

desire to implement emergency rule, let alone full-fledged martial law; the level and manner of military support for Yeltsin, if he were to declare emergency rule, would probably depend upon the level of public support for such a move.¹² If this analysis was correct, Yeltsin was in a bind: he might declare emergency rule, but who would enforce it if the Supreme Soviet ignored his declaration? The last attempt at emergency rule, the August 1991 anti-Gorbachev coup, exposed the deep political divisions which existed among the military, security, and police forces. As earlier noted by Colonel Ianin, those divisions still existed in 1992 and 1993 and gave rise to concern about the fragility of the armed forces and potential clashes among units of the "power ministries."

This sense of military fragility was probably behind Defense Minister Grachev's ostentatious public stance on the military's role in this political crisis. To forestall rumors of military intervention, the Defense Minister canceled military exercises and troop movements within the Moscow Military District during the Congress' upcoming special session (in which the burgeoning political crisis would be discussed). He declared that "(t)he Army . . . will abide by the constitution. It will not participate in political games--that would be dangerous."¹³ Moreover, the apparent military unwillingness to support Yeltsin

unequivocally at this time probably was a major reason why Yeltsin continued to press for compromise through a power-sharing agreement with his political enemies. On 6 March, Yeltsin again publicly appealed for a compromise "constitutional deal:" if the Congress rescinded its decision to hold a referendum, he would push for a non-binding poll to gauge the people's will.¹⁴ On 9 March, the Supreme Soviet rejected Yeltsin's plan for power-sharing and called on the Congress of Peoples' Deputies also to reject the president's proposals and to cancel the referendum.

Yeltsin's implied threats and cajolery had no impact on a Congress dominated by anti-reform and anti-Yeltsin delegates. On the first day of the Congress, Yeltsin, his policies, and the government were strongly attacked for weakening and impoverishing Russia, subverting the constitution, and threatening to bring the military into a political debate.¹⁵ By day's end, a presidential spokesman warned that Yeltsin was being boxed in, that "(t)he Congress is pushing the President towards deep and tragic deliberations over what decision he must take to save reforms and democracy."¹⁶ Yeltsin's direct appeal for compromise in an address to the Congress on the second day met with ridicule and rejection. The Congress voted to cancel the referendum, rejected Yeltsin's plan for power-sharing, and further stripped the executive branch of power vis-a-vis the

Supreme Soviet. Moreover, although Yeltsin survived an impeachment vote, the Congress threatened impeachment if Yeltsin carried out the now-canceled referendum. In response, Yeltsin vowed to "go to the people" and warned that the lack of compromise left him no other recourse but to "think about other additional measures to preserve the balance of power in the country."¹⁷ As he later put it in his memoirs:

All of my efforts . . . [were aimed at] trying to exercise restraint, trying not to be tempted to solve the problem of parliament with force, to go beyond law and order. Now that I was so close to decreeing restrictions on the rights of the Congress . . . once again I backed off. I was hoping for a peaceful, decent, honest outcome to the fight--after the referendum. I was mistaken. Our disagreement was in fact not about tactics . . . nor . . . even about politics. . . . No, what this was about was . . . a pitched battle to destroy the presidency. Only I realized that too late.¹⁸

Immediately after the Congress, Yeltsin appeared to link a direct appeal to the people with the prospect of emergency rule. According to press reports, Yeltsin made clear that he was going ahead with a plebiscite, scheduled for 25 April, and a positive poll result would provide sufficient justification for the establishment of presidential rule.¹⁹ Moreover, U.S. officials revealed that Yeltsin, in a meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl prior to the Congress, implicitly asked for Western and U.S. support in the event he declared emergency rule.²⁰ In his memoirs published a year later, Yeltsin claimed he directly

asked Kohl how the West would react if presidential rule were to be declared.²¹ For its part, the Supreme Soviet declared that any nationwide vote would be a non-binding poll with no legal force. Further, in an apparent effort to weaken military support for Yeltsin, it voted to reallocate funds previously set aside for the referendum to military housing.²²

Not Emergency, Not Presidential, But "Special" Rule

For Yeltsin, three stark choices now loomed before him: resignation from office, continuing a presidency increasingly bereft of powers and sliding into figurehead status, or a risky extra-constitutional move. In the week after the Congress, Yeltsin used the press to lambaste the legislature while his top aides, including one of his top personal military advisors, retired General Dmitriy Volkogonov, urged him to impose presidential rule.²³ On 18 March, the day after emergency meetings of the government's Security Council and Yeltsin's group of personal advisors, the Presidential Council, it was announced that Yeltsin would address the nation on this crisis of power; according to his spokesman, Yeltsin had decided whether to declare presidential rule and would be seeking public support for his course of action. In response, Supreme Soviet Speaker Khasbulatov appealed to servicemen to abide by the constitution and reject any extra-

legal actions ordered by the executive branch.²⁴

In a nationwide address on 20 March, Yeltsin announced that he had signed a decree which imposed "special rule" until the 25 April plebiscite on Yeltsin's presidency, a new constitution, and early legislative elections. He declared that, during this period, he would rule by decree and that any contrary actions by the legislature, courts, or regional or local authorities would have no legal force. Yeltsin did not dissolve the Supreme Soviet, nor did he deploy military, security, or police forces to seize legislative buildings, intimidate the legislature, or maintain order. The ministers of Security and Internal Affairs were directed to ensure law and order, while Defense Minister Grachev was ordered to "ensure the Army's non-participation in political actions."²⁵ With all executive government on his side, Yeltsin, in effect, decided simply to ignore the constitution and Supreme Soviet.

The Supreme Soviet had, of course, no intention of being ignored. The day after "special rule" announcement, the Supreme Soviet met in emergency session to condemn Yeltsin's actions as unconstitutional, labeling them a presidential coup d'etat. The legislature called for a ruling by the Constitutional Court and, two days later, convoked the Congress of People's Deputies to initiate impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin. The head of the

Constitutional Court agreed to hold hearings and declared that, in his opinion, Yeltsin's decree was unconstitutional. Vice President Rutskoy announced his opposition and, in doing so, made complete his break with Yeltsin after a two-year rocky relationship. From this point forward, Rutskoy joined forces with the Supreme Soviet. For its part, the government, led by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, announced its support for Yeltsin's decree. In a statement issued after an emergency meeting of government ministers, the ministers of Security, Internal Affairs, and Defense pledged that the forces under their control would not intervene in the political power struggle except to maintain law and order.²⁶

Yeltsin's decree apparently sparked a renewed effort at compromise to avoid what all began to fear: a political crisis spiraling toward some kind of violent showdown. Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, Chernomyrdin, and the head of the Constitutional Court met on 24 March to find a compromise, but failed. For his part, Yeltsin, who delayed the publishing of his decree, thereby delaying, by law, its entry into force, for fear of the consequences, apparently modified it. The modifications significantly diluted his power to rule by decree by removing language which declared legislative actions contrary to presidential orders automatically to be null and void.²⁷ Still, compromise was not in the cards. By the time the Congress of People's

Deputies convened on 26 March to discuss what was now seen as a dangerous constitutional crisis, talks between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet had ended. The Constitutional Court had declared Yeltsin's decree unconstitutional and anti-Yeltsin forces in the Congress were organizing to impeach the president, a procedure requiring a two-thirds majority.²⁸

In an open letter to the Supreme Soviet on 24 March, President Yeltsin set forth his complaints against the Supreme Soviet and Congress and his rationale for pressing for a new constitution and early elections.²⁹ In a television interview Yeltsin vowed that he would not step down if impeached and that a move to impeach him would "plunge the people into an abyss of confrontation."³⁰ The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Aleksey II, fearing that Russia was fast approaching that abyss, urged both sides to compromise. The Defense Ministry issued a statement which castigated "various political forces" for trying to drag the armed forces into politics, warned servicemen to act only in accordance with the constitution, and expressed confidence that servicemen would act with "restraint, calm, and organization."³¹

Stepping Back From the Brink--For The Moment.

Yeltsin wrote in his memoirs that his political analysts had determined that anti-Yeltsin forces in the Congress could not muster the necessary two-thirds vote for impeachment.³² Khasbulatov appeared to realize this as well, and polling data at the time suggested that public opinion, while split on Yeltsin's move to declare "special rule," was very supportive of a referendum and very much opposed to any attempt to remove the president from office through impeachment proceedings.³³ Although the Supreme Soviet Speaker was bitingly critical of the president in his opening address to the Congress, he thus came out against an impeachment vote, demanded Yeltsin admit he had gone too far with the declaration of "special rule," and appealed for compromise, albeit on the legislative branch's terms.³⁴

Various compromise proposals were discussed at the Congress, and an impeachment vote was postponed.³⁵ Efforts to reach a compromise, however, suffered from the intense polarization within the Congress: angry members rejected a compromise reached by Yeltsin and Khasbulatov on 28 March to cancel the plebiscite and hold early legislative and presidential elections in November. This sparked an impeachment vote and a vote to remove Khasbulatov as Supreme Soviet Speaker. In the end, both efforts at removal failed (impeachment by 72 votes), and Yeltsin and the Congress

agreed to a non-binding 25 April referendum comprising four questions: (1) do you support the president?; (2) do you support the president's reform course?; (3) do you support early elections for president?; (4) do you support early elections for parliament? Notwithstanding an apparent bias against Yeltsin in the questions, the president's spokesmen indicated that he would go along with them, would take the results as the people's will, and would subsequently take measures to enact that will.³⁶

By the end of the emergency session on 28 March, the political crisis had somewhat abated. The agreement on a 25 April referendum was, for all intents and purposes, a stalemate. It did not represent an advance toward a settlement on the division of powers or other constitutional or policy issues. Moreover, in retrospect, it appears that neither the executive nor legislative branch had the brute force to remove the other from political power. Both sides knew that the armed forces, security services, and police were unwilling to enter the political fray in the midst of a serious constitutional crisis, governmental paralysis, and talk of incipient civil war. As noted in Chapter 1, these very conditions often precipitated military intervention in politics. Thus, we are faced with the question: why did the Russian Armed Forces not intervene on one side or the other, or, for that matter, on its own side?

The Military Reaction: A Pox Upon All Politicians.

Since the beginning of this political crisis, the military had refused to become involved. As noted above, early talk of presidential rule or impeachment elicited declarations of neutrality by military spokesmen. The military hierarchy clearly wanted the power struggle quickly resolved, as its spokesmen repeatedly called on both sides to reach some sort of accommodation.³⁷ For the High Command, a quick resolution without military intervention offered the only solution which the armed forces could support. A major front-page article in the 23 March edition of the Defense Ministry's flagship newspaper Krasnaya zvezda spelled out the military's stance: no military involvement in the crisis, both sides must keep their hotheads under control, and both sides must act in accordance with their declared intention of not dragging the military into this dispute.³⁸

The views underlying the military's stance were perhaps best expressed most directly by Airborne Forces Commander General Podkolzin who, early in the crisis, publicly criticized the Supreme Soviet for treading on the prerogatives of the commander-in-chief and for failing adequately to support the military financially. At the same time, he scored politicians, especially those with executive

powers, for improperly trying to use the military to settle political questions. Gorbachev, he claimed, tried to impose emergency rule in September 1990 and August 1991³⁹ and would have left the military to suffer the blame if civilian casualties had occurred--just as when the military earlier had been ordered to put down demonstrations in Baku and other Soviet cities.⁴⁰ As far as Podkolzin was concerned, the armed forces would no longer serve as the scapegoat for the failed policies of dishonest politicians. Clearly, the commanding general of the troops most likely to be ordered to intervene would have none of it. His inhibitions sprung from such orders in the past and a concomitant deep mistrust of civilian authority. At the same time, he acknowledged the legitimacy of civilian authority to resolve fundamental political questions and disputes.

Fears about the internal cohesion of the armed forces also underlay the military leadership's strong desire not to become involved in the political crisis. Anti-Yeltsin officers and hard-line military associations like the Officers' Union publicly and early came out in support of the Supreme Soviet, warning that a declaration of presidential rule would spark mutinies within military units. After Yeltsin's declaration of special rule, an "All-Army Officers' Assembly" sponsored by the Officers' Union declared that any orders to move against the Supreme Soviet should be

disobeyed.⁴¹ The leader of the Officers' Union, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Terekhov, denounced Defense Minister Grachev as a traitor and declared that "(t)he Army cannot stay out of politics at the present time."⁴² Underground "strike committees" had reportedly also been formed within military units and were agitating against the leadership of Yeltsin and Grachev. According to one anonymous self-professed member of a strike committee, the parliamentary opposition to Yeltsin was their natural ally, but members of these committees did not trust politicians in general. Russia needed a military dictatorship brought into power by a military coup "(s)ince you cannot change authorities by legal means, you have to do it with the aid of an assault rifle."⁴³ On the opposite side of the political spectrum, the Russian officers union "Shield" and the Servicemen's Independent Trade Union announced their support for Yeltsin and Grachev and enjoined servicemen to show patience and obey orders.⁴⁴ However widespread these sentiments within military circles, the military leadership was clearly worried about exacerbating political splits within the armed forces. Podkolzin warned that, as long as the political struggle continued, the danger to military cohesion would grow:

The Army must stand guard over the law and the constitution, but when the two legally elected powers enter into open confrontation with one another, we, like all other citizens of Russia, have to choose. Although we do not want to do it, the Army cannot be beyond politics.⁴⁵

Defense Minister Grachev was more direct in his warning of potential military fracturing when he addressed the Supreme Soviet on 21 March, the day after Yeltsin's declaration of "special rule." Claiming to have talked that very day to "virtually all the commanders of military districts and fleets," that is, senior officers who exercised operational control over military units, the Defense Minister declared "for the umpteenth time" that the military would abide by the constitution and refuse to become involved in politics. That said, Grachev warned the legislators that "certain political forces . . . are nevertheless trying to play the Army card." As examples, he noted the activities of hard-line legislators who were providing moral and material support to anti-Yeltsin military personnel. Because of these activities:

(W)ith every hour the situation is hotting up--the situation is hotting up among the troops in the Moscow region, especially, because of these actions. At present the armed forces could be split through precipitate decisions and actions. There is just one thing that this could lead to: bloodshed. . . . The Army is appealing to you, esteemed people's deputies: in this situation compromises alone are what is needed.⁴⁶

In an interview later that day, Grachev stated that, while the "constitutional crisis has not affected the state of affairs within the armed forces so far . . . this doesn't mean . . . that everything is calm in the Army. There are forces seeking to demoralize the armed forces from within."

Officers' rallies sponsored by military extremists, he charged, could result in an irreversible split within the armed forces.⁴⁷

The next day, a spokesman for the Urals Military District stated that his district was strictly following Grachev's orders of non-involvement, despite "a divergence of views in that regard on the part of [district military officers]." ⁴⁸ According to an article by the military affairs correspondent of a leading pro-reform newspaper published shortly after the crisis, military counterintelligence sources had concluded as early as the day after Yeltsin's decree that "antipresidential feeling" was quite strong among officers and troops in the Moscow region. This feeling also extended to the central command structures of the armed forces themselves.⁴⁹ Thus, it would have been "tantamount to suicide" for the High Command to order troops to intervene.⁵⁰ The High Command therefore had cause to worry about political divisions within the military. Mistrust of politicians, combined with fears about military cohesion, almost certainly were powerful inhibitors of military intervention in this political crisis.

While the military as a whole remained passive, however, Grachev made it clear that he tacitly supported Yeltsin's attempt to resolve the crisis by declaring "special rule." This tacit endorsement was also recognized by Supreme

Soviet Speaker Khasbulatov who berated Grachev for declaring the armed forces to be neutral, but, in reality, supporting Yeltsin's "special rule" decree.⁵¹ At the same time, tacit approval tied Yeltsin's hands: without active military support, he could not physically force the Supreme Soviet to dissolve. Hence, the president found himself having to compromise, to back away from his decree, and to accept a referendum in which the questions seemed stacked against him.

As the political crisis played itself out, military spokesmen continued to emphasize the military's neutrality and the dangers of dragging the armed forces into the political fray. The Defense Ministry's Chief of Personnel, Lieutenant General Bogdanov, stated directly and without qualification the High Command's position in an interview on 23 March. "The Army," he announced, "is above politics, and any political actions within its ranks will lead to a split in the armed forces and to civil war."⁵² Actions and declarations such as those announced by the Officers' Union, Bogdanov declared, were unlawful, unconstitutional, and destabilizing. Nonetheless, the general stated that the Defense Ministry had no plans to "repress" those who participated in the All-Army Officers' Assembly--thus betraying the fear that the High Command had about taking actions that could split the armed forces. Both a Supreme Soviet military deputy, Colonel Aleksey Tsarev, and a Defense

Ministry spokesman added the next day that the then-current constitution and the failure of the Supreme Soviet to enact fundamental "Law on Defense" legislation had opened up the possibility that servicemen could be dragged into politics; the remedy, they opined, involved settling this political conflict and moving quickly to devise and enact such legislation.⁵³

Despite such dire warnings, the military opposition to Yeltsin continued to feed the flames of extremism. Leaders of the military opposition appealed to servicemen to support the legislative branch actively and to mutiny if Yeltsin ordered the military to dissolve the Supreme Soviet or Congress of People's Deputies.⁵⁴ By way of response, the Officers' Assembly of the Voronezh garrison called for the establishment of defensive structures and organizations staffed by active duty servicemen and reservists to defend legislatures throughout the country at all levels from presidential orders to dissolve legislative power.⁵⁵ In contrast, the military commander of the Saratov Province garrison announced that his forces intended to keep out of this political conflict. These declarations exhibited for all to see the divisions existing within the armed forces.⁵⁶ Academician and military specialist Aleksey Arbatov, noting splits within the military and the exacerbating declarations of military extremists, described the situation within

military ranks by 25 March as such:

The more favorable assumption is that the Army will not follow [Yeltsin if he orders the Army to move against parliament]. Worse and, unfortunately, more likely is the assumption that part of the armed forces will support Yeltsin and part of the Army will oppose Yeltsin. Then we [will] have a civil war.⁵⁷

Military intervention was inhibited by a strong fear by all that the danger of civil war was real if the armed forces intervened on one side or the other. Aside from extremists, no one wanted to take that risk. At the same time, no one in the military appeared to want the armed forces, on its own initiative, to intervene to save the nation and the military. The armed forces were outside politics and bound by the constitution in all its actions, declared statement after statement. As stated by Deputy Defense Minister Gromov, one of the most popular officers within the military, on 25 March, the armed forces "do not concern themselves with politics. . . . This crisis must only be solved by peaceful means." Officers, predicted Gromov, no matter their political views and no matter how desperate their personal condition, will not intervene.⁵⁸ Gromov's views appeared correct: according to 26 March report by a journalist with excellent military connections, there was no evidence of military preparations to intervene; only normal training and routine activities were occurring at military garrisons in and around Moscow.⁵⁹ Thus at the height of the crisis, the

leadership of the armed forces maintained its non-involvement. In the final analysis, the Russian Armed Forces did not intervene in the February-March 1993 constitutional crisis because the perceived risk of military fracture and civil war outweighed partisan support within the military for one side or the other. Efforts to convince some in the armed forces to overcome their fears and inhibition and intervene were finally undercut by a resolution of the crisis on 28 March. That said, this spring political crisis would set the stage for the violent October political crisis wherein the military would end up intervening to save the Yeltsin presidency.

Spring Postscript, Fall Prelude: The Army and April's Referendum.

The High Command's concern for military cohesion continued to manifest itself in the days before the 25 April referendum. Deputy Defense Minister Mironov announced that no one would be allowed on military garrisons to campaign for referendum votes. Military commanders and personnel officers would insure that servicemen understood their right to participate, "elucidate" the questions, and explain voting procedures. They were forbidden from lobbying for any referendum outcome. Further, no observers would be allowed

on military posts on the 25th; those servicemen unable to vote at public voting polls could do so at closed polling stations under the supervision of military authorities. According to press reports, these precautions were put in place to limit the ability of political groups to agitate among the troops.⁶⁰

Nonetheless, Defense Minister Grachev, all the while loudly and frequently proclaiming military neutrality, was openly campaigning for military support for Yeltsin in the referendum. Just days before the referendum and after stating that "the armed forces do not support any of the political parties," in an address to servicemen in the Russian Far East on 21 April (reports of which ran the next day in the Defense Ministry's flagship media outlet Krasnaya zvezda), Grachev announced that the Yeltsin government would almost double military pay for officers and triple it for conscripts and enlisted, retroactive to 1 April. Moreover, added Grachev, the Yeltsin government planned to hold a conference in July to resolve the grave issue of military housing.⁶¹ Such a transparent attempt to buy military votes did not go unanswered. Yeltsin foes within the prosecutor general's [Attorney General] office, an office controlled by the Supreme Soviet, not the executive branch, announced on 22 April that Defense Minister Grachev had been implicated in an ongoing investigation of corruption within high military

circles.⁶² Grachev, it was alleged, participated in a scheme to divert money meant for military housing into the pockets of senior officers. Grachev denounced this charge as a politically motivated attempt to discredit him, and through him Yeltsin and the referendum, just days before the vote.⁶³ Without doubt, Grachev was correct--just as, without doubt, Grachev was working to assure military support for Yeltsin in the referendum despite statements of neutrality.

Leading the charge against Yeltsin in the referendum was his own vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoy. This former Air Forces general positioned himself as the voice of reason and moderation within Yeltsin's entourage which he claimed was corrupt and which was, under the banner of reform, pursuing policies ruinous to Mother Russia. Stating that he would run for president if Yeltsin resigned, as the president had promised if he lost the referendum, Rutskoy appealed to his fellow citizens to reject Yeltsin and support honesty, order, and reasonable reform.⁶⁴ No doubt anti-Yeltsin forces hoped that Rutskoy's prominent opposition to Yeltsin would play well within military circles in the upcoming referendum.

For his part, Yeltsin made a direct pitch for the military vote just before the referendum. In a final televised appeal to the country for support the night before the referendum, Yeltsin pledged to better support the military both morally and financially and announced new

benefits for military retirees. He also warned that his defeat in the referendum would increase the chance of war with other former Soviet republics by strengthening his political foes, who were extremists and dangerous nationalists, and emboldening them to act.⁶⁵

Grachev's efforts and Yeltsin's appeals and inducements seemingly swayed most in the military to support the president. According to various reports, military turnout for the referendum was high and Yeltsin himself announced that 68% of military voters supported him in the referendum--some 10% higher than the voting population at large.⁶⁶ The referendum, however, did not resolve Russia's political crisis. It merely postponed that resolution until early October as both sides continued to jockey for power. The military's appeal for political stability would go unanswered.

The Russian Military and the October 1993 Crisis

In the fall of 1993 the Russian military experienced its most critical challenge in civil-military relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union two years earlier. By early September of that year, President Yeltsin had decided to force a resolution between himself and the Supreme Soviet.⁶⁷ As noted above, the relationship between Russia's Chief

Executive and its standing parliament had steadily deteriorated in the two years after the failed August 1991 putsch and, as also noted above, had reached a point by March of 1993 wherein the Supreme Soviet attempted to impeach and remove Yeltsin as president for abuse of power. While this effort failed, Yeltsin thereafter seemed convinced that his enemies, who controlled the legislative branch, meant to destroy him, and would continue their efforts in that direction.⁶⁸ He initially struck back by holding a non-binding four-question referendum in late April which asked citizens if they supported the president, his reform policies, and early elections for president and parliament. The results of the referendum revealed continued support for Yeltsin and his policies--58.5% and 52.9% respectively--and some support for early presidential--32%--and legislative--41.4%--elections.⁶⁹ Yeltsin used the referendum results to push for a new constitution and early national elections. His legislative enemies rejected the referendum as manufactured propaganda and continued to confront the president into the summer on various economic and social policies as well as, most importantly, on the content and implementation of a new constitution and the need for early elections. Sensing that the legislature would never approve a new constitution nor early elections, and realizing that his strategy of bypassing the national legislature and forging an alliance with regional and local political leaders

to force constitutional change had failed, Yeltsin decided to dissolve the legislative branch and call for new elections and a popular vote for his new constitution. This was a move clearly unconstitutional under the still-operative Soviet era constitution.⁷⁰ Indeed, Yeltsin later admitted that he fully expected the Constitutional Court to rule such a move unconstitutional and an impeachable offense.⁷¹ In Yeltsin's mind, however, it was time to act even if it meant forcing a risky and potentially violent showdown. As he noted in his memoirs, "Russia was drowning in lawlessness," his enemies were thwarting vital reform policies, and these same enemies were trying to emasculate the presidency.⁷²

Yeltsin Forces A Constitutional Crisis.

In a recorded television statement broadcast at 8 p.m. on 21 September, Yeltsin announced that he had signed Presidential Decree 1400 which dissolved the parliament and set a mid-December date for legislative elections and a vote on a new constitution.⁷³ In this televised speech to the nation, the president declared the parliament's dissolution and stated that he would rule by decree until a new legislature was seated after the December elections. He sought to justify what was, in effect, a constitutional coup by blaming the legislature for pursuing a confrontational

path against presidential authority which would only lead to violence and mass disorder. Legislative leaders had become implacable foes against political and economic reform, he asserted, and were thwarting all his efforts to enact and execute vital reforms. This struggle was worsening Russia's crisis and had gone on far too long without resolution. An impasse with this "irreconcilable opposition" gave him no choice but to act to "save Russia for ourselves and our children." To maintain order and enforce his decree, he pointedly noted that the "power ministries" (Defense, Security, and Internal Affairs) were directly responsible to him as president and that he would ensure public safety was maintained. Two days later he announced that he would stand for reelection in a presidential election which would take place two years earlier than required by law: June 1994 vice June 1996.

The Supreme Soviet, meeting in emergency session late on 21 September, refused to accept its dissolution. Shortly after Yeltsin's nationwide television address, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, denounced Yeltsin's actions as unconstitutional; announced that the legislature had impeached and removed the president; enjoined other governmental bodies, especially law enforcement, internal security, and military personnel, to refuse to obey Yeltsin; called for mass public protests and strikes; and

announced that Vice President Rutskoy would be sworn in as president and would shortly address the nation.⁷⁴ For his part, Rutskoy labeled Yeltsin's actions a coup d'etat, announced that his first act as Russian president would be the repeal of Yeltsin's decree, and charged that Yeltsin had ordered the Ministry of Internal Affairs' elite Dzerzhinskiy division, stationed near Moscow, to deploy into Moscow in order to use force to remove deputies from the "White House," the Supreme Soviet building.⁷⁵ In a news conference later on 21 September, Khasbulatov and Rutskoy declared their intention to defend the White House and resist force with force.⁷⁶ That same night, the Supreme Soviet voted to remove Defense Minister Grachev from office and in his place installed Vladimir Achalov, a noted reactionary retired general who had served on Khasbulatov's staff for over a year.⁷⁷ The Internal Affairs and Security ministers were similarly removed from office.⁷⁸ And, not unexpectedly, on that same momentous night a sharply divided Constitutional Court declared Yeltsin's decree unconstitutional, and its chairman declared the president's action an impeachable offense.⁷⁹

From the beginning it was clear that the key factors which would influence the outcome of this power struggle were the loyalties and actions of the government apparatus, especially the so-called power ministries; reactions in

Russia's two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg; and reactions in several important regions. At the very outset, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin announced his government's support for President Yeltsin. The president, averred Chernomyrdin, had no intention of using the military or internal troops to dissolve the parliament. Calling for calm in cities and provinces, he sought to assure his countrymen that all was more or less normal and that they should go about their usual business: the government was in place and would continue its functions, draconian moves such as martial law or mass arrests were not being contemplated, and the December elections would resolve the question of legislative and presidential powers.⁸⁰ While thousands of Supreme Soviet supporters converged on the White House to protest Yeltsin's actions and set up barricades to fend off an attack by government forces,⁸¹ Yeltsin's moves did not spark mass protests. Most Russians seemed to heed Chernomyrdin.

The Army's Initial Reaction: We Are Neutral--Sort Of.

Officers and servicemen thus found themselves in the middle of a constitutional crisis, verging on a potentially violent showdown, and possible civil war. Here was the High Command's worst nightmare, far exceeding the abortive executive-legislative confrontation earlier in the year. In

short, in the fall of 1993, the Russian Army faced its most serious civil-military relations test since the anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991.

The military's initial public reaction to the presidential decree and legislative response was to declare, as it had during the March-April political crisis, that it "will maintain strict political neutrality." Likewise, Defense Minister Grachev announced that the armed forces would continue to perform their duties to "ensure the security of the state," which duties now included increased security measures at military weapons' facilities and strategic installations, and the prevention of political agitation at military bases.⁸² According to a senior U.S. official, no unusual troop movements were noted at this time,⁸³ thus suggesting that the military had not been assigned any role in the crisis and that the High Command saw the situation as a political dispute in which it had no part.

That President Yeltsin considered military neutrality to work to his advantage was plain from the start. Three weeks before he dissolved the legislative branch, Yeltsin had visited several elite military units in the Moscow area. In his memoirs he claimed that his visits to these elite units--elements of the Kantemirovskaya, Tamanskaya, and 106th Airborne divisions--were part of an effort to familiarize himself with conditions and attitudes within military units.

Nonetheless, these visits took on extra significance in light of his decision to dissolve the legislature, which he had not yet divulged to anyone but his closest aide. Yeltsin wrote that he said nothing about his plans while visiting these units, but came away convinced that "they would support me . . . (t)here would be no betrayal."⁸⁴ Two weeks later, Yeltsin inspected the Internal Affairs Ministry's (MVD) Dzerzhinskiy Division, the MVD's military unit responsible for security in Moscow. In all these visits, he expressed his admiration for servicemen, his support for stabilizing the erratic military budget, and his favorable inclination for a pay increase.⁸⁵ Observers commented that the president was trying to counter the efforts of the Supreme Soviet to curry military favor by its call for a higher defense budget and visits by deputies to military units during the summer. Yeltsin was also checking on the loyalty of those troops to be involved in any military showdown with the Supreme Soviet, according to many of these observers. Yeltsin's political enemies took this argument one step further and argued that the president was trying to contain increasing military discontent over budget shortfalls and was even trying to woo troops with false promises. Still others argued that, regardless of either sides' efforts to win the support of critical Moscow area units, the mood within the military was decidedly apolitical, reflecting the disillusionment and disgust within the military for all politicians.⁸⁶

Defense Minister Grachev, notwithstanding his initial announcement of military neutrality, supported Yeltsin in this showdown, albeit with no small trepidation over the impact such a crisis could have on the armed forces. According to Yeltsin's memoirs, Grachev was first made aware of his plans to prorogue the legislature on 12 September. Yeltsin claimed that Grachev had been pressing him for months to show firmness and "close down" the Supreme Soviet. He thus had no doubt of Grachev's full support and, indeed, the Defense Minister "was glad that I had taken action" and was in complete agreement, as were the Internal Affairs and Security Ministers, with the "proposed measures."⁸⁷

The "proposed measures" did not include use of military units, according to Yeltsin. The initial timetable fixed the decree's announcement for Sunday, 19 September, and the occupation of the White House on that day by the MVD's Dzerzhinskiy Division. It was assumed that the 19th, being a Sunday, would find the Supreme Soviet building empty and no force would be needed or used. A coup de main would deprive Yeltsin's enemies a headquarters and symbol for any countermoves, and capture the significant weapons cache they had (allegedly) stockpiled at the White House.⁸⁸

Unfortunately, wrote Yeltsin, the plan was leaked-- probably by Supreme Soviet sympathizers in the Internal Affairs or Security Ministry who got wind of it as

preparations went forward.⁸⁹ At this point, two days before the decree's announcement, all three power ministers advised Yeltsin to postpone enacting the decree. They feared that Khasbulatov and Rutskoy would convene the Supreme Soviet early on the 19th, thus assuring that any move to occupy the White House would lead to an armed clash. Yeltsin agreed to a two-day delay, but also ordered his ministers to provide a fallback plan to occupy the building without casualties. Grachev and the other power ministers "left my office in agitation," wrote Yeltsin.⁹⁰ Yeltsin decided that the Dzerzhinskiy Division would still enter the city on the originally planned date, but, rather than occupy the White House, it would participate in anti-crime operations with the Moscow city police. They "caught a large number of criminals."⁹¹

Despite being ordered to develop a plan to seize the White House without casualties, the power ministers concluded that such an operation was impossible and related this judgment to Yeltsin. In a formal meeting mid-day on the 21st, scant hours before Yeltsin's televised announcement of his decree, Grachev and the other ministers persuaded the president not to deploy any military or internal affairs troops in Moscow lest they incite a violent response from Supreme Soviet supporters. In retrospect, wrote a rueful Yeltsin, "a fear and unwillingness to use force" soon led to

tragedy.⁹²

By afternoon on the 22nd, less than a day after his decree, Yeltsin, after consultation with his power ministers, decided to wait out the Supreme Soviet by cutting off communications, power, and any resupplies; denying entry to, but not exit from, the White House for anyone; proceeding forward on the December vote; and negotiating with the Supreme Soviet on the basis of his decree. This blockade of the White House, and the maintenance of order in Moscow, would be enforced by Moscow city police assisted by, as necessary, the MVD's special paramilitary police units (known by their Russian acronym OMON), and MVD troops (such as the Dzerzhinskiy Division). Army troops would enter Moscow only "if the situation [deteriorated and] required a tougher response."⁹³

After this meeting, Yeltsin, Grachev, and Internal Affairs Minister Yerin together mingled with Moscow crowds in what Yeltsin claims in his memoirs was an impromptu effort to gauge the mood and attitude of the man-in-the-street.⁹⁴ Russian media, including television, extensively depicted Yeltsin, flanked by Grachev and Yerin, working a supportive street crowd. Both Grachev and Yerin emphasized that their ministries and personnel fully supported the president.⁹⁵ Moreover, the ministers claimed that efforts by the Supreme Soviet to suborn military and police personnel had been

rebuffed. This imagery of military support for the president was explicitly noted by Grachev who said:

As far as the armed forces are concerned, yesterday and today I had negotiations with my commanders of all ranks. They in turn held talks and meetings with all their unit commanders who definitely declared full support for their Commander-in-Chief President Yeltsin and will carry out only the orders of Defence Minister Grachev.⁹⁶

Grachev and His Generals, The Morning After.

What allowed Defense Minister Grachev to, at least verbally, so strongly and publicly back President Yeltsin less than a day after the decree to dissolve the legislature was announced? According to Grachev, he discussed the situation with senior officers throughout the country shortly after the decree. Further, an emergency meeting of the Military Collegium convened in Moscow the morning after. In his first news conference after the decree, Grachev claimed that, as a result of this meeting of the military's top commanders, "all of (the senior military leadership) declared unanimously that they were under the subordination only of the Defense Minister and President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin."⁹⁷ The situation throughout the military was "calm," commanders of units across the country recognized Yeltsin as their commander-in-chief, and they had been instructed to "nip in the bud" all provocations directed at their units.⁹⁸

As noted above, Grachev also ordered military units to tighten installation security and to follow their regular, scheduled routine. He also ordered all units to reject any verbal orders received from Moscow and verify written orders; all legitimate orders must include his and the General Staff Chief's signature.⁹⁹

Press reports appeared to verify Grachev's claim that military units throughout the country were conducting normal activities in garrison or routine exercises, remained calm, and had not received any special operational instructions. Khabarovsk Radio Network reported units in the Far East Military District were carrying out their regular routine.¹⁰⁰ Other media organizations reported that units in the (obviously crucial) Moscow Military District followed normal routines, including preparations to assist in the upcoming potato harvest and scheduled combat training under the rubric "Exercise Tsentr." They had not been put on a heightened alert status, nor were they preparing to move into Moscow.¹⁰¹ For his part, Chief of the General Staff Kolesnikov came out in support of Yeltsin, stating in an interview that the military would not be drawn into this political crisis and would perform only its constitutional role as the defender of the motherland from outside aggression.¹⁰²

This early verbal public support for Yeltsin appears in large measure to have been the result of military anger

toward the Supreme Soviet's pleas to military units to ignore orders of Grachev and Yeltsin. This anger, in turn, was based on the fear that the Supreme Soviet risked splitting the military into hostile camps, thus, in the minds of servicemen, giving rise to the very real prospect of civil war. As noted above, within hours of Yeltsin's decree, Rutskoy and Khasbulatov engineered the putative sacking of Grachev and called on military personnel to ignore orders not issued by the Supreme Soviet. Beyond this, moreover, within a few hours after Yeltsin's decree, Rutskoy and his "Defense Minister" retired General Achalov contacted military units in the Moscow region and ordered them to defend the White House.¹⁰³ Later on the 22nd, the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution declaring invalid and illegal any orders issued by Yeltsin and Grachev after Yeltsin's decree, and threatened any serviceman with "criminal prosecution" for carrying them out. Moreover, a secret list of military units ordered to obey Achalov and defend the White House was compiled and written into the law.¹⁰⁴

The Supreme Soviet decided to raise the stakes probably because the deputies realized the danger of being seen as impotent. According to Russian press reports, except for supporters surrounding the White House, numbers of which varied from several hundred to several thousand during the course of the first post-decree day, there was no response to

the Supreme Soviet's call for mass protest actions nor for military units to come to the parliament's aid.¹⁰⁵ For example, the commander of the critically-located Kantemirovskaya Division, which played a role in the August 1991 coup attempt, declared that his troops would not enter Moscow under any circumstances.¹⁰⁶ The importance of military support for the Supreme Soviet was noted by Khasbulatov:

The Armed Forces have long ceased holding a stand of neutrality in politics. They cannot remain indifferent to what is happening to the country and therefore I have no doubts that (they) will obey the law and Constitution.¹⁰⁷

Yeltsin's response to this effort to suborn troops was swift and direct. The president promulgated another decree on the 22nd declaring any orders to military units or other government entities by the Supreme Soviet were to be considered illegal and to be ignored.¹⁰⁸

Grachev's response was even swifter. As noted above, he consulted with other senior officers almost immediately after Yeltsin's dissolution decree. The High Command declared that the armed forces had no intention of being dragged into this domestic political crisis. Yeltsin had agreed to keep the military out of action and on the sidelines asking only, in effect, for the military's acquiescence and neutrality. The Supreme Soviet, however, ordered the military to intervene on its side, with the very strong inference that it expected the military to use force

when necessary to support the legislature against Yeltsin. This the High Command could not abide. In the news conference after his meeting with other top officers, Grachev also stated:

All the commanding personnel of the Armed Forces are outraged . . . and have declared unanimously that they will not obey the orders of the (Supreme Soviet).¹⁰⁹

The armed forces support for Yeltsin became implicit in this stance. This support, however, was not for Yeltsin per se, but for the legitimacy of Yeltsin as president, the maintenance of stability within the country, and the avoidance of civil strife. This attitude was best expressed by Grachev in his news conference. Noting the efforts of the Supreme Soviet to destroy the military chain of command and its similarity to the failed coup of August 1991, he went on to say:

Extremist-minded . . . forces are once again attempting to make officers confront one other on the barricades. We realize the serious danger of such calls: if there is a split among officers, and if they take up arms against one another, a chain reaction will immediately spread to society as a whole. . . . (W)e cannot allow this to happen. This would be . . . a start of a real civil war.¹¹⁰

Thus Grachev himself, in noting the failed 1991 coup, indicated the High Command's mind-set: stay out of the political fray, hunker down, and stop all attempts to drag military units into the struggle. The High Command appeared convinced that to intervene actively was to risk the

military's disintegration and civil war. This attitude, along with the concomitant orders sent by the High Command to all military units, betrayed the belief that the military was a fragile institution, itself divided on politics and the right course of action to assure a condign future for Russia. Indeed, the Supreme Soviet's calls for military support suggest that its leadership was counting on these splits to help it defeat and remove Yeltsin.

The High Command had to acknowledge, however, that the crisis could turn violent, thereby making it difficult, if not impossible, for the military to remain on the sidelines. Perhaps in an effort to forestall this possibility, Grachev warned the Supreme Soviet that, if forced to intervene, the military would support Yeltsin to restore order. "If confrontation with legally elected authority continues and . . . blood is spilled in clashes between different political movements . . . be sure that the Army will not keep aloof," he declared at his news conference.¹¹¹ Moreover, he concluded, "(i)f the blood of completely innocent people in Russia is shed, the Army will have its say. And it will have its say in a decisive manner."¹¹²

Thus the military's mood in the first day after Yeltsin's decree could be described as desperate to stay out of the political showdown, and fearful that, if events spun out of control, it would have no choice but to intervene. It

also seems clear that the High Command opted for Yeltsin not out of any concern for or against democratic principles, but because the military recognized Yeltsin's legitimacy and longed for political stability so as to get its own house in order. The tack taken by the Supreme Soviet promised to embroil the military in a political showdown that risked disintegration and civil war.¹¹³ Given the military's mindset, the High Command followed the pattern first established in August 1991 and repeated in March-April 1993.

Unfortunately for the military, this approach left it hostage to the actions of an increasingly desperate group of men who would use force to resolve the crisis after little more than a day following Yeltsin's decree.

The Supreme Soviet Actively Looks For Military Support.

As the crisis entered its second day, the Russian press reported on the efforts of the Supreme Soviet to gain support within the military. Ruskoy sent letters to the commanders-in-chief of Russia's various services urging them "to adopt an active stance, a stance in keeping with an officer's honor and his oath of allegiance" to save the motherland from destruction and dictatorship. Of note, he couched his appeal from one professional to another: "I appeal to you as an officer. . . . Do not stand aside from what is happening. . . .

The Army cannot remain outside politics."¹¹⁴

On the morning of 23 September, a day and a half after the decree, an angry Grachev held another news conference. He had several purposes. First, he again sought to assure the country that the High Command stood four-square behind Yeltsin. He appeared with all the service chiefs, all deputy defense ministers save one,¹¹⁵ and several military district commanders.¹¹⁶ He declared that the military leadership considered Yeltsin to be the only legitimate president and Russia's Commander-in-Chief and that it did not recognize the legitimacy of the Supreme Soviet, the self-proclaimed president Ruskoy, or any ministers appointed by him or the Supreme Soviet. Second, Grachev made a point of stating that the military leadership considered him to be the only legitimate defense minister and that he retained their loyalty, understanding full well that he supported the decree of President Yeltsin: "Today," stated Grachev, "I received full confirmation of full support for the Ministry of Defense's position." Tellingly exposing the real fear of the military's senior leadership, Grachev added that his fellow generals supported him as Defense Minister "in order to preserve the unity of the Army and, in particular, its nuclear security." Third, he denounced continuing attempts by the Supreme Soviet to drag military units into this political fray, and reiterated that no military unit

recognized the legitimacy of Supreme Soviet-appointed ministers nor had any gone over to the legislature; rather, military units were conducting normal, scheduled activities. While all remained calm within the military, Grachev charged, Supreme Soviet representatives were still engaging in "psychological attacks" aimed at "introducing disharmony" into the military, and this would not be tolerated; any officer who supported such efforts would be dismissed from the military, stated Grachev. Finally, he warned the Supreme Soviet that the military would support MVD troops and paramilitary police units who were now prepared to respond if the legislature provoked violence against peaceful citizens or directed attacks against government facilities.¹¹⁷ For his part, the military's second-ranking officer, General Staff Chief Kolesnikov, after commenting on the purpose of an ongoing military exercise, stated the essence of the military's view:

I obey the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Defense obeys the Supreme Commander in Chief. The Army is strong and mighty because of its linchpin, and its linchpin is one-man command.¹¹⁸

Other reports suggested, however, that this impressive show of support, while essentially a true indication of the military's general mood and stance, glossed over some disagreement in the armed forces over the strong support accorded to Yeltsin by Grachev. A spokesman for the Black Sea Fleet commented on the 23rd that the vast majority of the

fleet's officers were adopting "wait and see tactics and offering no opinions." "This reflects," he added, "the experience of the August [1991] coup"--a not very veiled reference to the fact that the fleet's officers had actively supported the anti-Gorbachev (and anti-Yeltsin) coup plotters at that time. Moreover, Ruskoy was popular within the fleet, and the Supreme Soviet had strongly supported the fleet against Ukrainian efforts to gain control over it,¹¹⁹ going so far as to proclaim Sevastopol, Ukraine, the headquarters of the fleet, a Russian city.¹²⁰ The fleet's commander, Vice Admiral Baltin, asserted that his officers were conducting normal activities, but at the same time cautioned them to "remain calm."¹²¹

On 23 September, the anti-Yeltsin newspaper Pravda interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Terekhov, the head of the hard-line anti-Grachev Officers' Union, who claimed that his organization was galvanizing support within the military for the Supreme Soviet. According to Terekhov, they were having some success, and he warned, in reference to the competing claims of legitimacy, that "today it will be decided once and for all whether jurisdiction will change hands, or, possibly, whether there will be real actions to eliminate the dyarchy."¹²² Terekhov, without doubt, sought to inflate the Supreme Soviet's success in its campaign to get servicemen to switch loyalty. Nonetheless, at the same time, the press

continued to report that Supreme Soviet military deputies were "working in military units" to gain active support for the legislature.¹²³ Grachev himself betrayed concern over Terekhov's activities when, in his 23 September news conference, he threatened Terekhov and other officers by name with dismissal for their actions within military units.¹²⁴ Other comments, moreover, suggest that some in the military would disobey any orders to intervene on Yeltsin's side. In press interviews several anonymous officers bemoaned the situation in which the military had been placed, blamed both sides to one degree or the other, and asserted that military officers would not take up arms in this struggle.¹²⁵ In the words of the Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District: "We have received no order. Everyone evidently expects provocation [a reaction] from us. There won't be any--our weapons are not loaded."¹²⁶ This attitude of neutrality vexed Supreme Soviet supporters. In a press conference on 23 September Speaker Khasbulatov commented in some perplexity:

I don't understand the military's hesitation and lack of resolution. Yes, the Army is outside politics, but it has long been embroiled up to its ears in politics. The Army should state that it protects the laws of the state and the interests of the Constitution, not the individual who has disgraced the whole country.¹²⁷

Violence Erupts--And the Military Is At the Center.

Later on the 23rd, rumors swept Moscow that the military had finally decided to intervene: military units were marching on Moscow and that the High Command's telephone connections had been cut. A presidential spokesman publicly discounted rumors of unusual troop movements stating that, "I don't think(!) they are taking place," and pointedly (and tellingly) added that senior military officers in control of troops had pledged their loyalty to the Defense Minister "who is backing President Yeltsin."¹²⁸

While the rumors of unusual military movements were inaccurate, the military's civilian telephone links in Moscow were apparently cut, and the High Command increased security measures at its facilities in Moscow, charging that the Supreme Soviet had plans to seize the main Ministry of Defense building and General Staff Headquarters in Moscow. Media reports speculated that the phone lines were disconnected by order of Grachev who, upon hearing that a retired hard-line anti-Yeltsin general had gained access to a Moscow military facility and had tried to contact military units, decided to preclude any success in such efforts.¹²⁹ An official military press release stated that, because the Defense Ministry had reliable information of a plot by the Supreme Soviet to seize the main Ministry and General Staff buildings, "all necessary measures, including armed measures,

have been taken to head off any provocation."¹³⁰

The Defense Ministry's information was only partially correct. An attack on a military facility was planned by supporters of the Supreme Soviet, but not against the Defense Ministry building or General Staff Headquarters. Shortly after 9 p.m. on the night of 23 September, Terekhov and members of the Officers' Union assaulted the Headquarters of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) High Command with automatic weapons.¹³¹ The assault was repulsed by local police and MVD troops, and most of the attackers apparently escaped, but not before several people were wounded and two were killed.¹³²

According to some Russian press reports, Terekhov's actions were not sanctioned by the Supreme Soviet. That body was split between extremists like Terekhov, who believed that using violence would increase chances of success for the anti-Yeltsin forces, and more moderate Supreme Soviet supporters who rejected any violent offensive (as opposed to defensive) response to Yeltsin's moves.¹³³ On a more tactical plane, it also appears that Terekhov and his supporters picked the CIS Headquarters to attack so as to gain access to its communications equipment. Also, according to Grachev and a Security Ministry official, Terekhov aborted a planned attack on a military intelligence unit in Moscow when his group encountered strong resistance.¹³⁴

Yeltsin and his advisers were quick to conclude that the Supreme Soviet had either decided to foment violence in support of its struggle with the President or that extremists among Supreme Soviet supporters were no longer under the control of that body's leadership.¹³⁵ As far as Yeltsin was concerned, the attack signaled a new, very dangerous stage in his struggle with his political enemies: the crisis was deteriorating into a "undeclared civil war."¹³⁶ Consequently, he decided to reinforce security at government buildings in Moscow and impose a "strict blockade" around the White House which would allow people only to exit the building. In his memoirs, Yeltsin claimed that he still had no intention of using army troops to carry out the latter move and that the main burden remained upon the Internal Affairs Ministry and its forces.¹³⁷ Yeltsin also quickly issued a decree subordinating all armed organizations at the White House, particularly the Supreme Soviet's security force, to the Internal Affairs Ministry and ordered that these organizations be disarmed. The decree also ordered the Defense Ministry to assist in the disarming of these organizations.¹³⁸

As a result of these decisions, the police presence around the White House was dramatically increased and several hundred MVD troops were deployed to a holding area just two miles from the Supreme Soviet building.¹³⁹ These moves

sparked rumors that the government was planning to storm the White House soon to resolve the crisis. Yeltsin, however, publicly stated that no such plans existed and that he had no intention of using force.¹⁴⁰ Internal Affairs Minister Yerin and Defense Minister Grachev both commented that these moves were defensive and meant to avoid any further violence.¹⁴¹

Hardening Political Battle Lines Erode Military Passivity.

The crisis having taken a violent turn, leaders on both sides appeared to step up their efforts to ensure military support. They sensed that fissures, which had the strong potential of dragging the military directly into the conflict, were developing on both sides of the now-strengthened barricades and that it was critical to assure military support.

Indeed, fissures were apparent within the ranks of Supreme Soviet supporters. Supreme Soviet speaker Khasbulatov publicly commented that, if Yeltsin ordered an attack on the White House, little could or should be done to try to repel the assault.¹⁴² "Our weapons are the authority and force of law," declared Khasbulatov.¹⁴³ At the same time, more militant Supreme Soviet supporters increased their preparations to defend themselves in case of an attack, and to garner support from military, police, and security

personnel. As one member of the Officers' Union defending the White House put it:

You know, most of the deputies don't really realise the seriousness of the situation they're in here. We've told those with doubts to go home. The building is not built to be defended but we'll fight if they launch an attack. If that's the way it must end, so be it.¹⁴⁴

In an interview that suggested divisions also within military and government circles, Defense Minister Grachev contradicted public statements by Deputy Defense Minister Kobets which had threatened imminent government military action against the White House.¹⁴⁵ According to Grachev, "(t)here will be no storming of the White House."¹⁴⁶ Moreover, Grachev reiterated that the military would not get involved, except to defend itself, as long as he was Defense Minister and that "the bandits should be blockaded, disarmed, and dispersed by (MVD) troops."¹⁴⁷ At the same time, however, he implied that the military would not stand by if the situation was edging toward civil war. Internal Affairs Minister Yerin noted that some in the government were urging "decisive action" but that Yeltsin did not think such an escalation, which would result in much bloodshed, was justified.¹⁴⁸ The latest moves, said Yerin, were designed to convince those defending the White House to disperse.¹⁴⁹

Notwithstanding statements by Yeltsin and his supporters that their moves were intended to deter further

violence, the government's response to the 23 September armed attacks raised prospects for a violent showdown and, ultimately, the involvement of the military in this contest for supreme political power. For its part, the military left no doubt that any further attacks on its facilities would meet with deadly force. Deputy Defense Minister Kobets announced instructions "to shoot to kill" those who "invade military facilities," and Defense Minister Grachev revealed that airborne and regular troops have been brought into Moscow to stiffen the protection of military facilities.¹⁵⁰ Grachev and Kobets coupled their warning with scathing comments directed at former senior officers, including Supreme Soviet "Defense Minister" Achalov, for arming the parliament's supporters and then inciting extremists among them to "venture on an armed clash."¹⁵¹ Beginning to fear the real possibility of civil war, the military leadership, already forced into taking sides passively, was inexorably losing its ability to remain passive and was approaching a decision to actively intervene on Yeltsin's side. In short, the military's fate was slipping from the hands of the military leadership.

In response to Yeltsin's aggressive moves, the Supreme Soviet tried to assemble a force capable of deterring an attack while, at the same time, portraying its effort to win over military personnel and units to be a successful one.

Retired hard-line general Makashov, appointed Deputy Defense Minister by the Supreme Soviet, asserted that the defenders of the White House had been strengthened by additional armed men.¹⁵² "Defense Minister" Achalov claimed that two Supreme Soviet battalions of over 1000 men had been formed consisting of military volunteers, elements of military units, military cadets, members of the Officers' Union, retired servicemen, and reservists from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Press reports indicated, however, no such visible support in the White House or adjacent streets.¹⁵³ Moreover, what "troops" there were, were described as a motley collection of amateurs.¹⁵⁴ Ruts koy, nonetheless, asserted that military support was forthcoming and claimed that senior military officials from nine military districts had pledged loyalty to the Supreme Soviet.¹⁵⁵

Grachev moved quickly to puncture these claims of a divided military cracking under the strain. At a press conference on the 25th, Grachev asserted that he had just met with the entire military leadership and that it continued to unanimously support Yeltsin's position. "The Army," claimed Grachev, "unequivocally supports the President, there is no dissension anywhere in the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces are under normal control."¹⁵⁶ He again castigated those who supported the parliament, warning that "outbreaks of violence" in Moscow were likely in the next few days because

the Supreme Soviet was arming criminals.¹⁵⁷ Grachev's position remained constant and clear: the military does not intend to get involved and will defend itself if attacked. That said, the military would not stand by if, in its judgment, the crisis was deteriorating toward civil war.¹⁵⁸

Despite the military leadership's hostility to its cause, the Supreme Soviet continued its stepped-up attempt to gain active support from military personnel or some military unit. On 26 August, Rutskoy, announcing that he would fight to the death if the White House were attacked, publicly called for the armed forces to abandon Yeltsin.¹⁵⁹ According to Yeltsin, Rutskoy personally appealed to military district commanders by telephone. On the basis of his status as a general and career military officer, he "begged, demanded, shouted" for support from his military friends, one of whom included the Air Forces Commander. The rebel Vice President was nonetheless rebuffed.¹⁶⁰ Still, Rutskoy claimed that the Supreme Soviet had gained significant support in the Leningrad, Volga, and Siberian Military Districts. Once again Grachev had to deny Rutskoy's claim, and the military press carried statements from spokesmen from two of these military districts which disputed any report that servicemen were engaged in activities other than normal, scheduled operations.¹⁶¹ Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin, the only civilian in the senior military leadership, also asserted

that all remained normal among military units, and Deputy Minister of Security Yevgeniy Savostyanov stated that "there have been no unscheduled troop maneuvers."¹⁶²

Nonetheless, some military personnel did heed Rutskoy's appeal and went to the White House to take up its defense.¹⁶³ For the most part, as earlier, these people were anti-Yeltsin extremists, and their numbers remained insignificant.¹⁶⁴ Despite this, the military leadership worried about the mood of the troops and their susceptibility to Supreme Soviet appeals. Rutskoy claimed that General Staff officers had been dispatched to units to monitor servicemen, a wholly believable assertion.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the main military media ostentatiously reported to its readers and listeners--mostly servicemen--that everything was normal throughout the military despite claims and rumors to the contrary. At the same time, the military media clearly pushed the line that non-intervention and support for Yeltsin would guarantee stability and a peaceful resolution of the political conflict.¹⁶⁶ Yeltsin's next moves, supported by Grachev, were, however, to push the political conflict across the line toward violence.

Increased Violence Leads To Military Fears Of Disintegration.

On the night of 28-29 September the first major civil disturbance of the crisis erupted. Riot police and Supreme Soviet supporters clashed in the vicinity of the White House, leaving one policeman dead and many people injured. Yeltsin responded by again demanding the disarming of those supporting the legislature and the evacuation of the White House by 4 October. Grachev opined that extremists had taken over the opposition and that they were planning a terrorist assassination campaign against government figures.¹⁶⁷ Importantly, given his comments about military intervention if the crisis appeared to be sliding into civil war, the Defense Minister depicted this turn of events as the first step on the road to civil war. Nonetheless, Yeltsin still rejected the use of force; in his memoirs he wrote that a continued, tighter blockade of the White House would eventually force the Supreme Soviet to surrender.¹⁶⁸ Indeed, one press report highlighted the growing desperation among the Supreme Soviet and its supporters.¹⁶⁹ At the same time, however, other press reports noted the growing restiveness in the provinces, as local and regional legislative bodies increasingly aligned themselves with the embattled Supreme Soviet.¹⁷⁰ The dynamic developing a week into the crisis was a mix of confidence, desperation, and increasing pressure on both sides to force a resolution.

Military spokesmen sharply criticized this latest, violent turn of events. In a page 1 editorial report, Krasnaya zvezda condemned those "destabilizing society, inciting civil war on Russian territory." It blasted the Supreme Soviet for harboring "men of ambition who have no aversion to building a career . . . on the blood of innocent people." Moreover, it charged that these extremists were inciting hatred and violence toward police and MVD servicemen who were depicted as honorable servicemen simply obeying orders. The article ended with the question, "so will Russia really lack the strength and the sense to stop the impending (civil war)?"¹⁷¹ Although this diatribe was directed toward the Supreme Soviet, it reflected the growing mood in the military that officers and servicemen were innocent pawns caught in a political crisis which was risking civil war brought about by venal and incompetent politicians. Military spokesmen also played up the idea that the military was above the fray, above the dirty, dishonest level of politics and politicians. Krasnaya zvezda's senior commentator pointedly wrote that the armed forces, often "humiliated, slandered, and betrayed by politicians," were nonetheless immune to political games. "The Army," he asserted, "now is the only reliable guarantor of Russia's integrity."¹⁷²

This claim of military unity, calm, honor, and service to the nation was contradicted by military spokesmen

responding to reports of mutinies and to reports that some in the military had answered calls for support from the Supreme Soviet. Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin publicly discounted rumors of military splits on 30 September, claiming that all servicemen were "obeying the orders of . . . Grachev."¹⁷³ At the same time he noted that the High Command was concerned about its ability to maintain control over the troops and warned potential mutineers that the High Command disposed of enough force to suppress any mutinous action and that "such arbitrary action automatically comes under an article prescribing execution by firing squad."¹⁷⁴

For the first time military personnel were being threatened with death if they obeyed the calls of the Supreme Soviet. Such a public threat belied assertions that all was calm within the armed forces and again betrayed the growing fear within the military's leadership that the armed forces could fragment because of the current political crisis. Moreover, this startling statement was delivered by the High Command's only civilian, suggesting that uniformed officers were reluctant to mention execution or that divisions within the High Command militated against a senior officer making the threat.

Senior military spokesmen also continued to highlight the fact that Yeltsin, the government, and the Defense Ministry leadership were concerned about bread-and-butter

military issues such as pay and housing and that they were working to resolve problems in these areas.¹⁷⁵ The High Command was trying to assure military unity and non-involvement, it appears, through both a carrot and stick approach. Some press reports pointed to deepening divisions within the military. According to one report, officers were split by generation and by rank. Junior officers allegedly supported Yeltsin while more senior officers were divided in their political loyalties.¹⁷⁶ Another report indicated that the Defense Ministry and General Staff phones were still cut, making it difficult to contact military units except through channels controlled by senior officers.¹⁷⁷ To forestall military movements based on illegal orders, Grachev noted that he had instituted "strict personnel control" within units through specially created "operative work groups."¹⁷⁸

Throughout all this, Defense Minister Grachev continued to assert, not surprisingly in the military press, that he was in complete control of the armed forces and that they remained loyal to President Yeltsin despite attempts by the Supreme Soviet to suborn officers and servicemen.¹⁷⁹ He called for the suppression of extremist forces by MVD and police units to "normalize the situation," that is, to end the crisis and take the pressure off of the military.¹⁸⁰ As the political crisis sharpened in the second week, the High Command feared for the armed forces' unity and Mother Russia.

The Military Is Pushed Into Intervention.

At this point both Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet agreed to negotiations mediated by the Russian Orthodox Church. According to his memoirs, Yeltsin agreed to this course of action because he wanted to do anything to avoid a violent showdown, which he dreaded. Clashes in Moscow became a daily occurrence and Yeltsin had become convinced that well-armed extremists, craving a violent confrontation, had seized power within the Supreme Soviet.¹⁸¹ This view was confirmed, he claimed, when those very extremists rejected an accord negotiated under the church's auspices on 1 October between representatives of Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. As far as Yeltsin was now concerned, "the situation had spiraled out of the politicians' control." The extremists, continued Yeltsin, then decided to escalate the crisis by seizing government, military, and media facilities on 3 October, the day before the government's latest ultimatum was to expire. Nonetheless, Yeltsin wrote, as late as the morning of 3 October "the Council of Ministers [and I] did not discuss forceful options to resolve the conflict. As before, we were hoping for a renewal of the talks moderated by the patriarch."¹⁸²

Whether planned or not, by the afternoon of 3 October

some 15,000 Supreme Soviet supporters, apparently heeding the public call of Vice President Rutskoy to "join the fight against dictatorship," descended upon the police cordons surrounding the White House to destroy the barricades. A city government building was seized, scores were injured, and two policemen killed as demonstrators fought hand-to-hand battles with unarmed police.¹⁸³ At this point, Yeltsin asserted in his memoirs, he realized that the country was on the brink of civil war, and he had to meet force with overpowering, crushing force to bring the crisis quickly to an end. On the basis of his determination that the Supreme Soviet was now in open, violent rebellion against the government of Russia, President Yeltsin decreed a state of emergency in Moscow at 6 p.m. on 3 October and ordered the Internal Affairs and Defense Ministries to support police efforts to put down the rebellion.¹⁸⁴

According to Yeltsin, Grachev reported that the armed forces were prepared to defend "the legitimate government" and that he had arranged for military troops to enter Moscow to assist the police at a moment's notice. At 7:15 p.m., wrote Yeltsin, Grachev informed him that he had ordered troops into Moscow to defend government facilities.¹⁸⁵ At about the same time, Russian press reported that the military leadership had met and decided to support Yeltsin; troops from the Kantemirovskaya, Tamanskaya, and 106th Airborne

Divisions had been ordered into Moscow, and Grachev was preparing a public appeal to servicemen to back the leadership's decision.¹⁸⁶

Before the troops arrived, however, supporters of the Supreme Soviet launched an attack against the main facilities of Russian Television. MVD troops and police were hard pressed in defense, and at least 21 people eventually died. Other armed groups tried to seize the ITAR-TASS and Russian Information Agency offices. Prior to these attacks, Vice President Rutskoy urged supporters to seize media facilities and to storm the Kremlin.¹⁸⁷ Fearing that the police would be unable to restore order, Yeltsin ordered the military to intervene in the fighting, which has spread to other parts of Moscow, and to prepare to storm the White House.¹⁸⁸

The military was now being ordered not only to defend government facilities; its orders were also to suppress a rebellion and assault the Supreme Soviet. Despite the leadership's support for Yeltsin's earlier defensive moves, the military at this time balked at intervention on the scale and scope now being requested of it by Yeltsin. Appalled, Yeltsin exploded in anger when he found out, contrary to Grachev's assurances, that military troops had yet to enter Moscow and put down the rebellion. It appeared to him, based on reports from non-military sources, that the military units he thought ordered into Moscow had stopped on the city's

outskirts.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, the Russian press reported that an MVD unit had declared its allegiance to the Supreme Soviet and that some senior military officers had declared their neutrality.¹⁹⁰

The military's unwillingness to obey orders to intervene and suppress the Supreme Soviet was starkly noted by Yeltsin in his memoirs. He had to:

bring my combat generals out of their state of stress and paralysis. I saw that the army, despite all assurances of the defense minister, for some reason was not able to come quickly to Moscow's defense and fight the rebels. . . . [T]he army, numbering two and a half million people, could not produce even a thousand soldiers; not even one regiment could be found to come to Moscow and defend the city.¹⁹¹

To get the armed forces to obey his orders, Yeltsin was compelled to go to the Defense Ministry and attend a Defense Collegium meeting in the early hours of 4 October.¹⁹² The leadership of the armed forces, politically divided and fearful of the military's collapse and civil war, simply could not bring itself to follow orders to intervene. As caustically put by Yeltsin, "the lawful government hung by a thread but the army couldn't defend it--some soldiers were picking potatoes and others didn't feel like fighting."¹⁹³

Aware that divisions within the armed forces and fears of military collapse were paralyzing his generals, Yeltsin believed that the military at this point was indeed a fragile

institution. At the same time, he was convinced that he needed to secure the military's intervention now to end a crisis spinning out of control. Consequently, he opted not to confront his senior officers, but to exude confidence in his course of action at the meeting.¹⁹⁴ According to Yeltsin, during the early stages the military leadership could not even bring itself to discuss concrete options on how best to assault the White House. Sometime after 3 a.m., however, after prodding by Yeltsin supporters, and faced with Yeltsin's resolve, the High Command approved a plan to seize the White House beginning at 7 a.m. The initial plan assigned much of the fighting within the building to former KGB special forces troops now under the direct orders of the president, with some support from MOD special forces and airborne troops, while other MOD troops secured the perimeter and used heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and rocket-firing helicopters) to prepare the ground for the assault.¹⁹⁵ At the same time, Defense Minister Grachev, arguably President Yeltsin's most loyal military officer, requested that the president verify in a written order to him as Defense Minister that he, as Russia's Commander-in Chief, had ordered the military to intervene in Moscow and assault the Supreme Soviet.¹⁹⁶

Grachev's request almost certainly sprang from the fear within the military that the armed forces would be blamed for

the inevitable casualties and, as had happened during the later Gorbachev years, politicians would disclaim any responsibility or even knowledge of having ordered the military to take action. Yeltsin provided the written order, apparently recognizing this fear.¹⁹⁷ As he noted in his memoirs,

I never gave these advisers an opportunity to start doubting, never allowed them to slacken, or to let weakness and uncertainty creep in. We had already paid a heavy price for having vacillated for several hours. We had nearly sent the entire country into a state of shock. I acted tough and pushed people and apparently offended many of them, but I had no time for subtleties.¹⁹⁸

Cajoled, embarrassed, and fearful of the consequences, the leadership of the armed forces reluctantly agreed to intervene militarily against Yeltsin's political enemies. After last minute negotiations with the Supreme Soviet failed, and on the basis of a presidential decree issued early on 4 October, the armed forces assaulted the White House. After some ten hours of fighting, which included bombardment from tanks and other heavy weapons as well as hand-to-hand fighting within the building, Vice President Rutskoy, Supreme Soviet Speaker Khasbulatov, and their supporters surrendered. The cost in lives and casualties reached several hundred.¹⁹⁹ Yeltsin, in an address to the nation as the assault was underway, stated that he had no choice but to call in the armed forces once his political enemies decided to overthrow the government by means of an

"armed fascist-communist mutiny."²⁰⁰

The Cost To The Military Of Intervention.

The fears of the military's most senior officers were not without basis. Military district commanders reportedly disagreed with the decision to intervene and at least some junior and mid-level officers, contrary to military spokesmen who claimed that all servicemen remained loyal to the president, decided to throw in their lot with the Supreme Soviet.²⁰¹ Moreover, reports after the intervention suggested that sentiment was widespread in the armed forces that military intervention was wrong, and some servicemen assigned the task of storming the White House refused to do so; their place was taken by servicemen from other units who were willing to participate. Later reports also indicated that these officers were shunned by their fellow servicemen and that the medals, promotions, and other material rewards were considered by many in the military as payment for dishonorable actions.²⁰²

In a press conference a day after the assault on the White House, Defense Minister Grachev laid out the military's rationale for intervening. He pointed to his oft-stated assertion during the crisis that the armed forces would not become involved in politics. That position changed, he

claimed, when extremists took over the White House and decided to unleash civil war. At that point, he and other senior officers decided that the security of the country was at risk and, therefore, the armed forces could not stay on the sidelines. Military troops totaling some 1300 men from various units acted in concert with MVD troops to eliminate the extremists only after further discussions made it clear that those occupying the White House would not voluntarily disarm and leave the building. Grachev announced that 4 servicemen had died and 14 were wounded in the assault, praised the actions of those servicemen who participated and those who expressed understanding and support for the High Command's decision, and condemned those few who supported the "so-called opposition."²⁰³ All in all, Grachev struck the pose of a military leader who had done his best to avoid the military's entanglement in politics but who, in the end, reluctantly had no choice but to order the armed forces to act to defend the motherland.

Grachev's depiction of a military normally "out of politics" but, in extremis, the country's savior came under criticism from both the Yeltsin camp and, more importantly, internal military critics. His stance was not appreciated by strong Yeltsin supporters who in the press commented anonymously that Grachev had to be pushed into action by more pro-Yeltsin military officers, in particular, by Generals

Kobets and Volkogonov.²⁰⁴ Some media commentators depicted Grachev as evasive when asked to defend Moscow the night of 3 October. Others depicted the armed forces as sitting on the fence that night, waiting to see who would likely win before committing to one side or the other.²⁰⁵

Other, military, critics refused to support Grachev publicly, avoiding the press altogether. An anonymous General Staff officer commented in an anti-Yeltsin newspaper that the military was sharply split over the decision to intervene. Some senior officers refused to give orders and some junior officers refused to carry out orders to assault the White House.²⁰⁶ One general appeared to express the view of many in the armed forces who wondered how it was decided to intervene. The argument that the intervention was necessary to avoid civil war was one of the "attempts to justify the tragedy."²⁰⁷ From this perspective, the caution of senior military officials was more than justified, and the decision to intervene was probably wrong. The military faced an untenable position when asked to assault the White House, and it was the fault of both sides:

The thing is obviously that the political intriguers involved in the standoff had worked themselves up into a frenzy and did not wish to hear of any compromises. Any attempt by a representative of one camp to yield to the other in some way was perceived as betrayal. . . . The sides had forgotten how to listen to each other and constantly sought refined methods for revenge. The events of 3-4 October constituted that fanatical revenge.²⁰⁸

The armed forces had thus been victimized by both sides. Moreover, in time, the military, now praised by the victorious side, was likely to be cursed in the "subsequent course of history" for its bloody role in the crisis.²⁰⁹

The military intervened in October 1993 only with great reluctance and with great misgivings. As in the political crisis earlier that year, the military leadership feared the impact an intervention would have on military cohesiveness and the prospect for civil war. It also feared taking the blame for casualties and being betrayed by politicians. It was thus fear, not professionalism, which inhibited the Russian Armed Forces. In the end, the military leadership overcame that inhibition but only when faced with a combination of shame and the fear that the failure to intervene would lead to civil war.

The December 1993 Legislative Elections

After the events of October, Yeltsin pushed forward with his plan to hold elections on 12 December to establish a new legislative body, to be called the Federal Assembly, and to ratify his draft constitution. Given the Army's recent violent intervention in politics--which not only brought down the old constitutional order, but also widened splits within the military, and called into question the military's

relationship to political authority--many wondered, including military personnel themselves, how servicemen would vote and how their votes would influence the composition of the more powerful of the two houses of the new Federal Assembly, the State Duma.²¹⁰

While some extreme hard-line groups and their candidates, including unofficial military and military-related groups, were banned from standing for election because they actively supported the October rebellion, other nationalist, radical, and communist parties, factions, and candidates were not.²¹¹ Moreover, 46 servicemen had been deputies in the now defunct Russian Supreme Soviet, serving on many of its committees, especially on the various committees which had jurisdiction over issues of greatest interest to the Defense Ministry and servicemen. Would active-duty military officers be banned from serving as deputies, thus cutting off that channel of politicization? Would candidates for office and political groups be allowed on military bases to campaign for votes and perhaps, not coincidentally, deepen political fragmentation within the military? Would the military vote as a bloc for or against the government? In the aftermath of the October rebellion, the High Command and political authorities believed that they had to balance delicately the electoral rights of servicemen with the need to preclude radical politicization of

servicemen during what by all accounts was going to be a heated and divisive election campaign. As the election correspondent of Krasnaya zvezda, the Defense Ministry's flagship media outlet, reminded military personnel:

It is perhaps the Army which, of all state institutions today, is the force which is the most interested in extremism of any hue being prevented from getting inside the walls of the Federal Assembly. After all, events have repeatedly demonstrated, and have just done so again, that it is the Army which always pays for the irreconcilable parties' "lack of principles."²¹²

The Issue of Military Deputies.

Less than two weeks after the October rebellion it was announced that military personnel could stand for the legislature in the upcoming elections.²¹³ Although there would be no prohibition, however, the High Command said it would discourage servicemen from running for legislative office. Defense Minister Grachev announced that he did not intend to run for legislative office since it would be improper for military officers or government officials to do so.²¹⁴ At the same time he asserted that the civil rights of servicemen would be protected; the Defense Ministry would ensure that, like other Russian citizens, servicemen, including those serving abroad,²¹⁵ would be able to exercise their right to vote either at civilian polling stations or, if civilian stations were not available, at military polling

stations which would be set up per the Central Electoral Commission's instructions.²¹⁶

In early November, the Defense Ministry announced its official policy regarding military personnel standing for office in the December legislative election. The Chief of the MOD's Main Directorate for Personnel, Lieutenant General Konstantin Bogdanov, who was also head of the MOD's "Working Group for Organizing and Holding Elections and the Nationwide Vote Among Troops," said in an interview that Russian law allowed servicemen to run for, and hold, public office. The Defense Ministry could not, therefore, legally prohibit any serviceman from running for office. Nonetheless, "we suggest that servicemen not put themselves forward as candidates in the upcoming elections" because a deputy's work is permanent and full time. And since a deputy's job is "permanent and full time," he continued, any serviceman who wins a seat in the legislature would not be able to perform his military duties and thus would be temporarily suspended from active duty. General Bogdanov closed with the telling observation that those military officers who wanted to run for office should rethink their profession: what did they want to be, a politician or a military officer? You could not be both, opined the general.²¹⁷

This opinion was not shared by all in the military and some also thought that official discouragement of active duty

officers running for office was bad politics. Former Russian Supreme Soviet military deputy Colonel Aleksey Tsarev, a political officer who chaired the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the Supreme Soviet's Defense and Security Committee, laid out the case of those who dissented from the High Command's views on this issue in an interview in Krasnaya zvezda.²¹⁸ Tsarev claimed that many military officers in units he had visited were apathetic toward the upcoming election. Part of that apathy sprang from caution; the message officers perceived from the High Command's "recommendation" that servicemen not stand for election was that it would be better to distance themselves from showing any interest in the elections. Tsarev argued that, since the military needed to protect its interests in the new parliament, the Defense Ministry should ensure that servicemen had access to information about candidates and parties and their platforms. Agitation should be banned, but information and candidates' and parties' pamphlets and newspapers, should be readily available at military installations. More importantly, he added, the absence of military deputies in the State Duma could be dangerous for those in uniform. Civilians with no military background or experience would be making decisions crucial to the military's well being. Even worse, those deputies who dislike the armed forces could occupy critical positions in the legislature. The Defense Ministry and servicemen needed to protect themselves from such vagaries

through military deputies. Tsarev did agree, though, that being a deputy would be a full-time job and therefore military deputies should be temporarily released from duty.

This argument was also advanced by retired Admiral Chernavin, the former Navy Commander-in-Chief and also Supreme Soviet military deputy, in the MOD-sponsored radio program "Slavyanka." Admiral Chernavin asserted that the small number of servicemen standing for Duma election, 40, was not good. Military deputies in the defunct Supreme Soviet had worked to protect the Defense Ministry and servicemen, and, moreover, he stated, what military expertise there was in the Supreme Soviet was located among military deputies. The admiral believed that the military and its issues would be important in the new Duma and it was imperative that military deputies be elected to protect the military, especially the livelihoods of servicemen.²¹⁹

The fact that Colonel Tsarev could make his argument in the Defense Ministry's in-house "media organ," and that retired Admiral Chernavin was given an opportunity to express his views on the MOD's premier radio program, suggest that theirs were not lonely voices and that some high-level officers likewise disagreed with official policy. Interestingly, though, the picture they painted of a united corps of Supreme Soviet military deputies working in unison to advance Defense Ministry interests and protect servicemen

was never the reality; far from it. Military deputies were riven by generational and ideological fissures during the late Gorbachev period and often fought vicious legislative battles among themselves. Indeed, the High Command often became the target of military deputies and regularly seemed at a loss over how to respond.²²⁰

Perhaps, though, the advocates for a strong corps of Duma military legislators believed that future military deputies would have much in common ideologically and over military issues, and that this commonalty would be strongly nationalist and anti-government. According to a Western wire service on 9 December, nine military officers were standing for election as members of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's extremist nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, 1 was running as a member of the Russian Communist Party, 3 were running on the moderate reformist ticket of the Yabloko bloc, and 1 officer was standing for election with the pro-reform, pro-government party, Russia's Choice.²²¹ No one should have been surprised, therefore, when former military deputy and retired general Dmitriy Volkogonov, President Yeltsin's military adviser and a supporter of Russia's Choice, publicly stated that servicemen should not run for office.²²²

Campaigning Among the Troops

The High Command was also concerned about the impact that the campaign for votes for the December legislative election would have on the troops. The December election was certainly not a simple case of two or more political parties, which agreed on fundamental principles of philosophy and government, vying for power. Even with the most extreme candidates and parties proscribed from participation, the election (like that for the Imperial First Duma in 1905) was being contested by a wide array of candidates, parties, and factions. Duma candidates were for and against Yeltsin, for and against the government, for and against democratization, for and against marketization, for and against the restoration of the Soviet Union. The High Command could only contemplate with horror the impact that such political campaigning would have on military cohesion, already weakened and buffeted by the events of the last few years.

The senior military leadership moved quickly to limit the potential divisiveness of the upcoming election. Electioneering was deemed "political agitation" by the Defense Ministry and thus banned from military installations according to Russian Federation law, announced General Bogdanov.²²³ Servicemen, said the general, would be able to familiarize themselves with candidates and their platforms from the press, television, and radio during off-duty hours.

No candidates, campaign periodicals, newspapers, or political literature of any type would be allowed on military installations, nor would the MOD be instructing servicemen for whom to vote.²²⁴ As noted above, some, such as Colonel Tsarev, disagreed with such a blanket prohibition, fearing that it contributed to dangerous apathy among servicemen toward the election. While "agitation" should be banned, campaign literature should be allowed on military posts and officers should be allowed to discuss the candidates, their platforms, and the issues on base while off duty, argued Colonel Tsarev.²²⁵

The Defense Ministry apparently did relent a bit by the end of November. According to General Bogdanov, the MOD was being inundated with requests from candidates, parties, and blocs to allow them to carry out "campaign events," set out campaign literature, and meet with servicemen in units. Such activities, averred the general, were illegal and could not be approved by the MOD. Servicemen could get their information about the candidates and their platforms from the mass media. To make sure that servicemen had access to all information, however, the general stated that the MOD would allow campaign literature with brief information and no "appraisals" in soldiers' and officers' clubs and in on-base information and leisure areas.²²⁶ Bogdanov also decried attempts by local politicians who threatened adverse

consequences for servicemen if they did not vote a certain way. Such attempts had been detected and thwarted by the MOD, he declared.

Nonetheless, there appeared to be something less than complete adherence to the ban on campaigning on military bases, especially concerning candidates associated with the pro-government Russia's Choice Party. For example, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, running on the Russia's Choice ticket for deputy in the heavily military Murmansk Duma legislative district, met with sailors of the Northern Fleet, including the Fleet's commander, while on a campaign tour.²²⁷ Similarly, Yeltsin aide Vladimir Shumeyko, running on the Russia's Choice ticket for a Federation Council (upper house) seat in the military-dominated Kaliningrad constituency, "visited Army units" on a campaign swing and pledged to work on officers' housing problems if elected.²²⁸ Similarly, First Deputy Prime Minister and Russia's Choice standard-bearer Yegor Gaydar visited an armored division in the St. Petersburg area on a campaign swing just a few days before the election.²²⁹ The fact that the High Command was willing to break the rules for three individuals who were close to Yeltsin and allied with Russia's Choice suggests that the senior leadership did try to influence servicemen to vote in favor of the government.

Moreover, the High Command did lobby for approval of

the draft constitution, a draft which, although strongly supported by President Yeltsin, was controversial; under attack by government critics, including some of those running for legislative office; and in real danger of being rejected at the polls on 12 December. The Defense Ministry's Collegium, led by Defense Minister Grachev, came out publicly in support of the draft constitution a few days before the vote: "(I)t gives the Russian Armed Forces the guarantee of a decent life and of acting correctly no matter what the situation."²³⁰ General Bogdanov noted that the MOD had insured that the draft constitution was widely disseminated in the military and that "skilled assistance" from senior officers, commanding officers, military jurists, and military social scientists was being provided to servicemen to help them understand the draft Yeltsin constitution.²³¹

These activities strengthen the argument that the MOD's senior officers sought to influence the voting behavior of servicemen in favor of Yeltsin and the government. But even here it must be said that the High Command remained cautious and circumspect. Although it favored the passage of the Yeltsin constitution, the High Command said little publicly about that support and couched its efforts to build support for the constitution among servicemen as an attempt to educate servicemen about the constitution's intricacies. Moreover, the main media organ of the Defense Ministry,

Krasnaya zvezda, as well as other military media outlets, did not editorialize on the candidates, parties, and blocs during the election campaign while running extensive interviews with party leaders.²³² On 3 November, the newspaper informed its readers that it would strive to present unbiased, factual information about candidates, parties, and blocs and their positions on various issues.²³³ After the election, the editorial board of Krasnaya zvezda would trumpet an evaluation of the media by a Russian-American election monitoring group which determined that the newspaper, more so than any other, provided balanced coverage and equal access to its pages for candidates and their parties during the election campaign.²³⁴ Nonetheless, a pre-election report by a Russian think tank asserted that the High Command would "advise" servicemen to vote for pro-government candidates and organizations much as it had in the communist past. Officers, however, were likely to vote as they pleased and, according to this research, many in the officer corps desired to reestablish the Soviet Union and revive the armed forces.²³⁵

Military Attitudes During the Campaign.

Only incomplete information is available concerning the views of servicemen toward the candidates and parties as the

campaign progressed. After the events of October and given the High Command's approach toward the election, perhaps servicemen thought it best to remain publicly mute. Moreover, the election campaigns of the various candidates, parties, and blocs little touched upon what could be considered "military" issues such as military reform, defense conversion, the military budget, and conscription.²³⁶ Absent an emphasis on military issues, faced with official MOD discouragement of any military involvement in the election campaign, and consumed with day-to-day concerns over pay, food, and housing, many in the military are likely to have appeared as apathetic as those units that Colonel Tsarev observed in his visits.

Nonetheless, some data exists which could help gauge the views of servicemen toward candidates and their parties prior to the election. According to a 6 November poll of 1,171 individuals conducted by the Interfax News Agency, the Public Opinion Foundation, and the Viewpoint Sociological Service, 56% of servicemen and law enforcement personnel who were surveyed believed that the new parliament would contribute to overcoming the crisis. This percentage "topped the list" of those who pinned hopes on the new parliament.²³⁷ The overall results to the question were as follows:

Will the new parliament contribute to overcoming the crisis?

Yes:	32%	[military/law enforcement: 56%]
Don't Know:	27%	
Worsen:	17%	
No Change:	24%	

Also according to the poll, only a "very small percentage" of armed forces and law enforcement personnel cared that some parties had been proscribed from participating in the election; 31% indicated that they supported a participating candidate or party. Moreover, 66% of servicemen and law enforcement personnel supported the government's present economic policies. Overall, respondents gave the following answers:

Do you accept or reject the government's economic course?

Accept:	42%	[military/law enforcement: 66%]
Reject:	25%	
No Opinion:	33%	

Assuming that the above poll was conducted according to accepted standards, one could generalize that, a month or so before the election, many in the military approved of the government's controversial economic course and saw the new parliament as a way out of the crisis of government that was plaguing Russia. This would have been welcome news for the

pro-democratic, pro-government Russia's Choice Party.

Another poll conducted in mid-November in the heavily military Kaliningrad region suggested that many in the Army had yet to decide how to cast their vote. In a "four-stage stratified random sample survey" of 480 individuals (460 responded) conducted by the Kaliningrad Sociological Center from 18-20 November, 40% had difficulty answering the question for which party they planned to vote, while 12% said they would vote for Russia's Choice, 6% for Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party, and 4% for the Communist Party.²³⁸ The Kaliningrad electorate seemed anything but apathetic: 68% said they planned to vote, 23% were undecided, and 9% said they would not vote. Again, in a result that would be welcomed by pro-government, pro-democratic candidates and parties, Yeltsin advisor Shumeyko of Russia's Choice was said to be the leading candidate for a seat in the upper house, and those indicating support for the draft constitution outnumbered those against, 68% to 13% (27% "gave no answer"). No further breakdown of the poll was provided, which is unfortunate since a four-stage stratified survey should allow those conducting the poll to report out more than just overall percentages in answers to questions. Nonetheless, we can assume that many of the respondents were servicemen, retirees, or members of military families because of the very high number of such people in the region's population of

680,000.

Some indications, however, that many in the military were less enamored of Yeltsin and thus pro-government candidates and parties can be gleaned from another poll conducted by the Interfax News Agency, the Public Opinion Foundation, and the Viewpoint Sociological Service on 13 November.²³⁹ Respondents were asked the following question:

The draft constitution envisions that the current President will retain his office until 1996. Do you approve of that?

Approve:	33%
Disapprove:	38%
Difficult to Answer:	29%

With regard to armed forces and law enforcement personnel, a plurality--45%--responded that they did not approve of Yeltsin retaining the presidency for another 2 and a half years, while 17% found it difficult to answer the question. This feeling toward President Yeltsin could be explained by the lingering animosity within the military over being forced by Yeltsin to intervene in October as well as by mistrust of the president over his earlier promise, since reneged, to stand for election in December along with the parliament.

Yeltsin, the government, and perhaps the High Command, though, probably thought that many in the military would support pro-reform, pro-government candidates, parties, and blocs. After the election, a senior military officer admitted that the MOD had been conducting opinion polls among servicemen prior to the election. According to this officer, military support for the anti-reform, anti-government Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his Liberal Democratic Party "did not emerge in the opinion polls conducted among servicemen."²⁴⁰ According to one newspaper account, Defense Minister Grachev allegedly assured Yeltsin before the election that up to 70% of military voters would cast their ballot for Gaydar and Russia's Choice.²⁴¹

The Military Votes--And the Powers Are Not Amused.

The poor electoral showing of pro-reform, pro-government candidates, parties, and blocs and the comparatively large support given to nationalist-extremist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) on 12 December stunned many in Russia. Almost immediately, attention turned to the military: for whom did servicemen vote? As voting results began to trickle in, reports began to circulate that many, perhaps even most, in the military who voted gave their vote to Zhirinovskiy and

the LDPR. Only Zhirinovskiy, it was said, had convinced servicemen that he and his party stood for what many in the military also stood: Russia's return to "great power" status, a draconian crackdown on crime and corruption and a return to order and discipline in society, the rejection of radical economic policies impoverishing most Russians, and social protection guaranteed to servicemen.²⁴² Others argued that many in the armed forces voted not so much for Zhirinovskiy and the LDPR but against Yeltsin, reformers, and communists because most servicemen held them to blame for the Soviet Union's ignominious collapse, the shrinkage of military prestige brought about by the Army's forced bloody intervention in October, and the military's continued impoverishment.²⁴³

Foreign and domestic press reporting that many in the military voted for the Liberal Democrats and, to some extent, for the communists almost immediately embroiled the High Command in a public war of words with journalists and political analysts. Within a week after the election, the Defense Ministry issued a statement condemning journalists and analysts who reported the voting results of servicemen or of particular military units. Such reports were branded erroneous, "intolerable," and "irresponsible," for over 99% of servicemen voted at civilian polling stations and no record was made of how they, or anyone else, voted.²⁴⁴

Servicemen, noted some military journalists and experts, probably voted much like other voters and not in overwhelming numbers for anti-government parties like the LDPR.²⁴⁵ In short, there was no "Army vote." The Central Electoral Commission sided with the Defense Ministry, announcing that no records were kept of military voters, nor were votes broken down by military districts since most in the military voted at civilian polls.²⁴⁶

Incongruously, however, the Defense Ministry also announced that 96% of servicemen voted, and 74% of them voted for the Yeltsin Constitution--ultimately some 15% higher than the overall vote in favor of the Constitution.²⁴⁷ A well-connected journalist reported that the Defense Ministry did know more about how military personnel voted, but was refusing to release its data in order to stay out of politics.²⁴⁸ Picking up this theme, a military journalist stated "(o)ne thing is clear--even before the new parliament has been elected, parties and blocs are already organizing petty intrigues around the Armed Forces."²⁴⁹

Unfortunately for the High Command, and despite its protestations that, since most in the military voted at civilian voting stations no reliable figures existed on how servicemen voted, other authoritative sources also commented on the breakdown of the Army vote. The Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration, Yeltsin's think tank,

announced on 23 December that "(m)ost Russian servicemen voted for the Liberal-Democratic Party during the December 12 elections. Press reports on this score are correct." According to the Center's assistant chief, researchers were able to reach this conclusion by analyzing the returns from military polling stations and from the civilian polling stations where, because of nearby military bases, many voters were servicemen.²⁵⁰ The day before this announcement, President Yeltsin himself commented at a news conference that "(m)ost of the Army did not vote for the Liberal Democratic Party, but a third. Nonetheless, it is a lot and it worries us. Relevant measures are already being taken now."²⁵¹

No complete figures on the Army vote, however, have so far been released other than the overall percentage who voted--95%--and the vote by servicemen and their families for the Yeltsin Constitution--74% in favor. Both numbers far outstrip the percentage of the voting population which turned up at the polls on 12 December--55%--and the overall vote in favor of the new constitution--58%. These facts by themselves suggest that many in the military (and their immediate families) saw the 12 December elections as an opportunity to influence the future course of Russia's political development, a view which pre-election polls appeared to capture. Unlike many of their fellow citizens, servicemen probably thought that the election of a new

national legislature and the enactment of a new constitution would provide the political stability that Russia desperately needed.

The lack of published figures on the overall military vote, however, need not hamper our ability to comment upon how the military voted and to draw some conclusions. Voting figures from some military polling stations and units are available, and they paint a rather interesting picture of the military vote. Below is a list of military voting results for the Duma (lower house) compiled from various sources, as well as other available voting figures. Voters had four choices to make: (1) for the Federation Council (upper house), select two candidates to represent your region; (2) for the State Duma (lower house), select one candidate to represent your region; (3) for the State Duma, select a party or bloc to receive seats on a national percentage basis set aside in the Duma for parties and blocs; (4) for or against the proposed Yeltsin constitution.

- Moscow Military District. 98% of servicemen voted; most backed the Yeltsin constitution. For Duma seats, 46% voted for the LDPR; 13.7% for the Communist Party; 8.5% for Russia's Choice.

- Elite Moscow-based Taman Division. For Duma seats, 87.4% voted for the LDPR; several unidentified battalions of the Taman Division--Russia's Choice came in first, PRUA (another democratic coalition) second, and the LDPR third.
- Elite Moscow-based Kantemirovskaya Division. For Duma seats, 74.3% voted for the LDPR.
- Strategic Missile Forces. For Duma seats, 72% voted for the LDPR; 16.5% for the Communist Party; 5.8% for Russia's Choice.
- Air Force. For Duma seats, 40% for the LDPR; 10% for Russia's Choice; 8% for the Communist Party.
- Far East Military District. For Duma seats, 19% voted for the LDPR; 11.5% for the Communist Party; 8.5% for Civic Union (a centrist coalition); 4.3% for Russia's Choice.
- Black Sea Fleet. 11,000 servicemen and their families voted. For Duma seats, 19% voted for the LDPR; 11.5% for Russia's Choice; 8.7% for the Communist Party.
- Russian Humanitarian Academy (ex-Lenin Military-

Political Academy) in Moscow. For Duma seats, 93% voted for the LDPR.

- Baltic Fleet Units stationed abroad in Belarus and Latvia. 99.1% voted; 56% voted for Yeltsin's constitution and 23.4% voted for Russia's Choice Vladimir Shumeyko for an upper house seat. For other Duma seats, 39% voted for the LDPR.

- Kaliningrad Oblast (includes civilian votes, but heavily military). 56% voted. Democratic candidates for both houses "received overwhelming support . . . Communist candidates were the least popular;" For Duma seats, the LDPR "collected 29.1%, prevail(ing)"; another source reported that the LDPR "took first place (in Duma) party-list ballots."

- Military Units stationed abroad in Tajikistan. 77.2% voted; 79% voted for the constitution. For Duma seats, 43.4% voted for the LDPR; 11.4% for the Communist Party; 7.3% for Russia's Choice; 5.4% for PRUA.

- Military Units stationed abroad in Turkmenistan (including family members). Less than 25% voted. For Duma seats, 40% voted for the LDPR; 13.5% for Russia's Choice; 11% for the Communist Party.

- Military Units stationed abroad in Georgia (including family members). 83% voted; over 80% voted for the constitution. For Duma seats, the LDPR was "in the lead," Russia's Choice was second, PRUA placed third.²⁵²

The Defense Ministry continued to dispute many of the above results even after Yeltsin's remarks that every 1 out of 3 serviceman voted for the anti-reform, anti-government LDPR.²⁵³ Defense Minister Grachev, for example, again publicly insisted a week after Yeltsin's news conference that any data on how servicemen voted were "inventions which have no real basis." On 28 December the Strategic Missile Force's press center issued a statement which labeled "incompetent" those reports that most military personnel serving in this branch of the armed forces had voted for the LDPR. Some in the media, announced the press center, were trying to "compromise the Russian Army."²⁵⁴

This dispute over the "Army vote" on 12 December has not been resolved. As noted above, no authoritative figures, if they exist, have been released which show the complete breakdown of military votes. The voting data from military polling stations set up at units outside Russia (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Belarus, and Lithuania) are probably accurate and are considered authoritative since they were released by the Central Electoral Commission. It is not

possible to confirm from available sources the voting data on military personnel who voted within Russia: that is, the vast majority of servicemen who did go to the polls. Nonetheless, certainly President Yeltsin had concluded, probably based on analysis conducted by the Presidential Administration's Analytical Center, that many in the military voted against reform and the government. Moreover, if Yeltsin's percentage of servicemen who voted for the LDPR is correct--33%--then a higher percentage of servicemen voted for Zhirinovskiy than the overall percentage that the LDPR received--some 25%. And, Yeltsin's figure does not include those in the military who voted for the two other major anti-reform, anti-government parties, the Russian Communist Party and its rural clone, the Agrarian Party. In short, incomplete data and anecdotal evidence strongly suggest that many in the military, perhaps even most, who went to the polls on 12 December gave their support to anti-reform, anti-government, and anti-Yeltsin candidates, parties, and electoral blocs.

Why did servicemen vote so, while at the same time strongly approving the Yeltsin Constitution? First, many in the military probably saw the constitution as a necessary framework for government. Although the constitution's critics well pointed out its shortcomings (especially the great power given to the presidency vis-a-vis the legislative branch), anything which could bring more stability to the

political process and avoid a replay of October, so much of which was brought about by a defective Communist-era constitution which poorly laid out the separation of powers among the branches of government, seemed attractive to servicemen. As Defense Minister Grachev said a month after the 12 December vote: "We in the Army want only one thing: a maximal accord in the society, no new disturbances, no unexpected political changes. The Army wants stability, stability, and, again, stability."²⁵⁵

Second, a vote for the LDPR, and to a lesser extent for the Communist Party, was a vote against Yeltsin and his democratic allies in government. Many in the military simply could not forgive the President for forcing the Army to intervene in October in a political struggle between Yeltsin and his democratic allies on one side and the anti-Yeltsin nationalist-communist political coalition on the other. As a journalist well-connected within military circles noted in his analysis of the 12 December military vote: "There is some malicious joy and satisfaction. Too many people in the Army were indignant and chagrined at the overly unconditional support for one of the sides during the clashes in Moscow on 3 October and, particularly, at shelling the Supreme Soviet building."²⁵⁶

Third, many in the military probably voted for the LDPR in the hope that it could become a "third force," balancing

the radical democrats, with their economic shock program which many servicemen feared would impoverish them, and the Communists, with their discredited ideas and history of corruption which already had done so much to impoverish so many Russians. The High Command's point in late October about preventing "extremism of any hue" from being voted into the Federal Assembly was perhaps applied to radical democrats and discredited communists by many servicemen. In this sense, those in the military who voted for the LDPR probably reflected the views held by many of their fellow citizens who also voted for the LDPR.²⁵⁷

Fourth, many in the military who voted for the LDPR probably did so because Zhirinovskiy and his party's platform were appealing. During the campaign, Zhirinovskiy presented himself and his party as an alternative to the democrats and communists who had discredited themselves with failed policies and political conflict which had brought the country to the edge of civil war. His and his party's "hands aren't stained with blood or mud."²⁵⁸ He positioned his party as nationalist and patriotic and as a refuge for true Russians. He played to the embarrassment felt by many officers over the state of the country by heaping scorn on those who had brought down the Soviet Union, impoverished Russia, weakened the armed forces, and who refuse to slap down mostly non-Russian hoodlums running amok in the cities or pip-squeak

former Soviet republics which supposedly threatened Russians living within their borders. He pledged peacefully to restore Russia's old borders and make Russia a great power again.²⁵⁹ He promised to solve the military's housing problem and further stated,

We are telling all Army officers: we will never allow criticism of the Army. We will assist in the resolution of all material issues: a good retirement, the receipt of an estate, certainly resolve all issues associated with being in the officer service so that this (service) will give pride, give dignity, and be pleasant.²⁶⁰

For many in the military, a vote for Zhirinovskiy and the LDPR on 12 December was a vote against Yeltsin, democrats and communists, and for a third political force, a strong Russia, and a revived armed forces. As one political observer sarcastically noted, the LDPR "acquired the status of 'sole' defender of the people and the Army. . . . Zhirinovskiy came along as a living embodiment of the 'servant for the Tsar, Father for the Soldiers' idea. . . . What could other blocs and parties offer to attract the military? Ideas of [defense industrial] conversion, downsizing the Army, and pulling out the troops?"²⁶¹

One other consideration could also account for the pro-Zhirinovskiy vote in the military: it was a reaction by servicemen against the High Command. As noted above, the intervention in October helped to widen already existing fissures within the military. Defense Minister Grachev and

other senior officers could have been seen by many in the military as in Yeltsin's and the government's pocket rather than as defenders of servicemen and military equities. According to an analysis done by the Presidential Analytical Center, servicemen voted for Zhirinovskiy to protest "their deceived expectations linked with military reform, the toughened regime in the Army, and the arbitrariness of commanders."²⁶² Moreover, many in the High Command found some of Zhirinovskiy's proposals for military reform unacceptable.²⁶³ Any attempt by senior officers to lobby against the LDPR during the campaign would almost certainly backfire and spur on some servicemen to vote for Zhirinovskiy.

"Relevant measures are already being taken."

Yeltsin's remarks at his televised press conference 10 days after the election that "(r)levant measures are already being taken" to deal with the pro-Zhirinovskiy military vote sparked public commentary on what the President meant. Speculation centered around possible personnel reshuffling within the senior ranks of the armed forces, including the removal of Defense Minister Grachev, and the possibility of major military organizational restructuring, especially "command and control agencies."²⁶⁴ One journalist well-

connected in military circles warned that many, especially officers, would see even "the most reasonable [immediate] reorganization of the Army" as punishment for "incorrect" voting. Political authorities could then expect an increase in the "already substantial number of malcontents in the troops" which would "upset the so-far reliable (command and) control system."²⁶⁵

Nonetheless, the Defense Ministry itself moved to reshuffle and reorganize shortly after the election. Its actions had more than a whiff of looking for a scapegoat and sacrificial lamb in order to head off more comprehensive government-sponsored moves. On 22 December--the very day of Yeltsin's news conference--the Defense Collegium met and decided to reorganize and downsize the Ministry's Main Personnel Directorate.²⁶⁶ This was, as noted above, the military body responsible for conducting the elections among military personnel. Prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, the Main Personnel Directorate was the Main Political Administration (GLAVPUR), a Communist Party Central Committee body responsible for ensuring the ideological loyalty of servicemen. After the Soviet collapse, it was reformed and restructured as the military's highest personnel and educational body. It was now declared "unreformable." A working group under Yeltsin loyalist General Kobets was formed to purge the directorate of any remaining political

propaganda bodies purportedly converted to educational work and to reduce the directorate's staff from over 200 to 30-40 personnel. Moreover, the "question" of the military's Russian Humanitarian Academy (ex-Lenin Military-Political Academy) in Moscow, 93% of whose staff and students reportedly voted for the LDPR, would also be "resolved."²⁶⁷

That the government might have been contemplating more radical changes, including the removal of General Grachev, was reported by the press. According to one journalist, some of President Yeltsin's advisers thought that the emphasis placed by Grachev and other senior officers upon the idea that "the Army is outside politics" was misplaced and dangerous. Such an approach not only had relieved the High Command of any responsibility for ensuring that the military was loyal to the President, but also had given rise to an "ideological vacuum in the Army" which could be, and had been, exploited by anti-Yeltsin, anti-reform forces.²⁶⁸ Yeltsin's advisers allegedly drew up a list of some 36 senior officers to be forced into retirement. Many on the list were also said to have had doubts about the Army's intervention in October. Also, the President's advisers were said to be recommending to Yeltsin that he remove operational control over the troops from the Defense Minister and Defense Ministry by subordinating the General Staff, the executive arm of the Russian Armed Forces, directly to himself as

Commander-in-Chief.²⁶⁹ Finally, these advisers were said also to be urging the creation of a new post of Deputy Prime Minister with broad powers to monitor and control the activities of the ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, and Security. Several prominent pro-Yeltsin civilians, including First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin, and pro-Yeltsin radical reform senior officers, General Kobets and Marshal Shaposhnikov, were purported to be on a short list to take up this post.²⁷⁰

All of these moves would indeed put the President in a more powerful position vis-a-vis the Defense Ministry--at least, on paper. At the same time, such radical reshuffling and restructuring would almost assuredly have weakened Yeltsin's control over the military by arousing greater dissatisfaction and contempt within the officer corps toward political authority. Servicemen would probably see such actions as a reaction to their vote and consequently as an attempt to punish them for exercising their civil rights. It is likely that Yeltsin recognized this and so rejected the advice of some advisers to make such radical moves. According to a journalist, Yeltsin was in no hurry to "crack down" on the Defense Ministry. Changes would occur, but they would be gradual and based on "professionalization," that is, be perceived by servicemen as logical reforms to modernize and make more professional the armed forces.²⁷¹ Nonetheless,

Yeltsin did act on some of his advisers' recommendations: in a 21 December edict (presidential order), he dissolved the Security Ministry and placed its restructured and downsized segments directly under presidential control. Moreover, on 6 January 1994, Yeltsin created the post of National Security Assistant to the President to oversee and coordinate the activities of the power ministries: Defense, Internal Affairs, and the newly restructured security and intelligence services. He selected as his Security Assistant Yuriy Baturin, a young, outspoken presidential assistant with a strong reformist background, but inexperienced in national security affairs.²⁷² The fact that Yeltsin moved on the recommendations of his advisers with regard to the Security Ministry, but not the Defense Ministry, suggests that he was indeed concerned with the danger the military could pose if he acted precipitously. This, of course, suggests in turn that the armed forces were in such a "sociopsychological" state that it was feared by democratic reformers. As the chief editor of a leading reform newspaper commented:

It is unfortunate that people [in the democratic camp and the government] do not understand: in principle it is possible to fire at parliament at point blank range . . . as long as there are some economic success stories. But if there are no success stories (or if there are, but the "uneducated" populace does not understand this), it is better not to shoot. . . . Analyze . . . the voting results in the Army. Do not allow it finally to slip away from under the influence of democratic politics. Do not commit it anywhere, especially in central Russia--sooner or later it will sweep you away just like bread crumbs from the

table for dragging it into the confrontation.²⁷³

This fear over growing anti-Yeltsin, anti-democratic tendencies within the military was probably exacerbated by Zhirinovskiy's attempts immediately after the election to build on his military support. Zhirinovskiy passionately pledged to cooperate with the armed forces because "the Russian Army has always been the honor of the country." He would never, he said, allow the Army to be used for expansionism. Other senior LDPR officials stated that the LDPR "will focus on beefing up the Armed Forces more than the present government" and "stiffen" national security.²⁷⁴ Moreover, it was announced that at least two key LDPR positions, the number two figure in the party and the party's "shadow" security minister, were held by a military reservist and former officer in military intelligence, respectively.²⁷⁵ One newspaper also reported that, according to its source in the Russian Counterintelligence Service (the new name of the restructured Security Ministry), Zhirinovskiy secretly met with some senior Airborne Forces and Counterintelligence Service officers within two weeks after the election to elicit cooperation "between some parliamentary groups and the commanders of combat units."²⁷⁶ While General Podkolzin, the Airborne Forces Commander, denied that any of his officers attended such a meeting,²⁷⁷ the likelihood of LDPR-military collusion was generally accepted as plausible.

Friends In High Legislative Places?

The election results appeared also to provide the military with another avenue to exercise political influence. The composition of the key Duma committee responsible for oversight of the Defense Ministry, the Defense and Security Committee, was heavily weighted toward military officials. In fierce bargaining among the parties and blocs in the Duma for committee and other Duma assignments, the Chairman and all three deputy chairmen selected to sit on the committee were servicemen. Of the twelve remaining members, 3 more servicemen were selected.²⁷⁸ Thus 7 out of 16 deputies on this key committee were servicemen. At the same time, as in its predecessor, the Supreme Soviet, the 7 military deputies were split into several of the parties, which probably would weaken their ability to operate as a military lobby within the committee. Indeed, in the major military issue which was soon to consume the committee and the Duma, the 1994 defense budget markup and debate, even a united Defense Committee failed to preclude a major defeat for the Defense Ministry.

Reluctant Interventionists.

In retrospect, it is quite clear that neither the military hierarchy, the officer corps as a whole, nor rank-

and-file servicemen were at all motivated to intervene forcibly--either to displace or supplant political authority, per Finer--in the political crises of 1993. Nor did the military apparently engage in blackmail in an attempt to influence the course of events (although it could be argued that neutrality during an acute political crisis is a form of blackmail). Certainly the theoretical impetus for military intervention existed: the future appeared to hold nothing but worsening economic hardships; the military hierarchy truly feared that the armed forces verged on disintegration, especially if forced to intervene; on several occasions, the nation seemed to be teetering on the brink of civil war; and politicians were viewed as inept and corrupt.

Finer, it might be recalled, argued that military intervention is often predicated upon the belief of "manifest destiny," that is, the need to save the nation in the midst of a crisis, or upon a sense of "custodianship," the need to save the nation from incompetent and venal politicians. For their part, Nordlinger and Perlmutter posited that militaries intervene, first and foremost, when they perceive their corporate interests to be threatened by civilian authority. All three, however, noted that the military's impetus to intervene is also influenced by the interaction of a nation's political culture, especially its level, and the military's concept of professionalism, which, contra Huntington, could

either impel or inhibit military intervention.

The events of 1993 would appear to show that the Russian military's concept of professionalism inhibited any impetus to intervene. This concept, rooted in a communist political culture, accepted the legitimacy of civilian authority even in the face of the possibility of civil war. The Russian military was also inhibited by fear--fear that intervention would destroy military unity and spark a civil war. In short, most in the armed forces, and certainly those in the High Command, did not believe in 1993 that the military could arrest negative social or political trends by intervening. On the contrary, they believed the reverse, that military intervention would be the final straw pushing Russia into the abyss. In the end, some in the military hierarchy and officer corps decided to support President Yeltsin with force, sensing that doing otherwise would probably lead to civil war since Yeltsin's enemies had turned to violence to resolve the crisis. That said, 1994 would bring a direct threat to the military's corporate interests, the sort of threat that Finer, Nordlinger, and Perlmutter all posited is one of the strongest motives for military intervention.

¹Quoted in David Satter, Age Of Delirium: The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Union (New York: Knopf, 1996), 24.

²Michael McFaul, Post-Communist Politics: Democratic Prospects in Russia and Eastern Europe, Creating the Post-Communist Order, SIS Vol. XV, No. 3 (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 51-55; David Lane and Cameron Ross, "From Soviet Government To Presidential Rule," in David Lane, Russia in Transition, 10-13; and Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Post Communist Politics," in Gail W. Lapidus, The New Russia, 11.

³McFaul, Post-Communist Politics, 51-52, and Lane and Ross, "From Soviet Government To Presidential Rule," 12-13.

⁴McFaul, Post-Communist Politics, 53-54.

⁵"Ruslan Khasbulatov's Speech In Novosibirsk," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 20 Feb 93, pp1, 4. FBIS-SOV-93-035, 44-50.

⁶Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin Says His Patience At End, Questions Constitution," Reuter News Service, 28 Feb 93, LEXIS/NEXIS [hereafter Reuter].

⁷Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin's 'Final Option' Raises Questions Over His Power," Reuter, 3 Mar 93.

⁸David Ljunggren, "Yeltsin Says Russia Could Face Centuries Of War," Reuter, 3 Mar 93.

⁹Per Dalgaard, "Report On Interview With Aleksey Arbatov, Advisor To Russian President Boris Yeltsin," Det Fri Aktuelt, 5 Mar 93, p13. FBIS-SOV-93-044, 15-16.

¹⁰David Ljunggren, "Army Tells Yeltsin To Act Resolutely --Izvestiya," Reuter, 3 Mar 93.

¹¹See for example Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin Rival Starts Congress Session With Attack," Reuter, 10 Mar 93.

¹²Jim Wolf, "Yeltsin's Path In Danger, U.S. Intelligence Official Says," Reuter, 3 Mar 93.

¹³Quoted in Oleg Shchedrov, "Yeltsin Wants Compromise With Political Rivals," Reuter, 6 Mar 93.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵See for example Richard Balmforth, "Power Struggle Intensifies In Russia," Reuter, 10 Mar 93; Anatoly Verbin, "Congress Leaders Say They Will Not Yield To Yeltsin," Reuter, 10 Mar 93; and, Boulton, "Yeltsin Rival Starts Congress Session With Attack."

¹⁶Balmforth, "Power Struggle Intensifies."

¹⁷David Ljunggren, "Yeltsin Walks Out Of Congress, Warns Of Measures," Reuter, 12 Mar 93. See also Richard Balmforth, "Yeltsin, Conservative Foes Set For Violent Clash," Reuter, 11 Mar 93 and Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin Faces Defeat At Congress In Kremlin Power Struggle," Reuter, 11 Mar 93.

¹⁸Yeltsin, "The Struggle For Russia," 212. Emphasis in original.

¹⁹Oliver Wates, "Yeltsin Referendum Plans Shrouded In Uncertainty," Reuter, 14 Mar 93.

²⁰Carol Giacomo, "U.S. Mum On Yeltsin Threats To Invoke Emergency Powers," Reuter, 11 Mar 93.

²¹Yeltsin, "The Struggle For Russia," 135.

²²Wates, "Yeltsin Referendum."

²³See for example David Ljunggren, "Yeltsin Pressed To Declare Presidential Rule," Reuter, 18 Mar 93.

²⁴Brian Killen, "Khasbulatov Strikes First To Woo Russian Public," Reuter, 18 Mar 93.

²⁵Interfax News Agency [hereafter Interfax], 21 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-053, 13-15.

²⁶Brian Killen, "Yeltsin Challenged By Parliament," Reuter, 21 Mar 93, and Vanora Bennett, "Rutskoi Dumps Mentor Yeltsin For Right-Wingers," Reuter, 21 Mar 93.

²⁷Yeltsin, "The Struggle For Russia," 206-207.

²⁸Vanora Bennett, "Yeltsin Heads For Showdown After Failure Of Talks," Reuter, 24 Mar 93, and Oliver Wates, "Khasbulatov Calls For Yeltsin's Impeachment," Reuter, 23 Mar 93.

²⁹ITAR-TASS News Service [hereafter ITAR-TASS], 24 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-056, 18-20.

³⁰Mark Trevelyan, "Congress Weighs Whether To Impeach Yeltsin," Reuter, 26 Mar 93.

³¹Ibid.

³²Yeltsin, "The Struggle For Russia," 209.

³³Sergey Chugayev, "The Congress Must Reckon With the Will Of People Who Have Elected the President of Russia," Izvestiya, 26 Mar 93, pp1-2. Russian Information, Inc., Russian Press Digest, LEXIS/NEXIS, 26 Mar 93 [hereafter Russian Press Digest]. According to a 22-24 March telephone poll by the Opinion Sociological Service, 51.7% of respondents believed Yeltsin acted correctly in declaring "special rule;" 70.3% supported Yeltsin's plan to hold a referendum on 25 April; and 63.3% did not support legislative efforts to dismiss Yeltsin and replace him with Vice President Rutskoy.

³⁴Ralph Boulton, "Khasbulatov Accuses Yeltsin Of Grabbing Power," Reuter, 26 Mar 93.

³⁵Vanora Bennett, "Vice-President Denounces Yeltsin's Government," Reuter, 26 Mar 93.

³⁶Mark Trevelyan, "Yeltsin Drops Own Ballot Plan, Drums Up Support," Reuter, 1 Apr 93 and Yeltsin, "The Struggle For Russia," 210-216.

³⁷Reuter, 12 Mar 93.

³⁸Unsigned editorial, "The Army Must Have Secure Immunity to Political Stresses," Krasnaya zvezda, 26 Mar 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-057, 45-46.

³⁹Many in Russia believe that Gorbachev was not the innocent victim of the failed August 1991 coup. They speculate that he was actually behind the effort to declare a "state of emergency," and that the coup was, in effect, a charade which spun out of his control.

⁴⁰D. Makarov, "VDV [The Airborne Troops], As Always, Are On Guard," Argumenty i fakty 12 (March 93): pp1, 6.

⁴¹Rodrigo Fernandez, "Boris Yeltsin Is A Traitor," El Pais, 11 Mar 93, p4., and S. Turchenko, "Officers--With the People," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23 Mar 93, p3. FBIS-SOV-93-55, 38.

⁴²"Vesti" Newscast, Russian Television Network, 20 Mar 93, FBIS-SOV-93-053, 30-31.

⁴³Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Zhilin, "Does An Underground Committee Function?," Moscow News, 19 Mar 93, LEXIS/NEXIS.

⁴⁴Interfax, 21 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-053, 32, and Interfax, 23 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-055, 38.

⁴⁵Quoted in Makarov, "The Airborne Troops, As Always, Are On Guard."

⁴⁶Speech By Russian Defense Minister Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev At Extraordinary Session of the Russian Supreme Soviet In Moscow," Russian Television Network, 21 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-053, 39.

⁴⁷Interfax, 21 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-053, 30.

⁴⁸Interfax, 22 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-053, 44.

⁴⁹Igor Chernyak, "Whom Will the Men With the Guns Back?," Komsomolskaya pravda, 30 Mar 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-061, 35-36.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Reuter, "Russian 'Power Ministers' Not Taking Sides," 22 Mar 93.

⁵²A. Khokhlov, "'Left! Right!'--But the Army Prefers Marching In One Place," Komsomolskaya pravda, 23 Mar 93, p1.

⁵³Vladimir Makartsev, "Briefing At Russian Defense Ministry. Army Awaits Compromise," Kommersant-Daily, 24 Mar 93, p10. FBIS-SOV-93-055, 41, and Vyacheslav Baranov, "Armed Forces and Society" radio program, Mayak Radio Network, 24 Mar 93. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts [hereafter BBC Summary], USSR Special Supplement SU/1647/C1, 26 Mar 93, LEXIS/NEXIS.

⁵⁴Yuliya Salnikova, "Patriots: Officers' Meeting Ready To Stand Up For Their People," Segodnya, 23 Mar 93, p2.

⁵⁵Sovetskaya Rossiya, 25 Mar 93. FBIS-SOV-93-057, 60-61.

⁵⁶Oleg Zlobin, et. al., "What Russia Thinks," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 24 Mar 93, pp1,3. FBIS-SOV-93-057, 47-50.

⁵⁷Quoted in Matthias Schepp, "Yeltsin Is Unpredictable," Stern, 25 Mar 93, p42.

⁵⁸Enrico Franceschini, "Interview With Russian Deputy Defense Minister Boris Gromov," La Repubblica, 25 Mar 93, p3.

⁵⁹Dmitriy Kholodov, "Nonstop Around the Clock: The Military Away From War," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 26 Mar 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-058, 31-32.

⁶⁰Interfax, 9 Apr 93. FBIS-SOV-93-067, 34-35 and Roman Zadunayskiy, "How The Army Will Vote," Rossiyskiye vesti, 14 Apr 93, p7. FBIS-SOV-93-071, 31-32.

⁶¹Vladimir Popov, ITAR-TASS, 21 Apr 93. FBIS-SOV-93-075, 45, and Vladimir Shirokov, Valeriy Usoltsev, and Aleksandr Pelts, "Russian Troops Will Be Reformed Along Territorial Lines Too. Russian Federation Defense Minister Tours Garrisons In Far East and Siberia," Krasnaya zvezda, 22 Apr 93, p1. Russian Press Digest, 22 Apr 93.

⁶²Mark Trevelyan, "Scandal Erupts In Russian Referendum Battle," Reuter, 22 Apr 93.

⁶³Oliver Wates, "Grachev Accuses Prosecutor Of Political Meddling," Reuter, 23 Apr 93, and Aleksandr Pelts and Aleksandr Veklich, "Troops Withdrawn From Abroad Should Not Be Done Out Of Their Share," Krasnaya zvezda, 24 Apr 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-079, 48-49.

⁶⁴Mark Trevelyan, "War Hero Rutskoï Waiting In Wings If Yeltsin Fails," Reuter, 25 Apr 93.

⁶⁵Dmitry Solovyov, "Russian Troops In Hot Spots Take Time Off To Vote," Reuter, 25 Apr 93.

⁶⁶"Address To the Nation By Russian President Boris Yeltsin," Russian Television Network, 6 May 93. FBIS-SOV-93-087, 13-15. For overall results of the referendum, see next section. See also Solovyov, "Russian Troops In Hot Spots Take Time Off To Vote," Reuter, 25 Apr 93; and Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin Set For Victory, Must Now Face Congress," Reuter, 26 Apr 93.

⁶⁷Yeltsin, The Struggle For Russia, 242.

⁶⁸Ibid., 209-212.

⁶⁹Ibid., 212.

⁷⁰Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia," in Gail W. Lapidus, ed., The New Russia, 99.

⁷¹Yeltsin, The Struggle For Russia, 249.

⁷²Ibid., 241-242.

⁷³Ibid., 258, and Moscow Television, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 1-3. In his memoirs Yeltsin writes that he signed the decree a week earlier.

⁷⁴Tamara Zamyatina, ITAR-TASS, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 9; Ivan Novikov, ITAR-TASS, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 11.

⁷⁵Tamara Zamyatina, ITAR-TASS, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 9.

⁷⁶Moscow Radio Network, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 9.

⁷⁷Yuriy Filippov, ITAR-TASS, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 11.

⁷⁸Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin Dissolves Parliament In Dangerous Gamble," Reuter, 22 Sep 93.

⁷⁹Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 259, and Reuter, 21 Sep 93.

⁸⁰Radio Rossii Network, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 16-18. See also, ITAR-TASS, 22 Sep 93, for the announcement by the Council of Ministers that the government fully supported the President. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 19.

⁸¹Boulton, "Yeltsin Dissolves Parliament."

⁸²Radio Rossii Network, 21 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 14.

⁸³Reuter, 21 Sep 93.

⁸⁴Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 243.

⁸⁵Ibid.; Tatyana Chemodanova, Mayak Radio Network, 31 Aug 93. FBIS-SOV-93-168, 23-24; Andrey Naryshkin and Gennadiy Talalayev, ITAR-TASS, 31 Aug 93. FBIS-SOV-93-168, 22; Vyacheslav Kocherov, "After the Event: On Patrol," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-168, 24; Vasiliy Konolenko and Viktor Litovkin, "B. Yeltsin In the Army," Izvestiya, 1 Sep 93, p1.; Oleg Falichev and Aleksandr Oliynik, "Supreme Commander Intends To Spread One Day A Month Worker With the Troops," Krasnaya zvezda, 1 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-168, 21; and Vladimir Gondusov, ITAR-TASS, 15 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-177, 32-33.

⁸⁶Kocherov, "After the Event," and Izvestiya, "B. Yeltsin In the Army."

⁸⁷Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 245-6.

⁸⁸Ibid., 246-7.

⁸⁹Ibid., 249-251.

⁹⁰Ibid., 250.

⁹¹Ibid., 252.

⁹²Ibid., 254-257.

⁹³Ibid., 252-261.

⁹⁴Ibid., 261-2.

⁹⁵Sergey Shatunov, "Novosti" newscast television program, Ostankino Television Network, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 1. See also "Novosti" newscast television program, Ostankino Television Network, 21 Sep 93, for early statement of support from Internal Affairs Minister Yerin. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 14, and "Novosti" newscast television program, Ostankino Television Network, 22 Sep 93, for statement of support from Security Minister Golushko. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 19.

⁹⁶Reuter, 22 Sep 93, and Mark Trevelyan, Reuter, 22 Sep 93.

⁹⁷"Panorama" radio program, Mayak Radio Network, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 17.

⁹⁸Vadim Byrkini, ITAR-TASS, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 17-18.

⁹⁹Vladimir Maryukha, "Army General Pavel Grachev: The Army Has One Task--To Defend the Fatherland," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 18, and Byrkini, ITAR-TASS, 22 Sep 93.

¹⁰⁰"Kray News" radio program, Khabarovsk Radio Network, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 19.

¹⁰¹Vladimir Yermolin, Aleksandr Pelts, and Oleg Odnokolenko, "Russia At the Latest Crossroads. Armed Forces Remain Calm," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 Sep 93, pp1,3. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 18; "Power Ministries Would Not Like To Interfere In Conflict," Kommersant-Daily, 23 Sep 93, p3. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 28-29; and ITAR-TASS, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 15.

¹⁰²ITAR-TASS, 23 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 19.

¹⁰³Reuter, 22 Sep 93.

¹⁰⁴"Vesti" newscast television program, Russian Television Network, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 12, and Ralph Boulton, Reuter, 22 Sep 93.

¹⁰⁵See for example Kommersant-Daily, "Power Ministries Would Not Like To Interfere."

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Interfax, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 8.

¹⁰⁸Agence France Presse, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 3.

¹⁰⁹"Panorama" radio program, 22 Sep 93.

¹¹⁰Byrkini, ITAR-TASS, 22 Sep 93.

¹¹¹Sergey Omelchenko, "Novosti" newscast television program, Ostankino Television Network, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 15-16.

¹¹²Russian Television Network, 22 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 15-16.

113An article by the three senior commentators of Krasnaya zvezda went to great lengths to assure that newspaper's military readership that, while the situation was fraught with danger, so far calm prevailed, military units across the country were conducted their normal routines, and Yeltsin's moves promised to finally resolve the crisis of power which had been building since the Soviet Union's collapse. Vladimir Yermolin, Aleksandr Pelts, and Oleg Odnokolenko, "Russia At the Latest Turning Point. The Armed Forces Remain Calm," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 Sep 93, pp1,3, Russian Press Digest.

114"'I Appeal To You As An Officer," Pravda, 24 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 6.

115The only deputy defense minister not present at the thirty minute meeting and subsequent news conference was Col. Gen. Gromov, arguably the military's most politicized general. According to a reporter at the news conference, General Gromov was in the field, attending a planned military exercise. See Viktor Levin, Mayak Radio Network, 23 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 17.

116Ibid. See also Andrey Naryshkin, ITAR-TASS, 23 Sep 93, FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 17, and Vladimir Maryukha, "The Army Will Not Succumb To Provocations, And Will Never Act Against The People," Krasnaya zvezda, 24 Sep 93, p1, FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 19-20.

117Ibid.

118Petr Karapetyan, "Site Tests Taman Soldiers," Krasnaya zvezda, 24 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 25-26.

119The Black Sea Fleet found itself in independent Ukraine after the demise of the Soviet Union. Unlike most other Soviet military commands and units, it refused to recognize Kiev's claim over it, maintaining that it was subordinate to the Russian Navy. This issue is still not resolved, and remains a contentious point between Russia and Ukraine. The status of the fleet and Crimea--a primarily ethnically Russian peninsula--has been injected into domestic Russian politics from the beginning, with Yeltsin and the government looking for a diplomatic solution and the legislature demanding a hard-line approach to Kiev. One consequence of this situation is that the Black Sea Fleet, which is financed by, and remains subordinate to, Moscow, has become one of the most politicized elements within the military.

¹²⁰Rostislav Khotin, "Fleet Plays Waiting Game In Russian Conflict," Reuter, 23 Sep 93.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Igor Saltykov, Aleksandr Korchagin, and Viktor Kharlamov, "Military Dyarchy," Pravda, 24 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 13. According to the Russian press, by this time the Officers' Union consisted primarily of several dozen mid-grade and senior officers, most of whom served in intelligence and security. It had developed a paramilitary arm which was earning its spurs in the ethnic conflicts in former Soviet republics and Serbia. See for example, Aleksey Chelnokov, "Commissar Terekhov Predicts World War III," Izvestiya, 29 Sep 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-188-S, 39-40.

¹²³Olga Gerasimenko and Ravil Zaripov, "'We Are Rapping These Words Out From A Call Box' Was How Komsomolskaya Pravda's Special Correspondents Began Their Report In the White House, Where All Telephones Were Cut Off Yesterday," Komsomolskaya pravda, 24 Sep 93, pp1-2.

¹²⁴Vladimir Maryukha, "The Army Will Not Succumb."

¹²⁵Vladislav Kocherov, Aleksandr Mosgovoy, Yelena Shaposhnikova, and Svetlana Shevchenko, "Army: The Military Stays Neutral," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 Sep 93, p4. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 27-28. Caution must be exercised with regard to this newspaper, which was, at the time, an "organ" of (funded by) the Supreme Soviet. This particular article had a mainly anti-Yeltsin bias in its commentary, but the attitudes expressed in the interviews were mixed.

¹²⁶Igor Saltykov, et. al., "Military Dyarchy."

¹²⁷Gerasimenko and Zaripov, "'We Are Rapping These Words Out."

¹²⁸"Yeltsin Aide Doubts Rumours On Troop Movements," Reuter, 23 Sep 93. Comments in parentheses mine.

¹²⁹"Russia Defense Ministry Cites Attack Plot On It," Reuter, 23 Sep 93, and "Vesti" newscast television program, Russian Television Network, 23 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 16.

¹³⁰"Defense Ministry Cites Attack Plot."

¹³¹Nikolay Burbyga, "The Tragedy At the CIS Joint Armed Forces Headquarters: Latest Details," *Izvestiya*, 29 Sep 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S. The CIS High Command was created in 1992 to coordinate the military planning and operations of those former Soviet republics which joined the CIS. Like other CIS institutions it has no supranational powers and has no authority to order anybody to do anything. To this day it remains, in effect, an international advisory military staff which carries no bureaucratic or political weight. Nonetheless, Russia has tried since its creation to use the High Command to forge stronger military links to former republics with the ultimate aim of establishing a Russian dominated military alliance.

¹³²Mayak Radio Network coverage of Defense Minister Grachev and Deputy Defense Minister Kobets news conference, 24 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 24. Kobets claimed that 116 "irregulars" were involved in the assault; most reports cite only 8 attackers--a more plausible number, given the failure of those who attacked. Kobets probably included others who supported the attack, but did not actually participate in the assault. See, for example, Nikolay Burbyga, "CIS Joint Armed Forces Headquarters: Five Pistols Between Fifteen Security Guards," *Izvestiya*, 25 Sep 93, pp1,2. FBIS-SOV-93-185-S, 49-50.

¹³³See for example, "Vesti" newscast television program, Russian Television Network, 23 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-183-S, 12.

¹³⁴Mayak Radio Network, 24 Sep 93; Burbyga, "CIS Joint Armed Forces Headquarters," and Reuter, 24 Sep 93. Terekhov was arrested the day after the attack and his actions were repudiated, unconvincingly as far as journalists were concerned, by Supreme Soviet spokesmen. See, for example, Burbyga, "The Tragedy At the CIS Joint Armed Forces Headquarters."

¹³⁵Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 263-64.

¹³⁶Ibid., 263.

¹³⁷Ibid., 264.

¹³⁸ITAR-TASS, 24 Sep 93, FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 2-3.

¹³⁹Oliver Wates, "Yeltsin Tightens Security Noose Around Parliament," Reuter, 24 Sep 93.

¹⁴⁰ITAR-TASS correspondent Melnikova, ITAR-TASS, 24 Sep 93, FBIS-SOV-93-185-S, 6.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ralph Boulton, "'Siege' Atmosphere Grows In Moscow White House," Reuter, 24 Sep 93.

¹⁴³Wates, "Yeltsin Tightens Security Noose."

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Vladimir Zaynetdinov, Igor Chernyak, and Olga Saprykina, "In the Armed Pre-Election Clash Two Votes Have Been Lost Forever--Vera Malysheva and Valeriy Sviridenko," Komsomolskaya pravda, 25 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-186-S, 6-7. In this interview, Kobets claimed that he delivered an ultimatum via a military Supreme Soviet Deputy (who came to tell him that the Supreme Soviet had not authorized the assault on CIS Headquarters) which demanded that those involved in the assault be delivered to the government and that all weapons be turned over to government forces.

¹⁴⁶Reuter, 24 Sep 93.

¹⁴⁷Zaynetdinov, Chernyak, and Saprykina, "In the Armed Pre-Election Clash."

¹⁴⁸Boulton, "'Siege' Atmosphere Grows."

¹⁴⁹Wates, "Yeltsin Tightens Security Noose."

¹⁵⁰Burbyga, "CIS Joint Armed Forces Headquarters" and Mayak Radio Network, 24 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 24. ITAR-TASS reported that troops were being brought into Moscow "to protect the lives and security of Muscovites." See Ivan Novikov, ITAR-TASS, 24 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 20-21. There were no reports of any large military movements after the attacks of 23 September, however. It appears that no more than 1000 troops armed with side-arms and machine-guns were involved, and that they were deployed only at military facilities. Yeltsin himself is quite specific on this point in his memoirs: "(Grachev) and I and [Prime Minister] Chernomyrdin . . . had an agreed-upon position: army troops should not interfere in the establishment of order in Moscow. The brunt of the crisis therefore fell on Interior Minister Yerin." Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 264.

¹⁵¹Burbyga, "CIS Joint Armed Forces Headquarters;" "Novosti" newscast television program, Ostankino Television Network, 24 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 23; Andrey Naryshkin, ITAR-TASS, 24 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-184-S, 24-25; and Mayak Radio Network, 24 Sep 93.

¹⁵²ITAR-TASS, 27 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-185-S, 30.

¹⁵³Patrick Worsnip, "Russian Parliament Gets Promise Of More Troops," Reuter, 25 Sep 93 and Pavel Kuznetsov, "ITAR-TASS, 25 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-185-S, 28-29.

¹⁵⁴Vanora Bennett, "Yeltsin Says Russian Parliament At Last Gasp," Reuter, 25 Sep 93, and "Rutskoi Reviews Defenders Of Russian Parliament," Reuter, 25 Sep 93.

¹⁵⁵"Rutskoi Reviews Defenders."

¹⁵⁶Roman Zadunayskiy, ITAR-TASS, 25 Sep 93, FBIS-SOV-93-185-S, 43, and Radio Moscow, 28 Sep 93, FBIS-SOV-93-186-S, 5-6.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

¹⁵⁸See, for example, Aleksandr Peltz, "Blood Was Still Shed. Our Duty Is To Prevent Civil War," Krasnaya zvezda, 25 Sep 93, p1. Russian Press Digest.

¹⁵⁹"A Week In Moscow-Yeltsin's Tussle With Parliament," Reuter, 28 Sep 93.

¹⁶⁰Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 266.

¹⁶¹"Radio Slavyanka" program, Mayak Radio Network, 27 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-185-S, 43-44, and Vladimir Yermolin, Boris Soldatenko, and Oleg Odnokolenko, "Today Russia Needs Stability, Calm, and Order Above All Else," Krasnaya zvezda, 28 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-188-S, 40-41.

¹⁶²Moscow Television, 28 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-186-S, 7, and Yermolin, "Today Russia Needs Stability," Radio Rossii, 28 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-186-S, 7-8.

¹⁶³Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 268.

¹⁶⁴Viktor Trushkov, "Defenders of the House of Soviets. Regiment Commander's Oath," Pravda, 28 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-188-S, 20-21.

¹⁶⁵Valeriy Zenkov, "The Kremlin Has Been Liberated. From the Power of Law," Pravda, 28 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-186-S, 13.

¹⁶⁶See for example, Yermolin, "Today Russia Needs Stability."

¹⁶⁷Oleg Shchedrov, "Yeltsin Issues Ultimatum To Besieged Parliament," Reuter, 29 Sep 93, and Brian Killen, "Yeltsin Maintains Siege Of Russia's Rebel White House," Reuter, 30 Sep 93.

¹⁶⁸Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 269.

¹⁶⁹Ivan Rodin, "President Rejects Compromise, So Does Parliament," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-188-S, 42.

¹⁷⁰Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin Faces Threat From Russian Provinces," Reuter, 30 Sep 93.

¹⁷¹Vladimir Yermolin, "Fueling Tensions Only Causes Fresh Casualties. There's Been Enough Bloodshed!," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 Sep 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-189-S, 36.

¹⁷²Aleksandr Golts quoted in "Press Review," ITAR-TASS, 2 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190, 2-4.

¹⁷³Viktor Levin, "Interview With Andrey Kokoshin, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation," Mayak Radio Network, 30 Sep 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S, 35-36.

¹⁷⁴Quoted in Sergey Taranov, "No Mutinous Units In Russian Army Anticipated At Present," Izvestiya, 30 Sep 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-188-S, 9-10.

¹⁷⁵Valentin Rudenko, "Rumors That Some Units Have Become Insubordinate are Unfounded," Krasnaya zvezda, 1 Oct 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-189-S, 13-14.

¹⁷⁶Mikhail Timofeyev, ITAR-TASS, 1 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S.

¹⁷⁷"'Romashka' Calling 'Grach'," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 1 Oct 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S.

¹⁷⁸Zoltan Fekete, "Exclusive Interview With Pavel Grachev--Fascist Groups In Moscow," Pesti Hirlap, 2 Oct 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S.

179Sergey Sidorov and Valentin Rudenko, "Army General Pavel Grachev: The Army Is More Reliably Managed Than Ever," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 1 Oct 93, pl. Russian Press Digest.

180"Radio Slavyanka" program, Radio Rossii Network, 1 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-182-S.

181Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 268-270.

182Ibid., 269-270.

183"Two Weeks Leading Up To Moscow's 'Bloody Sunday'," Reuter, 4 Oct 93.

184Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 271-272, and *Golos Rossii*, 3 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S, 22.

185Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 272-273.

186"District Commanders Back Yeltsin," Reuter, 3 Oct 93, and *Radio Rossii*, 4 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S, 28.

187"12 Hours That Shook The World--Moscow's 'Bloody Sunday'," Reuter, 4 Oct 93.

188Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 273-274; Ralph Boulton, "Yeltsin Wins Breathing Space In Bloody Revolt," Reuter, 4 Oct 93; Russian Television Network, 3 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S, 20-21; Anna Melnikova, ITAR-TASS, 3 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S, 23; and *Radio Rossii*, 3 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S, 23-24.

189Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 274.

190Reuter, 3 Oct 93.

191Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 275-276.

192Ibid., 276.

193Ibid., 277.

194Ibid., 276-277.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 278. In a telling narrative, Yeltsin admits that the former KGB troops refused to take part in the assault as late as 5:30 a.m. In a personal meeting with the troops' commanders, Yeltsin was unable to convince them to obey orders. They did agree to take up positions around the White House, but not to participate in the assault. That task now fell to military special forces and airborne troops. The former KGB troops changed their minds and assaulted the White House after a sniper killed one of their number. See 11-14.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., 277-278.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 278-279, 281.

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 279.

¹⁹⁹Oleg Shchedrov, "Five Hundred Reported Dead In Assault On Rebel Parliament," Reuter, 4 Oct 93.

²⁰⁰Ibid.

²⁰¹Lyudmila Yermakova, ITAR-TASS, 4 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S, and Interfax, 4 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S.

²⁰²See for example, Sergey Turchenko, "Black Victory. Confession Of General Staff Officer," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 18 Dec 93, p4. FBIS-SOV-93-243, 40-43.

²⁰³Aleksandr Pelts, "Russian Defense Minister's Press Conference," Krasnaya zvezda, 6 Oct 93, pp1,3. FBIS-SOV-93-192-S, 21-22, and Nikolay Burbyga, "Only A Handful Of Traitors In The Army," Izvestiya, 7 Oct 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-193-S, 40-41.

²⁰⁴Burbyga, "Only A Handful Of Traitors;" Mikhail Sokolov, "Even The Minister Is Under Suspicion," Komsomolskaya pravda, 7 Oct 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-193, 40; and "Russian Drama Through The Eyes Of Its Participants," Argumenty i fakty 41 (Oct 93), p2.

²⁰⁵Irina Savvsteyeva, "Where Was The Army?," Komsomolskaya pravda, 5 Oct 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-192-S, 24-25, and Sergey Parkhomenko, Corriere Della Sera, 6 Oct 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-190-S.

²⁰⁶Turchenko, "Black Victory."

²⁰⁷Igor Chernyak, "Black October: Facts And Fabrications. When The Smoke Over The 'White House' Cleared," Komsomolskaya pravda, 20 Oct 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-203, 41-43.

²⁰⁸Ibid.

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰See for example Vladimir Yermolin, "We Should Be Certain That the Authorities We Elect Will Not Summon Us To the Barricades," Krasnaya zvezda, 21 Oct 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-203, 40-41.

²¹¹"Who Will Campaign For Seats In State Duma," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 Oct 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-198, 23-24; ITAR-TASS, 19 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-201, 36-37; Interfax, 20 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-201, 37; and Vladimir Yermolin, "Who Has Been Barred From the Elections," Krasnaya zvezda, 21 Oct 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-203, 31. Of the six extremist groups banned from participation, two were unofficial military groups: the Officers' Union and Shchit (Shield).

²¹²Vladimir Yermolin, "We Should Be Certain That the Authorities We Elect Will Not Summon Us To the Barricades."

²¹³Irina Demchenko, "Servicemen Should Not Stand For Parliament," Izvestiya, 16 Oct 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-200, 31.

²¹⁴Interfax, 21 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-203, 33.

²¹⁵Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 Oct 93, p3. FBIS-SOV-93-209, 34.

²¹⁶Ivan Novikov, ITAR-TASS, 28 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-208, 40. See also Leonid Stoykov, "Priamurye Day By Day," Khabarovsk Radio Network, 9 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-235, 57. Allowing servicemen to vote at civilian polling places was a major departure from past practice. It seems that the High Command's distaste for political involvement extended also to procedural questions on voting. Also, by having servicemen vote along with civilians in the vast majority of cases, the High Command probably thought that the absence of data exclusive to military personnel would preclude public analysis of the "military vote." They would be proven wrong, as will be discussed below.

²¹⁷Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Andreyev and Captain Second Rank Leonid Mrochko, "The Army and Elections: How Will We Vote?," Krasnaya zvezda, 16 Nov 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-215, 33-34.

²¹⁸Anatoliy Stasovskiy, "Aleksey Tsarev: New Parliament Will Not Be Able To Avoid Military Problems," Krasnaya zvezda, 9 Nov 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-216, 53-4.

²¹⁹"Slavyanka," Radio Rossii Network, 26 Nov 93. FBIS-SOV-93-227, 48.

Yang Zhong, "The Transformation of the Soviet Military," 53-56.

²²¹Ralph Boulton, "Russian Army To Defend Its Own Interests In Assembly," Reuter, 9 Dec 93.

²²²Interfax, 7 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-234, 43.

²²³Andreyev and Mrochko, "The Army and Elections: How Will We Vote?" See also, Sergey Knyazkov, "People's Prosperity More Important Than Political Differences," Krasnaya zvezda, 3 Dec 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-232, 38-39.

²²⁴Andreyev and Mrochko, "The Army and Elections: How Will We Vote?"

²²⁵Anatoliy Stasovskiy, "Aleksey Tsarev: New Parliament."

²²⁶Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Andreyev and Captain Second Rank Leonid Mrochko, "The Army and Elections: Pressure Is Inadmissible," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 Nov 93, p3. FBIS-SOV-93-229, 25-26.

²²⁷Vasiliy Belousov and Georgiy Shmelyov, ITAR-TASS, 27 Nov 93. FBIS-SOV-93-227, 54-55.

²²⁸ITAR-TASS, 25, 26, and 28 Nov 93. FBIS-SOV-93-227, 57.

²²⁹Sergey Slyusarenko, "Even On Vacation Yegor Gaydar Remains First Vice Premier," Kommersant-Daily, 8 Dec 93, p4. Even this pro-reform newspaper could not resist sarcastically commenting on the favoritism shown to pro-government candidates: "In the evening Yegor Gaydar went to a tank division located in a St. Petersburg suburb--apparently again in his capacity as First Vice Premier since the Law on Defense prohibits 'any political agitation, including election canvassing, on the premises of military units.'"

²³⁰"Russia's Armed Forces Leadership In Favor of Adopting the Russian Federation Constitution," Krasnaya zvezda, 10 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-237, 50.

²³¹Andreyev and Mrochko, "The Army and Elections: Pressure Is Inadmissible."

²³²For examples, see "Army's Problems Are Among the Priorities for 'Russia's Choice'," and "Statement By Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia: 'The LDPR Knows What Must Be Done'," Krasnaya zvezda, 10 Dec 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-236, 24-29; Vladimir Yermolin, "Army Card of Blocs and Parties," Krasnaya zvezda, 2 Dec 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-230, 25-26; and the interview of Russia's Choice military expert Sergey Yushenkov on the MOD-sponsored radio program "Slavyanka" broadcast to the troops serving in Tajikistan on Radio Moscow, 29 Nov 93. FBIS-SOV-93-228, 30.

²³³"Election Campaign Must Be Conducted Honestly, By Civilized Rules," Krasnaya zvezda, 3 Nov 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-213, 37-38.

²³⁴"Krasnaya Zvezda Has Been Named By Far the Most Objective and Impartial--Such Is the Opinion of the Russian-American Experts Who Have Analyzed Press and Television coverage of the Election Campaign," Krasnaya zvezda, 18 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-243, 15-16.

²³⁵Interfax, 19 Nov 93.

²³⁶"Editorial Viewpoint: Future Parliamentarians Must Tackle Military Reform," Izvestiya, 27 Nov 93, p8. FBIS-SOV-93-228, 39.

²³⁷Interfax, 2 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-231, 15-16, and Interfax, 9 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-237, 47-48. Law enforcement personnel would include not only policemen, but also the militarized elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) responsible for internal security. MVD Officers hold military rank, and many of the troops are conscripts, although the Defense Ministry does not exercise control over them.

²³⁸N. Nikolayeva, "Yeltsin Is Popular, But Less Than Before," Kaliningradskaya pravda, 25 Nov 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-231, 39-40.

²³⁹Interfax, 9 Dec 93.

- ²⁴⁰Sergey Ostanin, Interfax, 16 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-240, 6.
- ²⁴¹Yevgeniy Popov, "How Did the Military Vote? Moscow Times Refutes Television Journalists," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 21 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-243, 14-15.
- ²⁴²See for example Yevgeniy Federov, "Armed Forces Reform. The Army Will Be Called To Account For Its Choice," Kommersant-Daily, 21 Dec 93, p3. FBIS-SOV-93-244, 37-38.
- ²⁴³See for example Aleksandr Mnatsakyan, "The Success of Political Toadyism," Rossiya, 15-21 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-241, 31.
- ²⁴⁴"From Authoritative Sources: The Army and the Elections," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-241, 8.
- ²⁴⁵Vladimir Gavrilenko, "What Guided the Voter's Hand?," Krasnaya zvezda, 16 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-240, p5-6, and Aleksandr Batygin, "Just Who Did the Army Vote For Anyway?," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 Dec 93, pp1-2. FBIS-SOV-93-243, 13-14.
- ²⁴⁶Ibid., and "Press Conference By Nikolai Ryabov, Central Electoral Commission," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Federal Information Systems Corporation, 17 Dec 93. LEXIS\NEXIS, 18 Dec 93.
- ²⁴⁷Sergey Ostanin, ITAR-TASS, 16 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-240, 6, and Aleksandr Pelts and Anatoliy Stasovskiy, "Referendum Result: Constitution Adopted. Election Results Being Clarified," Krasnaya zvezda, 14 Dec 93, p1.
- ²⁴⁸Pavel Felgengauer, "The Army Voted No 'Worse' And No 'Better' Than the People. Military Chiefs Intent On Staying Outside Politics," Segodnya, 15 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-239, 46.
- ²⁴⁹Aleksandr Pelts, "The Choice Is Made. It Merely Remains To Add Up the Results," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-239, 1-2.
- ²⁵⁰Roman Zadunaiskiy, ITAR-TASS, 23 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-246, 2-3.
- ²⁵¹"Yeltsin News Conference," Ostankino Television Network, 22 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-244, 5.

²⁵²Voting figures compiled from: Russian Television Network, 15 Dec 93, FBIS-SOV-93-240, 5; Yevgeniy Popov, "How Did the Military Vote? Moscow Times Refutes Television Journalists," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 21 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-243, 14-15; Mikhail Shevtsov, ITAR-TASS, 28 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-248, 18; A. Lobskiy, "The Elections Have Been Held and the Choice Made," Strazh Baltiki, 14 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-243, 2; Interfax, 13 Dec 93, FBIS-SOV-93-238, 1-2; Igor Zhukov, "Most Russians In Turkmenistan Chose To Abstain. Those Who Did Turn Out Voted For LDPR," Segodnya, 14 Dec 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-238, 2; and Mayak Radio Network, 15 Dec 93, FBIS-SOV-93-239, 9.

²⁵³Aleksandr Pelts, "Army Has Done The Main Thing: It Has Prevented Civil War," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-249, 38.

²⁵⁴Mikhail Shevtsov, ITAR-TASS, 28 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-248, 18.

²⁵⁵"Excerpt of Address By Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev," Vesti Newscast, Russian Television Network, 14 Jan 94.

²⁵⁶Felgengauer, "The Army Voted No 'Worse' And No 'Better' Than the People."

²⁵⁷O. Bobrakov, "It Isn't All Gloom: Zhirinovskiy Will Not Be President and the Communists Will Not Return To Power," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 Dec 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-001, 28-30.

²⁵⁸"A Word To the Voter," New Wave Radio Program, Radio Odin Network, 6 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-233, 18-19.

²⁵⁹"Word With A Voter," Ostankino Television Network, 9 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-236, 37-39; Krasnaya zvezda, "The LDPR Knows What Must Be Done."; Aleksandr Batygin, "Just Who Did the Army Vote For Anyway?"; and Sergey Kaverin, "V. Zhirinovskiy: 'Politics Is the Art Of Deception'," Kuranty, 16 Dec 93, p4. FBIS-SOV-93-240, 16-17. Probably the best expression of Zhirinovskiy's approach to national security can be found in his 1993 book "Last Dash To the South."

²⁶⁰Ibid.

²⁶¹Aleksandr Mnatsakyan, "The Success of Political Toadyism."

²⁶²Roman Zadunaiskiy, ITAR-TASS. Of course, this presidential body no doubt would prefer to place blame on the policies and actions of military leaders in order to explain the military's apparent rejection of Yeltsin, the government, and pro-government candidates and groups.

²⁶³Felgengauer, "The Army Voted No 'Worse' And No 'Better' Than the People."

²⁶⁴See for example Yevgeniy Federov, "Armed Forces Reform. The Army Will Be Called To Account For Its Choice," and Pavel Felgengauer, "The Former Personnel Directorate Is Subjected To Yet Another Reorganization. The Military Thinks That the Balloting Was Secret," Segodnya, 24 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-247, 10-11.

²⁶⁵Felgengauer, "The Former Personnel Directorate Is Subjected To Yet Another Reorganization." Parentheses mine.

²⁶⁶Ibid.

²⁶⁷Ibid.

²⁶⁸Yevgeniy Federov, "Armed Forces Reform. The Army Will Be Called To Account For Its Choice," and Dmitriy Kholodov, "Did You Hear the Rooks Sing? How Many Legs Are left Under the Defense Minister's Chair?," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 30 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-249, 39-40. Dmitriy Kholodov was killed by a mail bomb on 17 October 1994. He had been investigating corruption among senior military officers and was scheduled to testify in the Duma about illegal arms trading. The bomb which killed him was contained in a package which he was led to believe contained documents that incriminated Army officers who had allegedly sold weapons on the German black market. Kholodov and Defense Minister Grachev had become political enemies, and Kholodov often had biting criticism for Grachev--the word "rook" above, for example, was a play on Grachev's name (in Russian, "grach" means rook). The defense minister was among those about whom Dmitriy Kholodov had raised the question of corruption.

²⁶⁹Ibid. The Soviet, later Russian, system is unlike that of the United States, where the Defense Department and secretary of defense do not exercise operational control over the U.S. Armed Forces: the chain of command extends from the President as Commander-in-Chief through the Joint Chiefs to the commanders of unified and specified commands. Russia retained the Soviet General Staff system in which the Defense Minister and Defense Ministry are in the chain of command.

270Yevgeniy Federov, "Armed Forces Reform. The Army Will Be Called To Account For Its Choice."

271Dmitriy Kholodov, "Did You Hear the Rooks Sing?"

272ITAR-TASS, 6 Jan 94. FBIS-SOV-94-004, 20.

273Vitaliy Tretyakov, "The Final Piece Of Advice For the Kremlin. This Government Is Incapable Of Salvaging Democracy: It Is Politically Incompetent," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-239, 53-54.

274Interfax, 15 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-239, 17-18.

275David Filipov, "Behind Zhirinovskiy: Who Are His Men?," Moscow Times, 17 Dec 93, p1-2. FBIS-SOV-93-243-A, 4-5.

276ITAR-TASS, 28 Jan 94. FBIS-SOV-94-019, 17-18.

277Ibid.

278Vladimir Yermolin, "Parliamentary Committee Teams Manned. Good Luck!," Krasnaya zvezda, 25 Jan 94, p1-2. FBIS-SOV-94-016, 34.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE 1994 MILITARY BUDGET DEBATE

Although the government responded to important High Command requests in late 1993 and 1994--it approved the High Command's draft of a military doctrine and moved to satisfy military demands for more conscripts by tightening up, at least on paper, the nation's draft exemption rules--it failed to support the Defense Ministry's most important 1994 policy issue, the military budget request for some 80 trillion rubles. As will be shown below, the 1994 defense budget debate, beginning in late 1993, would crucially add to the molding of military attitudes toward civilian authority after the October 1993 rebellion.

Curbing Inflation At the Military's Expense.

By the end of November 1993, the Russian Government was faced with important, far-reaching economic decisions while in the midst of a critical election campaign. As noted in the previous chapter, a draft constitution had been placed before the people for a vote on 12 December and a new legislature, to be called the Federation Assembly and

comprised of an upper house--the Federation Council--and a lower house--the State Duma, was to be voted into office at the same time. In the midst of Russia's first free legislative election, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin convened a meeting of government finance and banking leaders on 30 November to approve the government's fourth quarter 1993 budget and to discuss proposals for the 1994 budget.¹ A key issue at the conference was the extent to which the budget should hold down government spending in order to wring inflation out of the economy. The Finance Ministry, spurred on by Yegor Gaydar, Yeltsin's radical reformist Economics Minister, earlier that month had proposed a tough anti-inflationary budget which would meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions to make Russia eligible for IMF stabilization loans and credits.² Prior to the November meeting, however, the government was unable to reach consensus on the Finance Ministry's draft budget: it split between those pushing for a tough anti-inflationary 1994 budget and those who wanted to continue to place emphasis on government spending to prop up and protect social programs, industry, and agriculture.³ Moreover, at the same time, Gaydar and his party Russia's Choice, perceived as the government's party, were standing for election for seats in the new legislature; many other government officials were also standing for election and, not surprisingly, the internal government debate over the 1994 budget became an

issue in the elections.⁴

Finance Minister Boris Fedorov sought to convince Prime Minister Chernomyrdin at the 30 November meeting that the greatest threat to economic reform and social stability was continued high inflation and the increased danger of hyperinflation brought on by uncontrolled government spending. He argued that the government had to hold down spending beginning with the 4th quarter 1993 budget and throughout 1994.⁵ He achieved some success; although the Finance Ministry was apparently instructed to rework its draft 1994 budget and resubmit it for government approval, the draft's basic outlines and goal, to greatly cut inflation, were accepted and the 4th quarter 1993 budget proposed by the Finance Ministry was approved.⁶ The 4th quarter budget was signed into law by President Yeltsin on 21 December⁷ and on 24 December he issued an edict which directed the government, pending legislative approval of a 1994 budget, to set spending levels for the 1st quarter 1994 budget at 4th quarter 1993 levels with increases only for wages.⁸ The Defense Ministry (MOD) received about 4.48 trillion rubles for both quarters and promises of more funds to help retire a debt of over 2 trillion rubles which it had accumulated with defense industries and civilian providers of goods and services.⁹ Before the year ended, however, the Defense Ministry was complaining that the Finance Ministry,

continuing its practice of delaying the transfer of funds to military accounts, was disobeying the orders of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin to give the military funds to pay off its debts.¹⁰

A hint of the Defense Ministry's growing financial desperation and lack of clout within government circles at this time can be gleaned from an attempt by the MOD to cut some of its expenses by shifting responsibility for government programs to other ministries. For example, on 6 January 1994 a Russian newspaper reported that the head of the MOD's Military Budget and Finance Main Directorate had ordered a permanent cutoff of MOD funding to military courts starting 1 January.¹¹ On 10 January 1994, the Defense Ministry's Press and Information Directorate confirmed that, as of 1 January, the MOD had ceased funding military courts. It announced that the presidential decree on the legal system of 23 November 1993 made military courts part of a unified court system; logically, then, the Justice Ministry was responsible for funding and other support to military courts. According to the announcement, the MOD did not consult with the Justice Ministry prior to its decision.¹² The Justice Ministry registered shock at the Defense Ministry's attempt to foist responsibility for funding military courts onto it¹³ and then counterattacked successfully, as it turned out. On 1 February, a newspaper with ties to the government announced

that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had signed Government Decree 32 which instructed the Defense Ministry to fund and support military courts.¹⁴

It was within this environment that, on 21 January, Defense Minister Grachev held a meeting of senior MOD officials in which military reform and the state of the military's finances were discussed. According to a media report one week later, Grachev said that the main problem facing the Defense Ministry was financing. Because of underfunding, he claimed, the MOD was dipping into wartime reserves to avoid suspensions of food and fuel deliveries and electrical services.¹⁵ Four days after the meeting, on 25 January 1994, First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin--the ministry's most senior civilian official--publicly complained that the Finance Ministry's approach to budgeting was too monetarist. He lamented the bitter fights in 1993 between the Defense and Finance Ministries over the Finance Ministry's failure to pay the MOD funds authorized it. As a result, the military owed trillions and defense procurement had practically stopped.¹⁶ The Finance Ministry responded on 28 January, which was also the same day that Grachev's 21 January comments were reported. In an official statement, the ministry announced that it planned to submit a tough budget to the government in the next few days which would conform to the approved strategy of fighting inflation.¹⁷ The

official statement noted that the Finance Ministry had estimated that revenues in 1994 would be limited and therefore 1994 government expenditures would be "severely restricted."¹⁸

The Budget Battle Is Joined.

The military found itself in its most significant bureaucratic fight since it had helped Yeltsin literally blast his political opponents out of power and into jail in October 1993. By early February the Defense Ministry was pursuing a three-track strategy to overcome the Finance Ministry's recommendation for overall military spending in 1994. The first track involved pressing President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to reject the Finance Ministry's military budget recommendations in favor of the Defense Ministry's budget recommendations. The second track entailed forging alliances with important legislators to defeat government attempts to pass the Finance Ministry's military budget. The third track encompassed a vigorous, high-level public media campaign warning of the dire consequences to the military and to social stability inherent in the Finance Ministry's budget. Such a campaign almost certainly was meant to pressure the government, Yeltsin, and the legislature to move toward the military's proposed budget

as the budget debate unfolded in the Duma and Federation Council in the spring and early summer.

At a 16 February press conference, Colonel General Vasiliy Vorobyev, the Defense Ministry's military budget and finance chief, tried to put the military's case into context. He asserted that the approved military budget for 1993 had been 8.3 trillion rubles, of which the military had received only 6.5 trillion. Even worse, according to the general, the MOD had estimated that it needed 10 trillion rubles for 1993. The consequences of both a reduced 1993 military budget and the failure to meet even that reduced budget were continuing delays in wages, in military benefits, and a large military debt to defense and civilian enterprises.¹⁹ Some of the 1993 debt had been paid off from monies so far received in the 1st quarter of 1994, but over a trillion rubles were still owed. The military's financial situation was already acute, he added, and moreover, the Finance Ministry's proposed military budget for 1994 was only one-third of the sum requested by the MOD, thus jeopardizing the very solvency of the military.²⁰

A day in advance of the next government meeting to approve the 1994 budget for submission to the Federal Assembly, the Finance Ministry released its 1994 draft budget. Overall spending was planned at 182.2 trillion rubles, of which the largest single element was the

military's share at 37.1 trillion. According to the Finance Ministry, the military's percentage of government expenditures for 1994 was the same as for 1993.²¹ On 3 March it was announced that, at the government meeting called to discuss the budget and economic issues, the government had approved in principle the Finance Ministry's draft 1994 budget upon Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's recommendation. Chernomyrdin stated "(w)e are on the verge of an abyss beyond which we will just collapse. For this reason the draft budget is rather tight." He instructed the Finance Ministry to finalize the budget within ten days for submission to the legislature but "by no means increase items of expenditure, otherwise we will face catastrophe." He also admonished those ministries and government agencies wanting more money allocated to their budget to realize the complicated economic situation in Russia.²² Yeltsin added that "first and foremost" financial discipline must be firmed up to fight inflation, the state's "primary task."²³ Nonetheless, several ministries, most importantly Agriculture, Labor, and Defense, reportedly rejected the budget as insufficient for their needs.²⁴

The Defense Ministry's first public comments on the government's decision to adopt the Finance Ministry's draft 1994 budget came from its highest ranking civilian, First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin, when his remarks at

the government meeting were reported in the press. He asserted that the High Command believed that the approved budget "will literally ruin the country's defense capability" for the budget would require the MOD to immediately dismiss 400,000 servicemen and "fully terminate purchases of military equipment."²⁵ Claiming that the Finance Ministry did not understand the needs of the military and its role in society, Kokoshin also tried to make the case that the military saved the state billions of rubles and helped assure social stability. The military, he said, conducted operations to stabilize several former Soviet republics, a mission which kept down the number of ethnic Russian immigrants from these countries. Without the military's efforts, Russia could expect a million refugees which it would have to support. Moreover, some 15 million people in the defense industry sector depended upon military spending, according to the deputy minister. If all procurement were canceled in 1994, these people would see their livelihood collapse, along with the defense industries themselves. If the threat of social upheaval in the defense industry sector did not scare the government enough, Kokoshin noted that some 70% of the entire defense budget went to personnel--wages, benefits, housing, etc. Without adequate funds to support servicemen, the armed forces' stability would suffer, and without social stability in the military, Kokoshin said, the state could not be stable.²⁶

In the run-up to 15 March, the date set for the government meeting to finalize the approved budget for the Duma, the High Command's public campaign peaked. In a newspaper article written by a respected journalist with well-known connections to the MOD, the military's leadership was said to see catastrophe looming if the government's 1994 defense budget was not revised upward along the lines proposed by the MOD. Defense budgeteers had calculated that the military would need 80 trillion rubles to maintain spending parity with 1993. With a 37 trillion ruble budget, 400,000 servicemen, half of them officers, allegedly would have to be discharged without compensation and in violation of existing legislation. (Existing legislation required a generous severance package be paid to officers forced out of service.) Kokoshin was quoted at a government meeting as saying that there was a "clear trend toward loss of control over the Armed Forces." The MOD reportedly demanded in an "official letter" to the Prime Minister that all defense procurement orders for 1994 be canceled, existing contracts be abrogated, and a cessation of arms production be declared, regardless of the fact that the government had already (in late November 1993) approved and let procurement contracts for 28.3 trillion rubles.²⁷

In the first public indication that the MOD was also attempting to enlist Yeltsin to press the Finance Ministry to

back down at the next budget meeting, Defense Minister Grachev was purported to have sent a memorandum explaining the military's position on the budget and the dangers of failing to adequately fund the armed forces. In response, Yeltsin reportedly wrote to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin:

I share the Defense Minister's concern. I ask you to weigh everything one more time. A solution should be sought without detriment to Russia's defense capability.²⁸

The Defense Ministry probably tried to increase the pressure on Yeltsin by leaking Grachev's memorandum and Yeltsin's reply that he was "concerned." This tactic surfaced again two days later in an interview given by General Vorobyev. On 12 March, the general again publicly laid out the military's rationale for its rejection of the government-approved budget and for its sharp criticism of the Finance Ministry. The military, he declared, had asked for nothing superfluous; it could back up its budget request with unassailable facts and figures grounded in reality, while the Finance Ministry's approach rested on misleading abstract formulas. Moreover, the general charged that the Finance Ministry had stooped to blackmail by threatening to stop or cut funding to supposed unwarranted military privileges such as food, pay inducements, and pension allowances. Vorobyev noted that the military pinned great hope on Yeltsin to rein in the Finance Ministry because the president had recently declared in a speech to the legislature that it would be

unacceptable for the defense budget to bear unfairly the brunt of the government's inflation-fighting. Vorobyev also appealed to both the Duma and Federation Council to side with the military when it debated the 1994 budget.²⁹

Defense Minister Grachev went public with his rejection of the government-approved budget for the first time in a 16 March news conference. He declared that the military's financial situation was already critical; so far it had received only 68% of funds already authorized. Under a 37 trillion ruble budget, he asserted, military reform would be impossible, combat readiness would fall, and only 200,000 servicemen could legally be released in 1994 (that is, with legislatively mandated severance pay) vice the planned number of 400,000.³⁰

Glimmers of Hope Appear.

In two articles in mid-March the military press offered its readers a glimmer of hope that the High Command's campaign within government circles to rebuff the Finance Ministry would achieve success. In an interview published in Krasnaya zvezda on 11 March, the Chairman of the Federation Council's Committee for Security and Defense Questions, Petr Shirshov, said that his committee would look hard at the defense budget after it was voted upon by the lower house,

the Duma. Pledging that his committee would work to set proper defense priorities, including protecting the livelihoods of servicemen, he assured readers that he had served many years in the military, having retired as a major general in early October of last year, and that several military officers served on his committee. He vowed to establish a good working relationship with his counterparts in the Duma and with the Defense Ministry.³¹

On 15 March, Krasnaya zvezda reported Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets' comments at a recent news conference that the government, probably a reference to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, was concerned that reductions in the defense budget could bring the defense industrial sector to a halt, stop cold military reform, and make impossible further efforts to restructure the military into a smaller, modern professional organization. These points were the very ones that Grachev and other military spokesmen had emphasized in their criticism of the government-approved budget. Soskovets also said, according to the newspaper, that the budget had yet to be finalized. He believed that the estimate for 1994 government revenues was too low, implying that a higher estimate would mean more money earmarked for the defense budget. Once the budget was truly finalized it would be submitted to the relevant Duma committees for action, according to the deputy prime minister.³²

On 17 March, the Russian media reported that the government meeting to finalize the budget had lasted three days, from 15-17 March, and was still going on. Debate over estimated revenues and funding of the "military-industrial complex" was said to be "very intensive." The Finance Ministry was holding its ground and refusing to revise upward its estimate of anticipated 1994 government revenues and refusing to increase funding for defense.³³

Meanwhile, while the government was meeting to finalize the 1994 budget, the Defense Ministry continued its media campaign against the Finance Ministry, hammering away on its themes of military and societal collapse. In a 16 March news conference, Defense Minister Grachev remarked that the government-approved 1994 budget threatened Russia's security. Not only could the armed forces not protect the country, but defense production would collapse, massive reductions in force would throw hundreds of thousands of servicemen on the street, and social tension would explode among the troops.³⁴ In an interview given to the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, Grachev asserted that in government meetings he had presented the military's case for a higher 1994 defense budget in "concrete figures" and to show "what less money means." These were not threats, but reality, and it was not his intention to "threaten or beg (humiliate myself)." If the final version of the currently approved budget were to be

enacted, claimed Grachev, only 46-47% of military spending requirements would be covered, defense industry would collapse, and homelessness and unemployment among officers would increase.³⁵

The Finance Ministry Wins Internal Skirmishes Again.

The Duma finally received the government's proposed 1994 budget on 19 March. According to the deputy chairman of the Budget Committee, the submitted budget differed little from the version approved by the government in early March.³⁶ Prime Minister Chernomyrdin noted in an interview that he had held several meetings with President Yeltsin to discuss the budget and a legislative strategy to get it approved. He expressed confidence that, working with the Duma, the government's budget would pass.³⁷ Defense Minister Grachev publicly reiterated on 22 March that 37 trillion rubles was insufficient to meet the military's needs, and expressed the hope that the legislature would raise the defense budget. Deputy Finance Minister Andrey Vavilov publicly replied that, if the government were to give the MOD the budget it had requested, then "it would be virtually necessary to stop economic relations in the country, switch the state to labor camps, and carry out the tasks formulated by the Defense Ministry." He averred that defense spending had totaled

about 5% of GDP in 1992 and 1993 and, under the proposed 1994 government budget, would total 5.03% for 1994.³⁸ Meanwhile, it was reported that the Duma had approved the government's 2nd quarter 1994 spending plan on 23 March.³⁹ This plan, like the 1st quarter spending plan, required a virtual freeze on spending increases until the total 1994 budget was approved by the legislature and signed into law by the president.

Thus the Defense Ministry, despite its dire warnings about the consequences to the military of the Finance Ministry's 1994 budget, failed in its efforts to overcome the Finance Ministry in internal government meetings. The government refused to back down and, moreover, Yeltsin and his presidential staff appear to have given the High Command little but lukewarm verbal support in its efforts to rebuff the Finance Ministry. This first suggests that the Defense Ministry carried little influence within government circles on this issue. Second, it suggests that the military had little credibility within the government on this issue; if its dire warnings about the collapse of defense industry and social explosions among the troops were believable, the government would not have risked massive societal violence or civil war for the sake of lowering inflation, no matter how important that was for economic health. Other government ministries and agencies would have likely been targeted for deep reductions to reach inflation goals and to keep the

military from collapsing. Third, there appeared some sympathy for the Defense Ministry's position within the presidential staff and with Yeltsin. Whether this sympathy was genuine or more the result of a power struggle between the government and the president's staff is unclear.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, President Yeltsin in the end sided with his Prime Minister, a sign that not only did the military carry little weight on this issue within government circles, but that it also could not overcome its powerlessness with entreaties to Yeltsin.

The battle was far from over; the venue now switched to the legislature where Defense Minister Grachev had already appealed to legislators to rescue the military. Nonetheless, the High Command no doubt learned a bitter and disheartening lesson: although it risked its reputation and shed blood for President Yeltsin and this government, and while it clearly stressed that the proposed 1994 budget was intolerable, it had little power either within the government or with the president on an issue it had identified as a critical one for the military's health. Consequently, on a theoretical plane, many in the High Command had to wonder why the military risked so much in October when it intervened to arrest Yeltsin's opponents: the government ignored its concerns, and entreaties for help from the president were not answered or became mired down in political squabbling. On a practical

plane, the military moved into the opposition as it actively began to campaign to defeat the government in the upcoming legislative battle.

On the Legislative Front.

The military leadership continued its drumbeat of public criticism even as it sought to persuade legislators behind closed doors that the government's proposed budget was ruinous to the armed forces. First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin again attempted to depict the military as the victim of unjustified and dangerous financial games when he commented that, despite already unacceptably low authorized funding, the Finance Ministry continued illegally to delay transferring funds into military accounts. The military's debt to defense and civilian concerns had grown to 3 trillion rubles and 70% of servicemen had not received any pay in almost two months.⁴¹ Nonetheless, an anti-government newspaper seemed to capture the mood of many in government and the legislature in a 30 March article. The reporter noted that, by all accounts, the government's proposed budget, although painful, should come as no "shock" (a reference to "shock therapy" economic theory which brought massive bankruptcies and unemployment to Poland and which Russian radical reformers felt was necessary to apply to the

Russian economy). The Finance Ministry was said to have realistically estimated 1994 revenues at 120 trillion rubles and expenditures at 182 trillion rubles, with the military receiving the largest amount of all government programs--37 trillion rubles.⁴²

Parliamentary committee hearings on the budget were scheduled for 5 and 7 April. The first of several legislative votes on the budget was tentatively scheduled for 13 April, with final approval anticipated at the end of May.⁴³ Several parties and political factions within the Duma announced their position on the budget even before the hearings began. It was clear that the budget vote would be unpredictable and subject to a number of political vagaries. For example, the most radical reformist party, Gaydar's Russia's Choice, announced its support for the budget because, although it was not "shock," it was anti-inflationary. Another reformist coalition, the Yabloko Bloc, led by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, came out against the budget because it considered the budget's monetary and credit policies too tight and likely to spark an economic depression and massive unemployment.⁴⁴

In the 5 April committee hearings, Economics Minister Aleksandr Shokhin laid out the government's rationale behind its budget numbers. The government's goal, he said, was to lower the monthly inflation rate by the end of the year to 8-

10%. To achieve that goal, the government deemed it necessary to maintain strict control over government spending within the limits established in the proposed budget.⁴⁵ Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Petrov testified that cutting inflation to 8-10% was critical to overcoming the country's economic crisis and starting an economic revival. Many programs in the 1994 budget, he asserted, were funded at an inflation-adjusted rate to equal funding received in 1993. He pointedly noted that the military's share of the 1994 budget fell within these parameters.⁴⁶

The High Command continued publicly to fight the government during parliamentary budget hearings. In a television interview, Defense Minister Grachev boldly blamed politicians for the military's plight. "Political leaders have left the Army to fend for itself," he charged, and the military was experiencing serious morale and discipline problems because of funding shortfalls. He appealed to "our elected deputies and our leaders in the government" to recognize that the military did not request unjustified funding:

Our sums are realistic, and I emphasize again that the sum now being discussed [37.1 trillion rubles] and endorsed is clearly insufficient even to maintain servicemen's pay and the wages of [civilian defense] employees.⁴⁷

The military's anti-budget campaign seemed to make some headway among legislators. Vladimir Shumeyko, the Chairman

of the Federation Council (upper house), said that he would insist that the social status of those dependent upon the government's budget, such as servicemen, be protected. He added that the military's interests must be taken into account in the budget and fully provided for: "We [the Federation Council] will not allow the Army's interests to be undermined."⁴⁸ As the upper house, however, the Federation Council could not take action on the budget until it passed the Duma, and any vote to reject Duma-passed legislation required a two-thirds majority. Nonetheless, Shumeyko was generally considered close to Yeltsin, which is why he was appointed to the chairmanship of the Federation Council, and was rumored to have an eye to running for president in 1996 if Yeltsin did not. For many in the military it was undoubtedly gratifying that a Yeltsin advisor and possible presidential candidate would actively work to support the military in the budget battle.

The budget debate and vote in the Duma on 14 April were contentious. According to several reports, committee hearings resulted in little change in the government's proposed budget. The main debate in committee hearings over the government's projections of revenue estimates (too low said the critics) as well as overall expenditures (also criticized as too low) carried over onto the floor of the Duma. Also, many deputies saw the budget as insufficiently

detailed, just a list of funds to be given to government ministries, and even inaccurate. Acting Finance Minister Dubinin was called in to lobby the deputies. He admitted that the budget was tough, but not as tough as it could have been, he claimed. Inflation was the main enemy and had to be cut to 7-8% a month by year's end, he told the deputies. According to one report, two camps emerged during the debate: those who wanted to reject the budget outright and return it to the government for revisions, and those who wanted to adopt it as it was. Various parliamentary devices were used by the Duma Chairman, Ivan Rybkin, to try to get the budget passed.⁴⁹ It took three votes, but supporters of the budget finally succeeded in gaining its passage by the minimum required votes (225) when they agreed to consider the proposed budget "adopted as a working basis" for presentation to the Duma for its first reading in 10 days after revisions.⁵⁰

Round one in the legislative battle registered another loss for the Defense Ministry. Obviously, though, the battle was not over and the government still had a serious fight on its hands. Just to remind all the participants of what was at stake, the military representative testifying at Duma Defense Committee hearings on START-II stated on 18 April that, given current funding, by the end of the century Russia would be without nuclear weapons because of the MOD's

inability to maintain the force.⁵¹ Prophesising a social explosion in the army, the collapse of defense industry, 15 million unemployed, hundreds of thousands of angry ex-servicemen released from duty without severance, and now Russia's strategic deterrent under threat, the military was pulling out all the stops.

On the Legislative Front, Round Two.

On 26 April the revised government budget was resubmitted to the Duma for committee consideration and an 11 May floor vote. The deputy chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, Aleksandr Piskunov, stated that, according to his committee's calculations, the military budget for 1994 should be raised from 37 to 55 trillion rubles. At the same time, he admonished the Defense Ministry to take emergency steps to cut spending such as scaling back training, limiting contract hiring,⁵² and disbanding poorly manned units. He also claimed that Duma Chairman Rybkin had written Yeltsin, urging the president to discuss the defense budget with representatives from the Defense, Economics, and Finance Ministries, and from the Duma Defense Committee, at the next scheduled Security Council meeting.⁵³ Meanwhile, on 29 April the Duma's Economic Policy Committee voted to recommend to the full Duma that the budget be rejected because most of the Duma's revisions had

not been taken into account.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the military leadership, implying that it was responsive to outside criticism, emphasized that it was looking for ways to cut spending while protecting servicemen. Defense Minister Grachev chaired a two-day meeting of senior ministry financial officials on 27-28 April to find ways to cut spending, set budgetary priorities, and tighten austerity in order to respond to the military's extremely difficult financial situation. Grachev remarked that the MOD's financial officers had to find further cuts in spending and to make sure that what they did spend, was spent properly and efficiently. They had become the first line of defense in protecting the military from inflation and this "time of legislative confusion." They must, said Grachev, "shield the Army from those who want to cash in at the military's expense." He also reiterated that, above all else, spending on military personnel was a priority to be protected.⁵⁵

A week later, on 5 May, the MOD's two First Deputy Defense Ministers, Andrey Kokoshin and General Staff Chief Kolesnikov, chaired another meeting of senior ministry officials to discuss and set budget priorities in light of the military's financial crisis. The senior military leadership reportedly decided to set the following priorities: (1) social protection of servicemen--wages, food, energy payments; (2) maintenance of the country's nuclear

deterrent; and, (3) continued weapons procurement, albeit at drastically reduced levels. Despite this prioritization, the participants sensed that the MOD could not achieve its goals, given a budget of 37 trillion rubles. According to Kokoshin, "(i)t is getting harder and harder to ensure combat efficiency of the Armed Forces given the current conditions of financing." Other unnamed staff officers were reportedly less circumspect, as they "strongly condemned" the inadequate financing of the military.⁵⁶

In a 6 May news conference keyed to the two-year anniversary of the founding of the modern Russian military, Defense Minister Grachev presented the military's view of what the state had to provide for the armed forces to function properly and efficiently. Three tasks, he asserted, require solution at the state level: first and foremost, reliable and stable funding for the military; second, resolution of chronic manpower shortages; and third, guaranteed social protection for servicemen.⁵⁷ He reminded listeners that this social contract between the military and the state ensured stability in Russia, leaving unsaid, but surely implying, the consequences of breaking this contract:

One of the main results of the two years we have lived through, I believe, consists in the fact that our Armed Forces have become a reliable institution of the state, a guarantor of stability in society, and play an important role in maintaining the integrity and security of Russia. . . . No matter what difficulties Russia may now be experiencing, no matter what at times unresolved problems

confront the Army, the Armed Forces . . . remain wholly combat ready and controllable.⁵⁸

Thus in the preliminaries to the first Duma reading on the 1994 budget, scheduled for 11 May, the military publicly had positioned itself as an institution vital for Russia's internal and external security, but denied the funds needed to do its job. The MOD also was trying to appear as a reasonable government agency, looking for ways to cut its budget to the bone, and agreeing to scale back its request from 80 trillion rubles to 55 trillion rubles (see below). At the same time, it was warning both implicitly and explicitly that the current government budget was dangerous in the sense that it could spark dissent and uncontrollable actions by desperate servicemen.

Behind the Scenes, Round Two.

Prior to the second Duma budget vote, like before the first Duma budget vote on 14 April, the military appeared to make some headway among legislators and government officials. Duma Chairman Rybkin's call for a Security Council meeting to discuss the 1994 military budget resulted in several meetings between 27 April and 10 May, coordinated by President Yeltsin's National Security Adviser, Yuriy Baturin, in which representatives of the Economics, Finance, and Defense ministries, and the Duma's Defense Committee, participated.⁵⁹

At these meetings, the Duma Defense Committee and the Defense Ministry pushed for an increase in the military budget to 55 trillion rubles, which they said would keep the budget at 1993 levels adjusted for inflation, while the Economics and Finance Ministry sought to maintain the budget at 37 trillion rubles, a figure they claimed was much closer to 1993-adjusted rubles.⁶⁰ In short, the contending sides were debating whether inflation in 1994 would be in the 200-300% range (Finance, Economics ministries) or 400-500% range (Defense Ministry, Duma Defense Committee). The Duma's Budget Committee--responsible for coordinating the draft budget among the several committees having jurisdiction prior to the full Duma's discussion and vote, apparently did not take part in these discussions. Its chairman, Mikhail Zadornov, expressed caution over the source of funds for the proposed military budget increase.⁶¹

In the last inter-ministerial meeting on the 1994 defense budget, the deputy Finance Minister agreed to add funds to the military budget so long as the overall budget did not increase.⁶² In other words, if the military and their legislative and government allies wanted a larger 1994 defense budget, then there would have to be cuts in the projected budget allocations of other government agencies and programs. Nonetheless, according to Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Piskunov, a deal was struck to increase the

1994 defense budget to 50 trillion rubles.⁶³ The media reported President Yeltsin's agreement with the Defense Ministry/Duma Defense Committee's proposed increase to 55 trillion rubles. He purportedly sent a copy of the proposed increase to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin with the note, "I deem it expedient to agree."⁶⁴

At the same time, legislative disapproval of the revised draft seemed strong. All three committees which considered the government's revised 1994 budget prior to the second Duma vote recommended against its adoption: the Economic Policy Committee asked the full Duma to reject it; the Defense Committee said that the military portion of the budget had to be increased to 55 trillion rubles; and the Budget Committee, where sentiment ran against the proposed budget, failed even to consider the draft budget due to a lack of quorum.⁶⁵

And yet, for all the Defense Ministry's and Duma Defense Committee's bureaucratic politicking, and regardless of President Yeltsin's seeming endorsement of an 18 trillion ruble increase in the 1994 military budget, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin took no action to support an increase for the military. After reportedly discussing the issue with acting Finance Minister Dubinin on 11 May, the day of the Duma budget vote, the Prime Minister neither changed the government's proposed budget to include an increase for the

military, nor did he reject such an increase out of hand.⁶⁶

During the debate prior to the floor vote, government representatives noted that the Finance Ministry had taken into account the concerns of the Duma expressed during the first Duma vote on the budget in late April. The estimate of 1994 revenues had been revised upward to 124.5 trillion rubles, according to acting Finance Minister Dubinin, which allowed the government to raise expenditures from 182.2 to 193.3 trillion rubles and still retain an acceptable budget deficit.⁶⁷

Ultimately, none of this increase would go to the military budget. The floor debate in the Duma over the military budget grew contentious and was "marked by sharp exchanges."⁶⁸ Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov tried to convince the deputies in "desperate attempts" that 55 trillion rubles marked the absolute "subsistence minimum" for the armed forces.⁶⁹ Acting Finance Minister Dubinin argued that additional expenditures which increased the budget deficit would spur on inflation and were not acceptable. In this, he was supported by the reformist Russia's Choice Party and the Yabloko bloc.⁷⁰ Others argued for shifting expenditures to the military from other programs. Still others argued for more funding for agriculture, which, in the end, received the lion's share of the added expenditures, some 9 trillion rubles.⁷¹

The budget preliminarily passed much along government lines and with a projected defense expenditure of 37 trillion rubles. The military again fell victim to a chaotic legislative procedure marked by shifting voting rationales and alliances. Some democrats voted for the budget because they saw it as flawed, but the best attainable.⁷² Other democrats voted against the budget because they believed it not radical enough.⁷³ The Agrarian and Communist Parties, severe critics of the government, voted for the government budget because the agro-industrial sector would continue to receive huge subsidies.⁷⁴ And some voted for or against the budget believing that their action would make things worse for the government and help bring it, and Yeltsin, down.⁷⁵ Whatever the motivations, acting Finance Minister Dubinin praised the Duma action, saying that the state budget was more realistic and that it allowed the government to pursue its economic reform strategy.⁷⁶ The final Duma budget vote was scheduled for the end of May, and Dubinin pledged to work with the Duma to deal with remaining legislative criticisms.⁷⁷ Legislative supporters of a 55 trillion ruble defense budget labeled the vote "both a strategic and political defeat. At best, (the final Duma vote) will add just 1-2 trillion to the defense budget."⁷⁸

The military's public response to this latest, and seemingly insurmountable defeat, was swift and again full of

dire warnings. General Vorobyev asserted that 37 trillion rubles would "not guarantee the survival of the Russian Army." The military, he again claimed, was already severely underfunded; under this budget one half of all servicemen now would not be paid in any given month and should expect intervals of 2-3 months between wage payments. Regional authorities were already cutting power to military installations for non-payment; more cutoffs were now likely. This environment, he warned, "is fraught with very dangerous consequences."⁷⁹

A 13 May Krasnaya zvezda article highlighted the military's incomprehension over its situation and the High Command's deep bitterness toward politicians.⁸⁰ After noting the budget vote in the Duma which rejected an increase in the 1994 military budget despite President Yeltsin's support, the article ridiculed the Finance Ministry's arguments for holding down the military budget and excoriated Duma deputies who backed the Finance Ministry. They and their government allies were "trying to literally finish off both the country's defense industry and the Armed Forces themselves." Moreover, these legislators and their government allies knew what they were doing and did not simply act on the belief that this budget will be anti-inflationary and good for the economy. They were really playing "big-time politics" for political gain, willing to sacrifice the country's security

and were threatening the military's very existence for venal political purposes.⁸¹ And for this, the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of defense workers would be crushed and the military would sink into decrepitude. Politicians were again warned that "the situation among the troops is verging on the critical in many instances. . . . (T)he Army, put on financial starvation rations, will hardly be able to remain a factor of stability in the state."⁸²

Another Krasnaya zvezda article a few days later criticized the approved military budget on professional grounds. It took politicians to task for having no principles and throwing into question all progress made to reform the military into a modern, professional force able adequately to deter or combat threats to the nation.⁸³ According to the author, after over a year of damaging "populist" decisions concerning the Russian military, its manning, and its missions, things had begun to move in the right direction. A military doctrine guiding the development of the military's future and its missions had been approved, rationality was returning to the conscription issue, and patriotism was regaining favor. Now all this progress would be undone because politicians were pandering to populist sentiment to stabilize the state budget by irrationally cutting the military budget.⁸⁴ Preparations to meet future military threats, to restructure the military to allow it to

conduct its missions, were now questionable. It was reported that unnamed military experts believed that the proposed budget would effectively destroy Russia's strategic deterrent and they implored legislators to reconsider their approval of the budget in the final Duma vote.⁸⁵ For his part, First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin continued to warn that the procurement of weapons needed for modernization was under threat thanks to the "drastically deteriorating situation as regards the financing of defense needs."⁸⁶

The mood among officers in the field was reported to be grim. Most officers at one large Air Defense Forces unit were reportedly "quite pessimistic. The majority are holding out, but a feeling of futility and uncertainty has already lodged in many hearts."⁸⁷ Many feared being released from service because of budget cuts; many had not been paid for some four months; many were losing their professional capabilities because budget cuts had drastically restricted training. As a result, psychological trauma had increased: already an officer had killed his wife and then committed suicide. One of the unit's commanders avoided meeting fellow officers' wives: he would duck out of headquarters when they and their children came to ask for the money their husbands had earned. He had none to give. At another of this large unit's commands, personnel were "procuring mushrooms and berries and dry-curing fish since the Fall" in order to

survive. Plans by "Moscow generals" to prevent mental ferment by restructuring the military did not put pay in servicemen's' pockets nor food on their tables. Insulting "men who carry guns," asserted the author, is not the path "toward peace and stability."⁸⁸

Dissent Within the High Command?

The loss in the Duma also sparked public speculation that Defense Minister Grachev was under fire from other senior officers in the High Command for failing to lobby effectively for military equities. Grachev was said to have made a "strategic mistake" in believing that verbal support from President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin would suffice to secure the military's request for an additional 18 trillion rubles.⁸⁹ Unnamed critics in the Defense Ministry purportedly complained that Grachev failed to appreciate the evolving political relationship between Yeltsin and the government of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and between Yeltsin and the Duma. According to these critics, it should have been obvious to the Defense Minister that Yeltsin would be reluctant to confront either Chernomyrdin or the Duma on this issue.⁹⁰ He should have early on established working relationships with important Duma deputies sympathetic to the armed forces. Instead, "he left the Parliament completely

out of his considerations."⁹¹

Journalists eagerly awaited a 19 May news conference by General Semenov, the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces and a Grachev opponent on several issues involving the restructuring of the armed forces. Would the general criticize the Defense Minister, even indirectly, or would he forsake the opportunity, and if so, why? In the event, General Semenov commented at the news conference that senior officers freely voice their opinions in the High Command's highest decision-making body, the Defense Collegium, even if those views clash with the Defense Minister's. Once a decision on a particular issue is made, however, debate ends and implementation is obligatory, he asserted.⁹² This was taken as a signal that, despite the grumbling over Grachev amongst the military's senior officers, the Defense Minister's position remained secure and that the High Command would continue to unite behind a last-ditch effort to get those additional 18 trillion rubles.⁹³

The Military Goes Down Fighting.

While conducting its campaign against politicians, the military apparently again sought succor from President Yeltsin and its allies on the presidential staff. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Yushenkov announced on 19 May that

Yeltsin, the Security Council, and the government had practically agreed to a deal whereby the military would obtain its 18 trillion ruble increase by reprogramming funds within the budget.⁹⁴ Vyacheslav Kostikov, President Yeltsin's spokesman, emphasized that Yeltsin thought that 37 trillion rubles was not adequate for the 1994 defense budget. Yeltsin believed that the military should receive at least as much as in 1993, adjusted for inflation. Nonetheless, Yeltsin did not, averred his spokesman, intend to push for a sharp rise in the overall 1994 budget, nor did he think that the military needed an increase above inflation, since the military was to become smaller.⁹⁵ Kostikov also claimed that several in the Duma were playing political games over the budget, seeking to set the military and Yeltsin at loggerheads by voting for this budget and then claiming that the military's portion was unacceptable. Such a statement could not but confirm the suspicions of many in the military that theirs and the armed forces' future were being held hostage to "dirty politics."

At the same time, Federation Council Chairman Shumeyko reacted negatively to the Duma vote. He again reiterated his objection to a defense budget lower than 55 trillion rubles and pledged, during a visit to a Strategic Rocket Forces unit on 20 May, that the upper chamber would reject the Duma-approved budget.⁹⁶ In his view, Shumeyko announced, at the

current time the three pillars of Russian statehood were the Presidency, Federalism, and the Russian Army. The Chairman of the Federation Council's Defense Committee also publicly came out in support of a 55 trillion ruble defense budget.⁹⁷ The Deputy Chairman of the Duma, Valentin Kovalev, expressed the hope that the Duma and Federation Council would resolve their differences in existing reconciliation procedures and not get locked into a struggle over the military budget.⁹⁸

The final Duma vote, the second reading, for the 1994 budget was scheduled for 27 May, to be followed by a vote in June which would approve the budget as legislation to be sent to the Federation Council for final action. In a last ditch effort to pull out a victory, the Defense Ministry began working intensively with the Duma's Defense Committee to identify areas in the overall government budget from which funds could be reprogrammed to the military and to develop for presentation to legislators a detailed list of military expenditures in the hope that such a list would garner understanding and support.⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the High Command continued its public campaign to excoriate those who would force the military to live on "starvation rations." A 20 May article in Krasnaya zvezda blasted those supporting a 37 trillion ruble defense budget as "profoundly indifferent and incompetent." It ridiculed the idea that Russia's economic distress could be

cured on the backs of servicemen and took the Finance Ministry to task for so poorly managing the country's finances that it had to find scapegoats like the military. The article also pointed out that many military expenses had resulted from policy decisions, such as withdrawals from former Soviet republics and arms control treaties, and not from military requirements, thus implying that any blame for "high" military expenses belonged not to the military, but to politicians.¹⁰⁰ Just to make sure that military readers understood that those politicians to blame could be found both in the legislature and government, an unidentified Duma deputy said in a Krasnaya zvezda article that "the proposal to limit (the military budget) to a sum of R37 trillion came from the Russian Federation Government."¹⁰¹

That the High Command at least now understood the political complexities of the budget debate can be gleaned from an article in Krasnaya zvezda just prior to the scheduled final vote.¹⁰² The author pointed out that the High Command and Duma Defense Committee had provided legislators with a detailed military spending breakdown to buttress the military's arguments for an additional 18 trillion rubles. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Yushenkov was said to believe that these detailed figures could sway those who earlier voted against increasing the military budget to the military's position. The author noted, however, that the

"anti-Army" vote sprang from several motives and was not necessarily swayed by rational discussion. It would be possible to change the minds of some of those who voted against the increase because many deputies did so based on government figures, which would be proved incorrect. On the other hand, many in the "anti-Army" coalition included those who feared that increases in the army's budget would take money away from their constituencies, deputies who simply despised the military, and politicians who did not care about the merits of the debate, but rather saw the military budget debate as a political game through which they could increase their power at the expense of their political opponents. All in all, lamented the author, "(a)ny reasoning is powerless here."¹⁰³ As far as the author was concerned, the military had many allies in the Duma; indeed, the Duma Defense and Economic committees were leading the charge against the government's budget. But, in the end, the final amount approved for the 1994 military budget would result from a process governed by a variety of political motives.

The 27 May Duma vote was postponed for two weeks because of the battle over the military budget as well as disagreements over a number of other lesser budgetary issues.¹⁰⁴ According to one journalist, a "tense atmosphere in the State Duma . . . has developed in connection with the military . . . budget."¹⁰⁵ The Budget Committee, part of the

so-called "anti-Army" coalition, was said to be struggling with the more than 250 amendments to the budget offered by deputies, and was trying to come up with more money for the military.¹⁰⁶ The deputy chairman of the Budget Committee stated that the committee would recommend that some funds be reprogrammed within the budget to defense and other government programs. The committee also would recommend that any excess revenues received by the government during 1994, that is, revenues over the estimated likely amount contained in the budget, be directed to a "special Army support fund." He admitted, however, that excess revenues were unlikely to exceed 3 trillion rubles.¹⁰⁷

As the rescheduled date, 8 June, for the Duma budget vote approached, the military and its legislative allies made public the 1994 defense budget breakdown as well as their recommendation for the source of the additional 18 trillion rubles. The proposed ruble breakdown (in trillions) stood as follows:

Operations/Maintenance	28.0
Weapons/Equipment Procurement	11.1
Research and Development	5.1
Capital Construction (primarily housing)	7.1
Retirement Pensions	2.5
Support for the Ministry of Atomic Energy	1.2
TOTAL:	55.0

As to the source of the extra 18 trillion rubles, the military and its allies recommended that revenue derived from the sale of government facilities and from changes in import-export duties, which would generate over 20 trillion rubles, be passed to the military.¹⁰⁸

The Duma Defense Committee also held hearings just before the Duma vote as "a last-ditch attempt somehow to exert influence primarily on the Russian Federation Government on the eve of the repeat discussion in the Duma of the draft law on the 1994 federal budget."¹⁰⁹ In these hearings, Defense Ministry officials claimed that, despite existing laws which required the government to support the military adequately, 75% of officers and their families were living below the official poverty line. Many promising young officers--the military's future--were leaving service to find better-paying jobs elsewhere, and housing for servicemen had become the military's "accursed" problem.¹¹⁰ To these now familiar litanies of conditions within the military, a Finance Ministry official testified that the money simply was not there for the military; it would be difficult enough to come up with the government's proposed 37 trillion rubles. The Finance and Economic ministries felt that by the end of 1995, the country would see the "light at the end of the tunnel" concerning its budget travails.¹¹¹

Despite such testimony, the military press again sought

to depict a vote for 55 trillion rubles as a vote for the nation's security, and a vote for the government's figure of 37 trillion rubles as unpatriotic. As one military journalist put it to deputies, "(t)hink about the Motherland first and then about yourselves."¹¹² If they failed to do so, he warned, and continue "playing (intolerable) financial games with the Army" then they would set the stage for "explosions" around and within the Armed Forces.¹¹³ Moreover, another article in the military press criticized the government for failing to work with those Duma committees trying to come up with the additional 18 trillion rubles, despite public pronouncements by many senior officials, including the President and Prime Minister. As put in Krasnaya zvezda,

The interests on national security should not be alien to any political force. And the question then arises: Why has it been decided to combat the budget deficit at the Army's expense? There is no shortage of public assurances by statesmen that they understand the problems of the Armed Forces. . . . But when the time comes to allocate the money, it becomes clear that the idea of "shock savings" on defense needs is close to quite a number of government members and parliamentarians.¹¹⁴

As for the government's economic policy driving its decision on military spending, "(a)s the well-known proverb has it, an idiot can't do anything right."¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, because the military failed to "get busy with (its) elbows" early enough to lobby for its interests, other lobbies had shaped the process, and thus it seemed a very long shot hope that the military would receive an additional 18 trillion rubles.¹¹⁶

Defense Minister Grachev, however, was not about to throw in the towel. In a major interview the day before the Duma vote, he admitted that the military had made some mistakes in reforming itself, but he had still accomplished a tremendous amount given the very fluid conditions that had engulfed Russia, and the armed forces, the past two years.¹¹⁷ The military had so far managed to survive on "starvation rations" but it could not do so much longer without "irreparable damage on the Armed Forces." Stories about the military's unwillingness to cut costs and combat waste and fraud were simply untrue; large cuts had been made and waste and fraud were relentlessly routed out when found, he claimed. Even the sum of 55 trillion rubles would not meet the military's needs, but the military was willing to live with this amount: it could maintain minimal levels of performance and "prevent the defense complex from being destroyed once and for all."¹¹⁸

Grachev's plea for understanding and support did not convince military critics, including those in the Duma.¹¹⁹ An article in Rossiyskiye vesti, a newspaper funded by the legislative branch, noted the breakdown of the military budget and the plan to pay for a 55 trillion ruble military budget put forward by the Defense Ministry and its allies on the Duma's Defense and Economic Policy committees. Why, asked the author, was the military planning to spend over 11

trillion rubles on weapons and equipment procurement if it was in such dire straits? Moreover, why had the number of generals grown by over 600 in the last three years even though the armed forces had shrunk by 2 million men during that time? What happened to military reform? If the military was so concerned about combat readiness, why did so many military units engage in commercial activities? On top of this, wrote the author, society, the legislature, and the government have been subject to threat-like warnings concerning a breakdown in the military unless "civilians cough up" sufficient funds.¹²⁰ Where was the guarantee, asked the author, that if civilians cough up, "the Russian Army is not only the world's best-staffed with generals but also the most combat capable[?]"¹²¹

An article also appeared in the government funded newspaper, Rossiyskaya gazeta, just before the Duma vote. It noted that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and his government intended to stick to the 37 trillion ruble figure for the military's 1994 budget despite the High Command's lobbying.¹²² The author claimed that many trillions of rubles for the military and military-industrial complex were buried in other parts of the non-military portion of the federal budget, trillions which the generals and their allies failed to mention in their breakdown of military spending. After disparaging the scare campaign being waged by the military

and taking a verbal poke at "the generals' expensive [uniform] stars," the author concluded:

We are all hostages of our military-industrial complex. No military reform is taking place in the country. The switch to professional Armed Forces is being blocked . . . [and] technological backwardness is being conserved. All this behind closed doors. They use mystery to conceal lies. The economic consequences of the militarized nature of the budget . . . will be catastrophic. . . . Russia has been living throughout the 20th century under virtual wartime conditions and under the occupying regime of its own homegrown military-industrial complex.¹²³

When the Duma vote finally took place on 8 June, the military lost once again, as expected. A parliamentary procedure by the Defense Committee to increase defense spending by 18 trillion rubles for 1994 was cut short by the agrarian lobby's proposal, pushed along through parliamentary maneuvering by Duma Chairman Rybkin (of the Agrarian Party), and supported by the Budget Committee and representatives of the government and its Finance Ministry, to adopt the budget as proposed and without discussion of any committee-approved amendments.¹²⁴ The approved amendment on military spending added only 3.5 trillion rubles to the military budget and codified promises to give the military any "non-budget funds" generated from the sale of government properties and changes in some tax laws.¹²⁵ The budget passed by two votes, with the Communist and Agrarian Parties generally voting for it and the various democratic parties and blocs voting against. Zhirinovskiy and most of the LDPR deputies were conspicuously

absent and did not vote.¹²⁶ According to Duma Chairman Rybkin, the budget was adequate to protect the livelihoods of servicemen, and he believed that non-budgetary funds would eventually total some 12 trillion, thus more or less achieving the financial and social goals of the Defense Ministry.¹²⁷

The military's defeat on 8 June left the High Command with one last hope: the Federation Council. The day after the vote, one military spokesman asserted that, given the pro-military views of Council President Shumeyko and Council Defense Committee Chairman Shirshov, the Federation Council would reject the Duma-approved budget and force the lower house to increase the military budget.¹²⁸ Indeed, it was announced on 8 June that Shumeyko, along with Duma Chairman Rybkin, had been made members of the President's National Security Council, thereby increasing their clout on military issues.¹²⁹ Moreover, Shumeyko publicly appeared very confident that the Duma vote would not stand as the final word on the 1994 budget. In a Krasnaya zvezda interview after the vote he stated that "(n)either I nor the Federation Council will accept this budget." He charged that the Duma was acting as if "the worse things are, the better. The sooner there will be a change of power." He assured military readers that he would bring this issue to Yeltsin: "I will be having a talk with the President today about the defense

component of the budget."¹³⁰

Whatever Shumeyko might have said to Yeltsin did not sway the president into actively trying to overturn the Duma's vote. Moreover, for the first time, the president publicly criticized the Defense Ministry for causing its financial crisis by its own inaction. In a news conference two days after the vote, Yeltsin, in response to a question from Krasnaya zvezda's reporter, upbraided the High Command for not

carry(ing) out cuts more energetically. The lack of decisiveness here is incomprehensible. Today, as a society, we cannot maintain a 3-million-strong Army, we just cannot. . . . Therefore, cutting the Army is one of the main questions, one of the main problems the Army must itself resolve, with help, of course. . . . So, I held consultations. I had long talks with Chernomyrdin . . . Rybkin . . . [and] Shumeyko. . . . (W)e will find the funds that the Army won't get from [the budget], by drawing on non-budgetary appropriations.¹³¹

Krasnaya zvezda reported Yeltsin's answer without comment in its next issue.¹³² According to the pro-reform newspaper Izvestiya, after the news conference one could add to the nationalist and communist opposition bloc to the President "a section of the Army and the military-industrial complex."¹³³

President Yeltsin's admonition to the High Command notwithstanding, military spokesmen launched one of the most vituperative and apocalyptic phases of the MOD's public campaign against the government's budget. While Defense

Minister Grachev at first merely called the budget vote "sad," and likely to have a negative effect on the future of the armed forces,¹³⁴ others were less restrained. First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin called the approved budget "totally unacceptable and absurd."¹³⁵ Krasnaya zvezda's senior commentator ridiculed the Duma and the budget debate for "interparty intrigues, loud statements, and overt politicking. It follows from this that our politicians, alas, have not matured to the point of real parliamentarianism, which embodies, above all, responsibility for the country."¹³⁶ In a remarkable article, Krasnaya zvezda's Duma correspondent heaped scorn on even the military's allies, many of whom abandoned the armed forces when they thought the cause lost. He reminded his military readers that the vote approving the government's budget condemned many of them to poverty and the military itself to combat ineffectiveness. The Russian military would have to "sort out its own problems" since "the Communists, Agrarians, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Women of Russia, the majority of deputies from New Regional Policy, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and the Democratic Party of Russia" had abandoned it.¹³⁷ Even many who opposed the budget, like the reformist Yabloko bloc, did so not out of sympathy for the military, but for other partisan reasons, he charged. He then published the names of all Duma deputies and how they voted on the budget preceded by the following commentary:

These results [the budget vote] may affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and indeed the fate of the Russian Army itself. I hope that the deputies were aware of this when they decided which [voting] button to press or whether to press a button at all. The results of the voting which took place at 1647 hours on 8 June may prove historic. And when in the future we look at the names of the people's elected representatives, we will have a special feeling when we think of the first State Duma in post-Soviet Russia and its attitude to the defense capability of the Armed Forces, the problems of the Army and Navy, and its concern for the "man with the gun."¹³⁸

At the same time, Krasnaya zvezda ran several articles on servicemen's poor pay and the plight of servicemen and their families withdrawn from Germany to muddy fields and tents in Russia. The bottom line in these articles was that politicians were to blame for this state of affairs: on one hand, politicians decreed that the Army must leave Germany, but on the other hand, they provided insufficient funds for the military to carry out its orders.¹³⁹ Likewise, politicians passed laws on protecting the livelihoods of servicemen, and then failed to provide funds to carry out the laws.¹⁴⁰ The abandoned Russian military, it appeared, would have to fend for itself.

Moreover, both Defense Minister Grachev and Chief of the General Staff Kolesnikov publicly disputed President Yeltsin's assertion that the armed forces consisted of some 3 million personnel and that the military was not moving to reform itself.¹⁴¹ The president, Grachev said, had been misinformed: authorized active duty personnel strength was

set at 2.2 million, scheduled to be reduced to 1.9 million by year's end. He later added that, since the president had decided to reduce authorized strength to 1.5 million by the end of the year, the Defense Ministry would carry out that order.¹⁴² In actuality, according to a well-connected journalist, the armed forces were already down to 1.5 million serving personnel, which is what the president was calling for.¹⁴³ Also, in a defense of Grachev's leadership and approach to military reform, Krasnaya zvezda detailed the reform measures already accomplished in the military and those still in the planning stages. The newspaper also excoriated the press for printing misinformation about military reform and accused many critics of using the military for political games or even of trying to weaken the armed forces. The reality, noted the newspaper, is that:

Reforms in the Army, for all the difficulties and contradictions, are nevertheless making clear progress. . . . (M)any spheres of military reform are being retarded precisely by the fact that the appropriate economic, political, and legal preconditions have still not been created.¹⁴⁴

On 24 June the Duma adopted the "Law On the Federal Budget For 1994." As noted in the military press, no changes were made in the budget approved at the second reading on 8 June. An article in Krasnaya zvezda provided the breakdown of the vote by party for its military readership.¹⁴⁵ The numbers showed that only two political groups voted in the main against the government's budget: the centrist-reformist

Yabloko coalition, none of whose members voted for the budget, and the LDPR, of which only 10.9% of its deputies voted for the budget. The author also noted that many LDPR deputies had changed their votes from "for" to "against" the budget.¹⁴⁶ According to a LDPR deputy several weeks later, the party changed its position due to lengthy discussions and meetings with military and military-industrial officials after the 8 June vote in which the "threat of a weakened defense capability" became more apparent. This official explained that the LDPR had, in effect, returned to its original position: it had earlier supported the military's request for an additional 18 trillion rubles, but when it became apparent that such an increase would not make it through the Duma, party leaders decided, in the interest of political concord, that any budget was better than no budget and so had passed instructions to vote with the government.¹⁴⁷

Political Betrayal and Military Attitudes.

Such political flip-flops, even by a presumed political ally of the military like the LDPR, only served to deepen cynicism within the military about the political process in general. The Federation Council's failure on 27 June to live up to its president's promise to reject the Duma-approved budget probably drove that cynicism toward political

authority and processes deep into the attitudes of military officers. In an article in Krasnaya zvezda, for example, a sense of betrayal permeated:

The evolution in the Federation Council's attitude to the 1994 draft Federal Budget Law may be roughly characterized as "no, no, no--yes!" A categorical "no" rang out from public platforms, was uttered into journalists' microphones, and was heard in statements made, above all, by the Federation Council Chairman. "Yes" rang out immediately the budget just passed by the State Duma reached the Federation Council. Let us remember that the members of the Federation Council were going to back to the bitter end defense expenditures of 55 trillion. . . . To be honest, the stance of those who opposed 55 trillion from the very outset is far more understandable and attractive.¹⁴⁸

In a remarkable article written by two active-duty colonels, the depth of bitterness and cynicism toward political authority and the military chain of command among at least some Moscow-stationed officers was evocative.¹⁴⁹ According to the officers, the head of the MOD's Center For Military, Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research refused to provide data or answer their question about the reactions of servicemen to the "budget cuts." Through sources, they claim, they found out that a June survey conducted by the Center indicated that 89% of respondents felt that their legal rights had been violated, inasmuch as the various laws for the protection of the livelihood of servicemen were not being enforced. Moreover, 90% were dissatisfied with "the level of material provision." At the same time, Grachev and other senior officers and their

families were living quite well, having received their "30 pieces of silver" for betraying the Russian Armed Forces and ordering the military assault on the Supreme Soviet in October. Meanwhile, those who followed the orders and led the assault were being purged, while their troops, and others in the military, had been kept on "starvation rations" by Yeltsin. According to these officers, the prevailing attitude among officers at an Airborne unit near Moscow, one of the units which stormed the Supreme Soviet, was that the officer corps had been deceived:

How many times are we to be duped? Our old pay-- which has been entirely eaten away by inflation-- has not been issued for weeks, and now Grachev states on TV that we should not even dream about getting any kind of increase? The paratroopers almost felt like tearing up their striped undershirts--[for] what did they shed their blood in October?¹⁵⁰

The budget debate, continued the colonels, underscored the duplicity of politicians: "All the deputies have sworn their love of the Army and given an assurance that they will not insult soldiers any more. But in actual fact only Yavlinskiy and his 'Yabloko' Bloc firmly voted against the government decisions."¹⁵¹ The government, concluded the authors, realized that the military had become unreliable and thus sought to create or strengthen other armed formations while weakening the armed forces just in case the military decided that this Duma needed to be "bombarded . . . with tanks."¹⁵²

Concern over the spread of, or perhaps the already-widespread extent of, such attitudes in the military probably sparked a long interview in Krasnaya zvezda with President Yeltsin's Press Secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, after the Federation Council vote ended all hope for at least a 55 trillion ruble 1994 military budget. Kostikov agreed with the interviewer that partisan political forces, especially the Communists and nationalists, were trying to play the "Army card" in their struggles against each other and with Yeltsin. Calling this a "dangerous phenomenon," he reminded military readers that the "Army must resolve general national interests, not narrow political ones. Unfortunately, not all parties understand that now. But fortunately the President does understand it."¹⁵³ Kostikov said he agreed that attacks against the military were motivated by ignorance or for partisan political reasons. Those who attacked Grachev were really criticizing Yeltsin because Grachev "is one of the President's men." Moreover, in what was probably an effort to quash rumors of Grachev's removal from his post, or actual attempts to have Grachev removed, Kostikov explicitly assured the readers that the defense minister enjoyed the president's confidence. He claimed that Yeltsin and Grachev communicated regularly and that Grachev "is one of the President's closest comrades in arms, he enjoys (Yeltsin's) support and full confidence." Kostikov also scoffed at rumors that Yeltsin knew little about the military as commander-in-chief and thus

had failed to intervene in the budget debate to help the armed forces. Yeltsin, he said, worked closely with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and supported a "strong military budget." But, as President of Russia, Yeltsin had to balance what the military wants and needs with what others also want and need. Yeltsin simply had to make difficult choices; he was certainly not "anti-Army." It was Russia's "great good fortune" that it had a president who was a courageous man "not afraid of tough decisions and measures." For the military's part, it was now "very important that the Army adopts a normal, peaceful civic stance . . . [and] for society to leave the Army in peace and give it the opportunity to calmly surmount" its difficulties.¹⁵⁴

Along with this defense of Yeltsin, Defense Minister Grachev announced on 5 July that, to help individual servicemen and their families surmount their personal difficulties, the government had approved a 40% military pay raise as of 1 July.¹⁵⁵ It appears that Yeltsin and the government hoped to counter negative attitudes within the military not only by appeals to reason and patriotism, but also by an appeal directly to the pocketbook, this despite the recently passed budget.

Notwithstanding this attempt by Yeltsin to smooth over the bitterness over the budget debate, some of the most inflammatory and vituperative public commentary leveled by

military officials at political authorities now appeared. Media critics who complained about the pace of military reform or waste and corruption in the military were simply labeled liars.¹⁵⁶ More stories appeared in the military and general media detailing the abysmal conditions in which servicemen were living and placing the blame for this situation squarely on politicians.¹⁵⁷ Defense Minister Grachev, hitherto restrained in his public criticism, claimed the military's financial situation was "critical" and called the budget "ruinous" and "criminal" after President Yeltsin signed the budget bill into law in early July.¹⁵⁸ A week later, he stated to the Duma Defense Committee that the budget was "discriminatory," that the military was not even receiving the funds it was authorized, and that the military was raiding its wartime reserves in order to survive.¹⁵⁹

Grachev's statements to the Defense Committee followed a high-level Defense Ministry conference on 8 July called to evaluate military reform the past two years and to reevaluate future reform in light of the military's financial situation. Along with senior military officials, representatives of the Federal Assembly, Russian Government, and Presidential Administration, including the National Security Council, participated in the conference.¹⁶⁰ This marked the first conference in two years after an earlier one set out the basic parameters and timelines for various aspects of

military reform, such as downsizing, restructuring, and mission development.¹⁶¹ Grachev described the military's financial situation "disastrous" due to underfunding; nevertheless, "we can neither delay nor stop the reform of the Armed Forces."¹⁶² According to one journalist, Grachev faced "strong displeasure" at the conference, especially over his failure to stand up to Yeltsin on the issue of authorized manning levels and his subsequent agreement to further personnel cuts.¹⁶³

Perhaps responding to continual internal military criticism that he was not standing up to politicians, Grachev, in a meeting with the Defense Committee on 11 July, sharply criticized the legislators and the government for jeopardizing what progress the military had made on reforming itself, as well as jeopardizing future reform efforts because of severe financial constraints.¹⁶⁴ He again highlighted the plight of servicemen and the danger to the country's security brought about by underfunding. He also discussed a number of reform issues including conscription shortages and personnel manning levels. On manning, he reversed his earlier support for Yeltsin's edict which authorized military personnel strength be reduced to 1.5 million, and he urged the legislature to override the president and set an authorized military personnel level of 2 million.¹⁶⁵ In a move sure to generate bureaucratic infighting, Grachev called for the

consolidation of all the country's military formations, except those belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Foreign Intelligence Service, under the Defense Ministry. Finally, he called for closer Defense Committee-Defense Ministry cooperation, including joint working groups, to insure that "servicemen's lives and service are properly supported."¹⁶⁶

A day after Grachev's testimony, Yeltsin reportedly expressed his concern about "underfinancing of the legitimate requirements of the Army" to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.¹⁶⁷ For his part, the Prime Minister noted in a speech at a 15 July government session that military funding "will be implemented in full accordance with the [1994 budget] law" and that "special extrabudgetary funds . . . obtained from privatization is designed to resolve [the military's] social problems."¹⁶⁸

Grachev's comments to the Duma Defense Committee suggest that, even though the defense minister remained "one of the President's closest comrades in arms," he was maneuvering to be seen as a more independent actor willing to criticize and disagree with the president and others. Moreover, despite his contention that the "Army must stay out of politics," he now appeared willing to establish closer bonds to political authorities supportive of the armed forces. Also, his attempt to acquire the armed formations of

other government entities (in particular the Border Guards), presumably to weaken competition for the "military ruble," suggests that Grachev intended to be more proactive in his defense of military equities. In short, as a result of the budget debate, the defense minister had apparently decided to "get busy with his elbows." Interestingly, at about the same time, the most senior civilian in the military hierarchy, First Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin, appeared to mute his earlier sharp criticism of the government. On a popular television news magazine program, he refused to discuss the consequences of the budget allocated to the military for 1994.¹⁶⁹

It's Not About Money--It's About Military Reform and Corruption.

As noted above, in the month after passage of the 1994 Budget Law, the military leadership and military critics verbally sparred over why the Russian Armed Forces were in such dire economic straits: for the High Command, government underfunding was to blame, while critics claimed that the answer could be found in the military's reluctance to reform itself. In what was probably an effort to counteract assertions that a bloated, unreformed military had brought on its own financial difficulties, the military's allies on the

Duma Defense Committee held parliamentary hearings on the status of military reform on 19 July.¹⁷⁰ Senior military officials testified as to what the armed forces had done to restructure themselves and what the military leadership's plans were for the future. According to them, the military's severe problems were the result of poorly executed or non-existent military-related legislation, severe manpower shortages among enlisted and junior officers, and lack of adequate funding. In this regard, they were strongly supported by the senior Liberal Democratic Party deputy on the committee.¹⁷¹ In contrast, former military officers, including a former general who was employed by the Presidential Administration's Analytical Center, testified that the military's critical state was a consequence of the High Command's failure to reduce personnel strength levels at the higher officer ranks and its failure to downsize by radically cutting unneeded structures and consolidating service arms and branches.¹⁷² In an interview at the conclusion of the hearings, Defense Committee Chairman Yushenkov, not surprisingly, came out in support of the military's views on military reform and what was retarding progress on reform. As far as he was concerned, if the military's personnel and funding shortfalls were not solved soon, a revolt in the Russian Armed Forces would be inevitable.¹⁷³

President Yeltsin, however, apparently was not so convinced. In a meeting with Yushenkov three days after the Defense Committee's hearings, Yeltsin "advocated tightening financial discipline" in the defense budget and had so informed Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.¹⁷⁴ Yeltsin believed that underfunding in the military could also be remedied by the formation of a special voluntary fund for servicemen's needs as called for in the 1994 Budget Law. As to the 3.2 trillion rubles the military owed for servicemen's pay,¹⁷⁵ "the President at once gave an order to the Prime Minister to remove all obstacles preventing the uninterrupted, immediate financing of military servicemen."¹⁷⁶ A Presidential Administration commission for Questions of Defense Policy and Armed Forces Affairs would be established. This new body would ensure that the Presidential Administration was more active in formulating military policy.¹⁷⁷

This continued military campaign against the 1994 budget appeared to spark an effort by the military's critics to show that corruption in the military, not supposed government underfunding, was the other main reason for the military's plight. For example, during the debate's endgame in late June, a pro-reform newspaper reported that its sources in the Finance Ministry had evidence that pay shortages and delays had little to do with inadequate funding, but rather were the result of "financial

manipulations by Defense Ministry chiefs."¹⁷⁸ A government commission was created to analyze the Defense Ministry's financial management, but it "could feel powerful pressure from the very first day" by the military which was hampering the commission's efforts and was trying to cover up corruption.¹⁷⁹ By late July, Krasnaya zvezda ran a long article with a Finance Ministry official who confirmed that he had led an audit of the Defense Ministry in June and July.¹⁸⁰ The audit was undertaken primarily because of the great discrepancy between the government's and Defense Ministry's views over the minimum amount required for the military's 1994 budget. The government audit found some misuse of funds, but all in all, concluded that the Defense Ministry, and Defense Minister Grachev in particular, worked hard to keep expenses down. Moreover, the commission could find no substance to media charges of widespread corruption in the military; indeed, the commission concluded that Grachev and the MOD's Financial Chief Directorate worked assiduously to root out corruption in the military.¹⁸¹

A month later, a pro-reform newspaper reported that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin considered the audit a whitewash and had ordered another "more thorough" audit of the Defense Ministry.¹⁸² The main target was to be the MOD's Chief Directorate of the Budget and Financing, the military body most critical of the government's budget, and senior

officers. The author implied that Grachev himself might come under investigation and concluded:

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has staked his political future on the policy of containing inflation and the budget deficit. So, he has a clear political objective when he authorizes an investigation into large-scale corruption in the Armed Forces. As a result, a vortex might emerge into which lots of high-ranking generals might be dragged.¹⁸³

The implication for the High Command probably could not have been clearer: if you continue to try to subvert the government's 1994 budget, then expect some personally unpleasant results. Indeed, by late August it was reported that the Defense Ministry was being investigated for corruption and that this time, unlike the previous audit, the Federal Counterintelligence Service's Military Counterintelligence Directorate (the former KGB Third Directorate For Military Counterintelligence) was involved.¹⁸⁴ Several instances of corruption "involving certain Defence Ministry officials" had already "been established."¹⁸⁵

Notwithstanding such omens, the High Command maintained its public campaign into the fall of 1994 to highlight the plight of the military and to garner sympathy for servicemen. The military and other media continued to run stories of power cutoffs to military units, the growing poverty among servicemen, layoffs at defense industries caused by cuts or cancellations in military procurement, and fears for the

lives of servicemen and their families living in harsh climes.¹⁸⁶ The High Command also continued to attack its critics sharply. One military journalist, while admitting that "anti-military feelings . . . had apparently died down," claimed that anti-Army plotters in political and media circles, having successfully defeated the military on the 1994 budget issue, were still active against military efforts to carry out reform.¹⁸⁷ Any problems in carrying out military reform, he added, were mostly the result of indecisiveness by governmental authorities and funding shortfalls. Most critics of the armed forces had a "couldn't-care-less attitude toward the Army," and were using the military as a whipping boy to further their own political careers, "aspiring to popularity in certain party circles."¹⁸⁸

By late August the High Command felt compelled to issue an official statement denouncing its critics who, it said, were now spreading "tendentious" charges that the Russian Armed Forces "are becoming increasingly dangerous to their own people every day, and that the Army is in an 'explosive state,' is getting out of control, and is harboring the threat of new putsches and coups."¹⁸⁹ Such reports were meant to

divert Russians from the true reasons for the difficult position of the Armed Forces, which has developed as a result of the complex sociopolitical and economic situation in the country, the intolerably low level of funding for the needs of the Army and Navy, and the enormous burden of

unresolved problems which we have inherited from the past.¹⁹⁰

Moreover, these provocations by military critics were part of an attempt to "draw (the armed forces) into internal political conflicts and court games [and] are dangerous both for the Armed Forces and for society."¹⁹¹ A military observer, commenting on the Defense Ministry's statement, noted that these recent speculations about the military sprung from two sources. First, military critics continued their efforts to slander the military in order to cut "the already meager budget and encroach on the military's already slim privileges." More importantly, and stated much more directly than the High Command probably could:

The second reason for such "attention" toward the Army is the struggle of various political forces for spheres of influence, including in the Army. Left, Right, Jingoists, and Democrats of various hues are doing very well at this.¹⁹²

Lost Faith in Politics and Politicians.

It is clear that by the middle of September the Defense Ministry and probably most officers had lost much of their remaining faith in the political system, in the government, and in the legislature. Despite Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's public assurances (given at a high-profile ceremony on 3 September to welcome back the last Russian soldiers from Germany) that "priority is being given . . . to

the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families. I promise you that the government will make every effort to implement what has been planned,"¹⁹³ the High Command emphatically stated that such was not the case. Probably mindful that the Duma would shortly reconvene for its fall session, the Defense Ministry once again launched an all-out attack on the Finance Ministry in an effort to open government coffers more widely for defense spending. At an "emergency" Duma Defense Committee meeting held in mid-September, that is, prior to the official opening of the Duma's October session, Defense Ministry representatives charged that the Finance Ministry violated the 1994 Budget Law by not allocating funds to the armed forces as specified by the law.¹⁹⁴ Military officials asserted that the army had received only 9.2 trillion rubles instead of the required 16.04 trillion rubles and that the Finance Ministry was ignoring the section of the law which required it to finance fully "protected" budget items: pay and payments for food, clothing, and utilities.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, according to a military journalist, this state of affairs was "no longer seen as an emergency by anyone--government or president."¹⁹⁶ Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov promised that the full Duma would discuss the state of the military budget based upon his committee's report of these hearings.¹⁹⁷ The Finance Ministry, which allegedly ignored an invitation by the committee to answer the Defense Ministry's charges, would

have to account for its actions at a full Duma plenary session, asserted Yushenkov.¹⁹⁸

Shortly after the Defense Committee's hearing, the Defense Ministry was deeply embarrassed when, on 21 September, Moscow's power authority cut off power to the Central Command Post of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Russia's equivalent to the US Aerospace Command, for non-payment of bills and failure to respond to several notices requesting payment. Although power was turned back on about 4 hours later, the High Command became apoplectic, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin vowed to punish the "guilty" bureaucrat "trying to be more holy than the Pope," and National Security Adviser Baturin promised an investigation into the matter.¹⁹⁹ Several military officials took this opportunity to publicly point out how badly the military was underfunded,²⁰⁰ and Krasnaya zvezda claimed that this was not the first military unit to suffer a power cut off for non-payment of bills. Other strategic and conventional forces units had recently endured this form of "blackmail," and, in response, several of them "had captured power facilities and held them until the central authorities interfered."²⁰¹ The authors sarcastically questioned the ability and leadership of those in power and pointedly comment on the danger to the country if run by incompetents:

One may not agree, but this incident raises the question of the effectiveness of those in power in

this country, since practically any bureaucrat has the possibility to disregard state priorities, including national security. Evidently this implies that tomorrow some plumber is in a position to cut off the water supply to the Kremlin. Proceeding in that direction, we may well come up to the line beyond which lies disorganization and chaos.²⁰²

Meanwhile, Deputy Finance Minister A. A. Astakhov publicly responded in the military press to the Defense Ministry charges leveled at the Finance Ministry at the emergency Defense Committee hearing. He first stated that no Finance Ministry representative had appeared because his ministry did not receive an invitation to the committee hearings.²⁰³ In his letter to the Chief Editor of Krasnaya zvezda, Astakhov complained that the newspaper's coverage of the allocation of funds to the Defense Ministry was inaccurate. In an effort to set the record straight, the minister claimed, inter alia, that only servicemen's pay, like the pay of all government workers, was in a "protected" category, that is, to be paid "in full" regardless of the state of government revenues. Other expenditures such as food purchases, clothing allotments, and payments for municipal services, were not so protected: per the 1994 Budget Law, the Finance Ministry was transferring funds to military accounts for these expenditures on the basis of the revenue received by the federal budget.²⁰⁴ Unfortunately, added the minister, budget receipts were lower than projected, at about 70%, so, according to the Budget Law,

government agencies were getting about 70% of projected expenditures, except for protected categories which were being fully funded. If servicemen were not receiving their full pay or were experiencing pay delays, then the answer lay with the Defense Ministry, for the Finance Ministry was allocating pay in full as required by law:

It is not the Finance Ministry, but the Defense Ministry which bears responsibility for actually paying servicemen and civilian employees their pay and wages, for satisfying in full measure the funding of the protected items of expenditure in the . . . budget.²⁰⁵

Both the editorial office of Krasnaya zvezda and the Defense Ministry felt compelled to respond to these Finance Ministry charges. Krasnaya zvezda ridiculed the fact that the livelihoods of servicemen and their families depended upon the ability of the government to collect taxes. The government had to fund the military fully at the (admittedly unacceptable) level approved in the 1994 budget or else, warned the editorial board:

(I)n order that the military carry out their duty, they will have to take control of power supply systems, heat supply lines, gas mains, and so on. . . Or take another scenario: they lay down their arms and go home.²⁰⁶

The Russian Armed Forces, implied the editors of Krasnaya zvezda, had reached the state where the High Command would be willing to countenance the seizure of civilian installations and many in uniform would consider taking

autonomous actions. The political authorities' control over the military had so weakened and the chain of command within the military had so eroded that the possibility that senior officers, units, or individuals would act independent of authority was real and growing. Moreover, following in the footsteps of the soldiers of the Russian Empire on the Eastern Front in 1917, the armed forces of democratic Russia could melt away. Whether servicemen would "lay down their arms" before they go home, as the editors of Krasnaya zvezda supposed, was a debatable proposition.

For its part, the Defense Ministry responded to the Finance Ministry by claiming that it faced a Hobbesian choice. Given the total amount of money which the MOD was receiving every month, if it fully paid all servicemen's wages on time, then it would have little money for any other expenditures, including for food, medicine, housing, and utilities.²⁰⁷ The Defense Ministry "has been forced to sacrifice promptness in paying pay and wages and divert up to 30% each month from the capital received from the Finance Ministry."²⁰⁸ Chief military budgeteer General Vorobyev noted that a special commission had been set up in the Defense Ministry which regularly determined how much, and to whom, funds earmarked for pay are diverted for emergency payments.²⁰⁹ "The truth is," he asserted, "that over the last few months the Finance Ministry has only given us money to

pay monetary allowances and wages and virtually not a cent for other matters involved in the upkeep of the Armed Forces."²¹⁰ The Defense Ministry's statement, in direct response to Deputy Finance Minister Astakhov, admitted that this was a "flawed practice," but without such diversions "the very existence of military units . . . is unthinkable."²¹¹ An earlier newspaper report suggests that the High Command would consider another choice to preserve the Army. In remarks aimed at "saboteurs," Grachev warned that the army would "act by different methods" if "someone suddenly thinks to switch off lighting or water" to military units.²¹² Meanwhile, it was announced on 6 October that the Duma Defense Committee's attempt to hold an immediate full Duma discussion of the defense budget was sidetracked by the government which requested more time to analyze the performance of the budget for the first nine months.²¹³ It was also announced that the Finance Ministry intended to "employ the same methods to plan defense spending in 1995" that it used to determine that the Russian Armed Forces 1994 budget need be only 37 trillion rubles.²¹⁴

Thus, by the end of August the Defense Ministry had developed an "us" versus "them" attitude: what has been called "negative corporatism" held full sway. The "them" included not only expected military adversaries such as the Finance Ministry and radical democrats, but the government

and politicians in general. All of "them" were guilty of forcing "the Army literally to fight for its survival;"²¹⁵ for trying to drag the Russian Armed Forces into their dirty political games; for widening the already deep fissures within the military and eroding the chain of command, including the authority of the Defense Minister and other senior officers; and for threatening the very security of Mother Russia. Reminding his readers of the actions of Russia's miners, who did so much to undermine public and party support for Gorbachev and help Yeltsin to consolidate his power in 1991, one well-connected military journalist warned:

Needless to say, military people and those working in Defense Ministry organizations are more patient than the miners, who have repeatedly shown the country's leadership their readiness to take extreme measures. Nonetheless, it is shortsighted to try this patience infinitely: if a social explosion matures in the depths of the Army and Navy, in troop units, or the military department's labor collectives, it may shake society far more than the miners' actions.²¹⁶

Maturing Social Explosion In The Military?

The failure of the government, and President Yeltsin, to support the military's 1994 budget ultimately was seen as a bitter betrayal by many in uniform, far outweighing the praise garnered by the government's support for other military issues, such as military doctrine and conscription

changes. For many in the military, the budget battle highlighted the incompetence and venality of politicians of all political stripes and the failure of the evolving political system to meet minimal Army needs. Consequently, by the late summer/early fall of 1994, support in the military for democratization and political authority had sunk to a new low. Moreover, conditions in the military continued to worsen, thus exacerbating already existing internal fissiparous trends, crime and corruption in the military, discipline problems, and the decline in combat capability.

By fall 1994, civilian authorities appeared to threaten the personal and corporate interests of those in uniform. Finer, Nordlinger, and Perlmutter all posited that this sort of threat was the most likely to impel the military, or segments of it, to intervene in politics. And yet, despite dire warnings that the military mood and motivation was edging ever closer to intervention, no intervention occurred. To be sure, these dire warnings, especially from high military officials, constituted a form of blackmail (one of Finer's categories of military intervention) in that civilian authority was told that it must acquiesce to the military's budget demands or likely face an uncontrolled and uncontrollable response from military units.

The trenchant questions thus are: why did the military not intervene by late 1994; why did military units not

explode into political intervention once bread and butter issues came to the fore, given extant military views about civilian authority? Was Huntington correct that a high level of professionalism is the strongest inhibitor of military intervention, or is the argument of Finer and Nordlinger, that a military's and society's political culture are greater determinants of intervention, more correct? And if the latter argument is the better, then what indeed was the Russian military officer's level of political culture and how did it inhibit military intervention? These questions will be addressed in Chapter 6. First, though, let's turn to a now-famous (retired) senior Russian military officer who may provide a clue to the answers to these questions.

¹Interfax, 30 Nov 93. FBIS-SOV-93-229, 40.

²Y. Yevgenev and A. Golyayev, "Budget 93: Major Surgery," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30 Nov 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-229, 40-41.

³V Kononenko, "Budget Battles May Cause Split in Russian Government," Izvestiya, 2 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-230, 40-41.

⁴Kononenko, "Budget Battles May Cause Split."

⁵Yevgenev and Golyayev, "Budget 93: Major Surgery."

⁶Ibid.

⁷Interfax, 23 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-246, 56-57.

⁸ITAR-TASS, 24 Dec 93. FBIS-SOV-93-246, 58.

⁹Holloway and McFaul, 215. Holloway and McFaul point out that Yeltsin's pro-military stand on the military budget at this time was payback by the president to the military for its support in October. On military complaints about the failure to follow through, see Interfax, 23 Dec 93, and "Yet There Were Instructions, And Very Strict Ones," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 Dec 93, p1. FBIS-SOV-93-249, 40.

¹⁰Krasnaya zvezda, "Yet There Were Instructions."

¹¹Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 Jan 94, p6. FBIS-SOV-94-005, 36.

¹²Krasnaya zvezda, 10 Jan 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-006, 42.

¹³Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 Jan 94.

¹⁴Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 Feb 94, p4. FBIS-SOV-94-022, 18.

¹⁵Editorial report, Russian Television Network, 28 Jan 94. FBIS-SOV-94-020, 32.

¹⁶Editorial report, Russian Television Network, 25 Jan 94. FBIS-SOV-94-017, 15-16.

¹⁷Acting Finance Minister Sergey Dubinin announced on 2 February that he planned to submit the Finance Ministry's draft 1994 budget to government ministries for comment and review by 7 February. Interfax, 2 Feb 94. FBIS-SOV-94-023, 30-31. Dubinin replaced Finance Minister Fedorov when the latter resigned his position on 19 January over his fears that the government was going to abandon its tight monetary policies.

¹⁸Interfax, 28 Jan 94. FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31.

¹⁹ITAR-TASS, 16 Feb 94. FBIS-SOV-94-032, 31.

²⁰Ivan Ivanyuk, "There Is No 1994 Budget Yet. Problems With Financing Army and Navy Apparently Remain," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 Feb 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-034, 19.

²¹Interfax, 2 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-042, 21. In other words, the Finance Ministry was arguing that 8.3 trillion rubles in 1993 was equal to, as a percentage of government spending, 37.1 trillion rubles in early 1994.

²²Ivan Ivanov, ITAR-TASS, 3 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-043, 26.

²³Speech by President Yeltsin at Government Session, Mayak Radio Network, 4 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-043, 17.

²⁴Ivan Ivanov, ITAR-TASS, 3 Mar 94.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Anna Melnikova, ITAR-TASS, 4 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-044, 26. Editorial report, "Vesti" Television News, Russian Television Network, 6 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-044, 26-27.

²⁷Pavel Felgengauer, "Russian Army Suffers Defeat in Budget Struggle. Defense Minister Threatens 'Loss of Control Over the Armed Forces,'" Segodnya, 10 Mar 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-047, 17.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ivan Ivanyuk, "Military Budget Without Abstractions and Illusions," Krasnaya zvezda, 12 Mar 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-050, 19-22.

³⁰Editorial report, "Vesti" Television News, Russian Television Network, 16 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-051, 22-23. Concerning personnel reductions, Grachev was referring to legal requirements which govern severance and retirement pay. He had apparently rejected the notion--or at least the public campaign tactic--of immediately releasing 400,000 servicemen without compensation, an action which would have violated existing law.

³¹Aleksandr Pelts, "Petr Shirshov: Legislative Process Not Currently Keeping Pace With Life," Krasnaya zvezda, 11 Mar 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-051, 29-30.

³²Vladimir Yermolin, "Oleg Soskovets Is Opposed To Further Reducing the Defense Budget," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 Mar 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-051, 23.

³³Irina Savvateyeva, "The Government Will Not Be Able To Unravel the Budget," Izvestiya, 17 Mar 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-053, 24.

³⁴Viktor Badurkin, "Army On Brink Of Poverty," Trud, 17 Mar 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-053, 20-21.

³⁵Fiammetta Cucurnia, "Grachev: Russian Army Loyal To Constitution." La Repubblica, 18 Mar 94, p15. FBIS-SOV-94-053, 20-21. Parentheses in original.

³⁶Rodion Ivanov, "How Much Money To Give To Government?", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Mar 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-055, 28. Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvyy, 21 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-054, 34.

³⁷"Novosti" Television News, Ostankino Television Network, 22 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-057, 12.

³⁸"Grachev Expects Money" and "Reserves At Zero," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 22 Mar 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-055, 22.

³⁹Interfax, 23 Mar 94. FBIS-SOV-94-057, 18.

⁴⁰The Yeltsin Constitution approved in December, 1993 created a "French-style" government with both a Prime Minister and a strong executive. The result has been a jockeying for power and policy preeminence between the Prime Minister, his staff, and the ministries on one side, and the Presidential Staff on the other.

⁴¹"Andrey Kokoshin Criticizes Draft Budget," Segodnya, 24 Mar 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-057, 16.

⁴²Tamara Smirnova, "Shock Free, But Painful. The Duma Agonizes Over the Budget," Pravda, 30 Mar 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-062, 23.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Yelena Kolokoltseva, "The State Duma Will Hold Budget Hearings On Tuesday. The Majority of Factions Have Determined Their Positions," Segodnya, 2 Apr 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-064, 30.

⁴⁵Interfax, 5 Apr 94, FBIS-SOV-94-066, 26.

⁴⁶Igor Galkin, ITAR-TASS, 5 Apr 94, FBIS-SOV-94-067, 28.

⁴⁷Interview of Defense Minister Grachev by Vladimir Pozner, "We" television program, Ostankino Television Network, 11 Apr 94. FBIS-SOV-94-070, 22-24.

⁴⁸Petr Karapetyan, "The Army Must Have All Its Needs--And As A Matter Of Priority," Krasnaya zvezda, 2 Apr 94, p1-2. FBIS-SOV-94-069, 19-20.

⁴⁹Rybkin was considered a pragmatic centrist, although nominally elected to the Duma on the pro-Communist Agrarian Party ticket.

⁵⁰Interfax, 15 Apr 94; Stanislav Koltsov, "Sergey Glaziyev Has Sent the Budget Back to the Council of Ministers. The Duma Hoped To Begin Its Consideration On Friday," Segodnya, 14 Apr 94, p2; "Draft Budget Discussed," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 Apr 94, p1-2, FBIS-SOV-94-074, 39-40; Vladimir Isakov, "Budget Drama--Act Two," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 Apr 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-076, 44-45.

⁵¹Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 19 Apr 94, FBIS-SOV-94-076, 39.

⁵²Since 1992, the Russian military has hired volunteers to serve in the military, a key element of military reform. In order to attract people to serve, the armed forces need to offer a competitive salary and benefits, well in excess of what conscripts receive. For the cash-starved military, this has been a very expensive program, but one which most of the military leadership has felt is necessary to increase professionalization, i.e., combat readiness and efficiency.

⁵³Interfax, 28 Apr 94. FBIS-SOV-94-083, 31.

⁵⁴Mayak Radio Network, 29 Apr 94. FBIS-SOV-94-084, 35-36.

⁵⁵"Financial Service Looks For Ways of Armed Forces' Survival," Krasnaya zvezda, 29 Apr 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-084, 30.

⁵⁶Ilya Bulavinov, "It Is Bad Enough To Be Poor, But To Be Weak Is Even Worse," Kommersant-Daily, 6 May 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-089, 32.

⁵⁷Viktor Levin, Mayak Radio Network, 6 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-089, 30.

⁵⁸MOD sponsored radio program "Slavyanka," Mayak Radio Network, 7 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-089, 31.

⁵⁹Sergey Parkhomenko, "The President Agrees To A 1.5-Fold Increase In Russia's Military Budget," Segodnya, 11 May 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-091, 17-18; Interfax, 10 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-091, 20; and Mikhail Berger, "When the Military Wants To Seize the Treasury, It Needs Neither Tanks Nor Special-Purpose Troops. One Mercedes Is Sufficient," Izvestiya, 12 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-092, 30-31.

⁶⁰Parkhomenko, "The President Agrees To A 1.5-Fold Increase."

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Berger, "When the Military Wants To Seize the Treasury."

⁶³2X2 Television, 11 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-091, 17.

⁶⁴Parkhomenko, "The President Agrees To A 1.5-Fold Increase;" Berger, "When the Military Wants To Seize the Treasury;" and Interfax, 10 May 94.

⁶⁵Interfax, 10 May.

⁶⁶Berger, "When the Military Wants To Seize the Treasury."

⁶⁷Valeriy Konovolev, "Agriculture Reaps Money Harvest In Parliament," Izvestiya, 12 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-092, 34.

⁶⁸Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 11 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-092, 35.

⁶⁹Vladimir Yermolin, "State Duma Denies the Army Its 'Subsistence Minimum,'" Krasnaya zvezda, 13 May 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-094, 31-32.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Konovolev, "Agriculture Reaps Money Harvest," and Aleksandr Piskunov, "Budget As A Mirror Of Russian Economy. Neither the Government Nor Parliament Prevents It From Being Examined More Frequently," Rossiyskiye vesti, 1 June 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-107, 17-19.

⁷²Segodnya, 14 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-094, 34-35.

⁷³Robert Serebrenikov, ITAR-TASS, 12 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-094, 26-27.

⁷⁴Boris Federov, "Economy in Wake of Accord Treaty," Izvestiya, 17 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-097, 34-38.

⁷⁵See, for example, Lyudmila Aleksandrova, "Yeltsin Stands For Moderate Rise In Arms Spending," ITAR-TASS, 19 May 94.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷"Vesti" Television News, Russian Television Network, 12 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-093, 27.

⁷⁸Aleksandr Piskunov quoted in Yermolin, "State Duma Denies the Army."

⁷⁹Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 12 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-093, 29. See also, "Interview of Major General Vladimir Osadchiy," Mayak Radio Network, 25 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-102, 20.

⁸⁰Yermolin, "State Duma Denies the Army."

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Colonel Gennadiy Miranovich, "In the Snare Of Populist Decisions, Or Returning Once More To the Question Of What Kind Of Army Russia Needs," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-096, 33-35.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 16 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-094, 30-31.

⁸⁶Nikolay Burbyga, "Russia's New Armaments Under Threat," Izvestiya, 25 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-102, 20-21. See also, Aleksandr Gerasimov, "Itogi Television Program," Independent Television Network, 22 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-099, 35.

⁸⁷Igor Yelkov, "If MIGs Could Raise Pollock," Komsomolskaya pravda, 17 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-096, 30-31.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ilya Bulavinov, "Defense Ministry's Reaction To Federal Budget: A Minister Who Cannot Be A Lobbyist Is A Bad Minister," Kommersant-Daily, 14 May 94, p3. BBC Summary, Special Supplement: Military Affairs, SU/1999/S1.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ilya Bulavinov, "Generals On Military Budget: The Army and Hope Are the Last To Die," Kommersant-Daily, 19 May 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-098, 32-33, and Ilya Bulavinov, "News Conference By Army Commander In Chief: Pavel Grachev Comes To Know His Friends In Need," Kommersant-Daily, 20 May 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-099, 34-35.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Aleksandr Gerasimov, Itogi Newsmagazine, Independent Television Network, 19 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-099, 35-36.

⁹⁵Aleksandrova, 19 May 94 and Interfax, 19 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-098, 31.

⁹⁶ITAR-TASS, 20 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-100, 37-38.

⁹⁷Petr Karapetyan, "The Federation Council Will Be Consistent And It Will Not Let the Figure 37 Slip Through-- This Was Declared At A Meeting With Journalists By Federation Council Security and Defense Committee Chairman Petr Shirshov," Krasnaya zvezda, 9 June 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-112, 29-30, and Lyudmila Yermakova, ITAR-TASS, 7 June 94, FBIS-SOV-94-110, 35.

⁹⁸Ivan Novikov, ITAR-TASS, 3 June 94, FBIS-SOV-94-107, 27.

⁹⁹Vladimir Yermolin, "Could 18 Trillions Be Found?," Krasnaya zvezda, 20 May 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-099, 39-40.

¹⁰⁰Ivan Ivanyuk, "An Army Without Housing, Weapons, Or Hope. That Is the Possible Result Of Budget Cuts," Krasnaya zvezda, 20 May 94, p1. JPRS-UMA-94-022, 2-3.

¹⁰¹Vladimir Yermolin, "State Duma Protecting Army's Interests. Only 18 Trillion Still Have To Be Found," Krasnaya zvezda, 26 May 94, p1.

¹⁰²Vladimir Yermolin, "Could 18 Trillions Be Found?" Krasnaya zvezda, 20 May 94, p1. BBC Summary, Special Supplement: Military Affairs, SU/2005/S1.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Yelena Kolokoltseva and Dmitriy Volkov, "The Deputies Showered the Budget With Amendments. Second Reading Has Been Postponed Two Weeks," Segodnya, 28 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-104, 40.

¹⁰⁵Vladimir Yermolin, "State Duma Protecting Army's Interests."

¹⁰⁶Yelena Kolokoltseva and Dmitriy Volkov, "The Deputies Showered the Budget With Amendments."

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Vladimir Yermolin, "The 18 Trillion Ruble Contest: Will Appreciation Of the Country's Security Interests Prevail?," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 June 94, p1,3. JPRS-UMA-94-025, 4-8.

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122Anatoliy Zhuravlev, "We Are All Hostages Of the Military-Industrial Complex. Charm Of the Directors' and Generals' Budget," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 7 June 94, p1,3. JPRS-UMA-94-025, 6-8.

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127"Vesti" Newscast, Russian Television Network, 15 June 94. FBIS-SOV-94-116, 37-38.

128Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 9 June 94. FBIS-SOV-94-112, 27.

129Ilya Bulavinov, "The Federation Council Speaker Will Take Care of Security," Kommersant-Daily, 8 June 94, pp1,3. Russian Press Digest, 8 June 94.

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¹³¹"Yeltsin Independence Day News Conference," Russian Television Network, 10 June 94. FBIS-SOV-94-113, 19-26.

¹³²Vladimir Yermolin, "The President Looks To the Future With Optimism. Boris Yeltsin's News Conference Was Pegged To the Latest Anniversary Of the Proclamation Of the Russian Federation's State Sovereignty," Krasnaya zvezda, 11 June 94, p1. BBC Summary, Special Supplement: Military Affairs, SU/2022/S1.

¹³³Sergey Chugayev, "The President Confirmed His Choice In Favor Of Reforms And Democracy," Izvestiya, 15 June 84, p4. FBIS-SOV-94-116, 20-21.

¹³⁴Mikhail Shevtsov, ITAR-TASS, 9 June 94. FBIS-SOV-94-112, 27.

¹³⁵Interfax, 15 June 94. FBIS-SOV-94-116, 34-35.

¹³⁶Aleksandr Golts, "Battle For the Budget: The Argument Over the Figures Never Became A Debate On the Country's Security Problems," Krasnaya zvezda, 11 June 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-114, 26-27.

¹³⁷Vladimir Yermolin, "When Adopting the Federal Budget the State Duma Accepted Reduced Defense Spending," Krasnaya zvezda, 16 June 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-118, 34-36.

¹³⁸Ibid.

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¹⁴¹Pavel Felgengauer, "What Is the Real Size Of the Army," Segodnya, 17 June 94, p1.

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¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Anatoliy Dokuchayev, "Military Reform: Truth and Fantasies," Krasnaya zvezda, 18 June 94, p1,3. JPRS-UMA-94-027, 4-9.

¹⁴⁵Vladimir Yermolin, "Budget Law Adopted. Army's Interests Unaffected," Krasnaya zvezda, 25 June 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-124, 29.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷"Letter From State Duma Deputy Ye. E. Mikhaylov, Member Of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Faction and Member of the Committee For Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 July 94, p2.

¹⁴⁸Vladimir Yermolin, "Federation Council Agrees To 40.6 Trillion Rubles: Upper Chamber Of Federal Assembly Votes In Favor Of the 1994 Budget Passed By the State Duma," Krasnaya zvezda, 28 June 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-125, 30-31.

¹⁴⁹Colonel A. Nikolayev and Colonel P. Vladimirov, "Under Presidential Decree Another 83 Officers Will Decorate Their Uniform Trousers With Stripes," Novaya yezhednevnyaya gazeta, 8 July 94, p1-2. Russian Press Digest, 8 July 94.

¹⁵⁰Ibid. The Airborne Forces and a few other select units wear a distinctive blue-and-white striped shirt under a jumper which identifies them as among the combat elite of the Russian Armed Forces. Among servicemen, it is a great honor to wear the "striped undershirt." To consider tearing it up is tantamount to believing that the honor of the military's elite has been terribly sullied.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³Oleg Odnokolenko, "Vyacheslav Kostikov: It Would Be Beneficial To Leave the Army In Peace," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 June 94, p1-2. FBIS-SOV-94-127, 17-21.

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Mayak Radio Network, 5 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-129, 27.

¹⁵⁶"Far-Fetched Stories About Whose Finances? Journalists Writing To Order?," Krasnaya zvezda, 30 June 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-128, 26.

¹⁵⁷See for example, Alexander Khokhlov, "Without Housing Allocation Order Would There Be A Motherland? It Is Difficult To Build A Family Nest In A Missile," Komsomolskaya pravda, 29 June 94, p2.; Nikolay Astashkin and Vladimir Yermolin, "Mobile Forces Formed In Southern Russia and Ready To Resolve Any Tasks," Krasnaya zvezda, 5 July 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-129, 26-27; and Vladimir Yermolin, "Military Pay Held Back," Krasnaya zvezda, 9 July 94, p1.

¹⁵⁸Ekho Moskvyy Radio Station, 2 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-128, 25-26, and Vadim Byrkin, ITAR-TASS, 8 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-133, 24.

¹⁵⁹Yelena Masyuk, Independent Television Network, 11 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-133, 23, and Vladimir Gondusov, ITAR-TASS, 11 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-133, 23-24. See also Ivan Ivanyuk, "It Is Right To Keep Accounts But the Method Of Accounting Has To Be the Same," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 July 94, p1, for a sympathetic military deputy's view of the alleged financial gimmickry which the Finance Ministry used to delay funds to the military.

¹⁶⁰Anatoliy Dokuchayev, "Military Reform: Outlines Of Third Stage Drawn Up," Krasnaya zvezda, 13 July 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-136, 33-35.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid.

¹⁶³Ilya Bulavinov, "Pavel Grachev Disagrees With the President. Defense Minister Unfaithful To Yeltsin with State Duma," Kommersant-Daily, 13 July 94, p3. FBIS-SOV-94-134, 33-34.

¹⁶⁴Ilya Bulavinov, "Pavel Grachev Disagrees With the President;" Vladimir Gondusov, ITAR-TASS, 11 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-133, 23; and Aleksandr Pelts, "We Have Common Goals and Identical Problems. Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev Meets With Duma Defense Committee Members," Krasnaya zvezda, 13 July 94, p1.

¹⁶⁵Ilya Bulavinov, "Pavel Grachev Disagrees With the President."

¹⁶⁶Ibid.

- 167ITAR-TASS, 12 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-133, 20-21.
- 168Rossiyskiye vesti, 19 July 94, p1,4. FBIS-SOV-94-140, 28-37.
- 169"Details" Television Program, Russian Television Network, 25 July 94, BBC Summary, Special Supplement: Military Affairs, SU/2058/S1, 27 July 94.
- 170"The Army: Give Generals the Freedom And They Will Put Everyone Under Arms," Novaya yezhednevnyaya gazeta, 22 July 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-143, 23-24, and Vladimir Yermolin, "Russian Armed Forces: Is 1.5 Million 'Bayonets' Much Or Little?," Krasnaya zvezda, 21 July 94, p1. Russian Press Digest, 21 July 94. Hearings were also held by the Defense Committee on 25 July on the related question of the state of defense industries and the military's procurement of weapons systems. See Petr Karapetyan, "Does Russia Need A Military-Industrial Complex Or Not? This Was Exactly How the Question Was Raised By Some Federation Council Deputies," Krasnaya zvezda, 26 July 94, p3.
- 171"The Army: Give Generals the Freedom And They Will Put Everyone Under Arms."
- 172Ibid.
- 173Interfax, 19 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-139, 25.
- 174"President Intends To Bring Order To Armed Forces Finances," Krasnaya zvezda, 26 July 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-143, 21.
- 175Ivan Ivanyuk, "It Is Right To Keep Accounts."
- 176Krasnaya zvezda, "President Intends To Bring Order To Armed Forces Finances."
- 177Ibid.
- 178Aleksandr Nikolayev, "The Way the 'Defense' Ruble Works," Moskovskiy novosti, 19-26 June 94, pA2.
- 179Ibid.
- 180Ivan Ivanyuk, "Truth and Fabrications About Russian Armed Forces' Financial Situation. What Government Check On Defense Ministry Showed," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 July 94, p1-2. JPRS-UMA-94-031, 1-6.

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸²Stepan Stepanov, "Corruption: Chernomyrdin Promises To Put An End To Thieving In the Defense Ministry. Investigation Into the Military's Financial Affairs To Continue," *Segodnya*, 24 Aug 94, p1. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 28 Sept 94, 13. This article was written by a reporter named Stepan Stepanov, a name before never noted in print. This fact, plus the nature of the name, gave rise to some suspicion that "Stepan Stepanov" was a pseudonym for a reporter who did not want to jeopardize his senior military contacts by writing on military corruption.

¹⁸³Ibid.

¹⁸⁴"Check of Defence Ministry's Financial Activity," *Rossiyskiye vesti*, 27 Aug 94, p1. BBC Summary, 1 Sept 94.

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶See for example, "Lunch Hour Break" Radio Program, Vladivostok Radio Network, 14 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-136, 40; Petr Karapetyan, "Time To Warm Up For Coming Winter! Especially Far North Garrisons," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 22 July 94, p1.; and "Vremya" Newscast, Ostankino Television, 28 July 94. FBIS-SOV-94-146, 14-15.

¹⁸⁷Gennadiy Miranovich, "Who Needs Military Reform In Russia?," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 10 Aug 94, p2. JPRS-UMA-94-035, 14-16.

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¹⁸⁹"Statement By the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Information and Press Directorate: The Army Should Not Be the Object Of Political Speculation," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 25 Aug 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-165, 15-16.

¹⁹⁰Ibid.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Oleg Falichev, "The Threat Of the Man With the Rifle Is being Brandished At Society Again. Who Needs This And Why?," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 Aug 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-166, 19-20.

¹⁹³"Speech By Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin At Ceremony Marking the Return Of Russian Troops From Germany, At the Belorusskiy Railroad Station In Moscow," Russian Television Network, 3 Sept 94. FBIS-SOV-94-172, 42-43.

¹⁹⁴Yevgeniy Skukin, "Making Cuts Or Committing Hara-Kiri," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 15 Sept 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-180, 34, and Pavel Anokhin, "Ulyanovsk Military School Students Without Bread For Three Days," Rossiyskiye vesti, 27 Sept 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-190, 38-39.

¹⁹⁵Vladimir Yermolin, "Who Will Protect the Protected Items In the Military Budget: the State Duma, the Government, the President?," Krasnaya zvezda, 15 Sept 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-180, 32-33.

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¹⁹⁷Pavel Anokhin, "Ulyanovsk Military School Students Without Bread."

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹⁹Michael Specter, "Russia's Poor Army! Now Power Is Cut Off To Rocket Forces," New York Times, 23 Sept 94, pA3.

²⁰⁰See for example Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 22 Sept 94. FBIS-SOV-94-184, 38.

²⁰¹Oleg Falichev and Aleksandr Dolinin, "Submarine Building Plants Cut Off From Power Supply," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 Sep 94, p1, as reported by ITAR-TASS, 23 Sept 94, LEXIS/NEXIS, 24 Sept 94.

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²⁰³"Letter From Deputy Finance Minister A. A. Astakhov To Krasnaya Zvezda Chief Editor V. L. Chupakhin," Krasnaya zvezda, 28 Sept 94, p2. JPRS-UMA-94-041, 7-8.

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CHAPTER 5

GENERAL ALEKSANDR LEBED: MACARTHUR, EISENHOWER, OR DEGAULLE?

One particularly fascinating senior Russian military officer who has gained much recent notoriety is retired Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, the former commander of Russia's Fourteenth Army stationed in the Dniester region of now-independent Moldova. As early as the summer and fall of 1994, polls suggested that he had become highly popular within the military, and, by the fall of 1996, after placing third in the first round of the June 1996 presidential election, he was being touted by some as Russia's next president. At the same time, Lebed has been highly critical of civilian authority and, prior to his forced retirement in 1995, had gone so far as to praise Chile's General Pinochet as a model for Russian officers to emulate.

Who is this man who has captured the hopes of many Russians? Is he fated to turn out like General Douglas MacArthur, of little political consequence after his forced military retirement for insubordination, or like General Dwight Eisenhower, able to translate his popularity as a military officer into high political office after retirement?

Or will he wrap himself in Mother Russia's garb, and like General Charles DeGaulle, don the mantle of the nation's savior? His rise to political prominence from 1992-1994 provides a case study of the politicization of a senior military officer.

Yeltsin's Man.

In his memoirs about the failed August 1991 anti-Gorbachev coup, President Yeltsin notes his first impressions of then-Major General (one-star rank) Aleksandr Lebed. During the coup, Yeltsin and his supporters were holed up in the Russian "White House," the Supreme Soviet building, expecting an almost certain attack at some point by special forces troops loyal to the coup plotters. Yeltsin thought his position hopeless if troops stormed the White House: against trained military assault specialists, his defenders had no chance.¹ On the night of 19 August Lebed went to the White House, representing then-Airborne Forces Commander Grachev who had thrown his support to Yeltsin, to determine where things stood and to check on defenses. Lebed confirmed that, militarily, Yeltsin's position was indeed hopeless, even though some soldiers in the immediate vicinity had gone over to Yeltsin. Lebed thereupon advised Yeltsin to declare himself the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed

Forces pending Gorbachev's return. Yeltsin's earlier exhortation to the troops not to obey the coup plotters, said Lebed, was fracturing the military.² Lebed impressed the Russian President as a real military professional who knew his trade. Yeltsin described Lebed as "strikingly tough in manner, . . . a blunt man who placed his military officer's sense of honor above everything."³ According to press reports, Lebed and a battalion of an airborne brigade then "took up the defense of the (White House)" during the night.⁴ According to another journalist, Lebed replied to those who charged he had violated his military oath by going over to Yeltsin's side, saying that "(n)othing of the sort happened. I received a combat task [from Airborne Forces Commander Grachev] and performed it."⁵

In his 25 September 1991 affidavit on the events of the 1991 coup, Grachev testified that he ordered Lebed on 19 August to guard the White House with one battalion of paratroopers under his personal command.⁶ This was seen by Soviet Defense Minister Yazov, one of the coup plotters, as a sell-out by Lebed to Yeltsin; the minister ordered Lebed to report to him early on 20 August. Meanwhile, that day the plans were finalized for "Operation Thunder," a combined military operation to storm the White House early the following morning by KGB special forces, MOD Airborne Forces, and MVD paramilitary riot police.⁷ According to Grachev (who

testified that he already had decided that neither he nor his forces would participate in the attack and that he had so informed Yeltsin), he had Lebed report in his meeting with Yazov, which included the group finalizing the operational attack plan, on the situation around the White House. Lebed, said Grachev, reported that such an attack would lead to massive bloodshed and should not be conducted. The plotters planning the attack "displayed dissatisfaction with Lebed's report."⁸

The day after he met with Lebed, Yeltsin declared himself the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Quoting from the then-unpublished memoirs of General Lebed, Yeltsin painted a picture of a divided High Command and a military in chaos. Lebed himself was convinced that the chaos in the military was part of some conspiracy and that any attempt to storm the White House would lead to massive bloodshed.⁹ The probability of such bloodshed paralyzed the military into inaction even though some units went through the motions for an assault on the White House scheduled for the night of 20-21 August.¹⁰ Prominent in the planned assault were paratroopers under the command of General Lebed.¹¹ But, when the order came to begin the operation, the elite of the military and its senior officers refused to obey. From Yeltsin's perspective this refusal sprang from two sources: the military's horror at the prospect of killing or wounding

hundreds of civilians among those who surrounded the White House in support of Yeltsin and Gorbachev; and the military's fear of being blamed for attacking the symbol of the Russian government, the White House.¹² The implications Yeltsin probably, and correctly, drew from these events are two. First, the military did not so much support him in his showdown with the coup plotters as it rejected orders that would have led to many civilian casualties. And second, the military above all feared for its unity and prestige in times of political crisis.

General Lebed's next prominent appearance came some 10 months later, in late June 1992, when he was appointed commander of Russia's Fourteenth Army. Most of the army was deployed in the Dniester region of Moldova [formerly Moldavia], a region with an ethnic Slavic majority which had been attached to the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic from Ukraine when Moldavia was annexed from Romania by Stalin. The 42-year-old general was described in the press as a sophisticated, tough, no-nonsense, professional officer being sent by Defense Minister Grachev to command an army slipping out of Russia's control and becoming embroiled in a then-violent ethnic and territorial conflict--many hundreds of persons, mostly Slavs, had been killed or wounded--between the Moldovan government and Slavic separatists.¹³ Lebed himself stated that his initial mission in Moldova was

actually to lead a special forces operation under the nom de guerre Colonel Gusev to evacuate the families of servicemen caught up in the fighting. When he, and presumably Moscow, realized an evacuation was impossible, he was appointed Fourteenth Army Commander on 28 June with the task of stopping the fighting.¹⁴

Almost immediately upon his appointment, General Lebed warned Moldova in a news conference that he had no intention of standing by and reconciling himself to "genocide:" while "the army will continue to maintain neutrality," he warned, "it will be armed neutrality."¹⁵ He also remarked that a resolution to the Dniester problem should not involve Romania--a comment disavowed that same day as the general's "personal opinion" by a spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who noted that President Yeltsin had agreed to quadripartite talks among Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania to halt the fighting and resolve Dniester's status.¹⁶ Several days later a deputy Foreign Minister pointed out that his Ministry had no say, as far as he knew, in the appointment of General Lebed for this was the "prerogative of the Russian Defense Ministry."¹⁷ For his part, in a 3 July radio phone-in program President Yeltsin responded to a question about alleged Moldovan genocide against Slavs by remarking that he had sent Lebed to Moldova to ensure appropriate behavior by the Fourteenth Army and "to hold on

to all positions" while diplomats forged a cease-fire as well as an agreement on a peacekeeping force to prevent further conflict.¹⁸

One journalist asserted that Lebed told him that his mission in Moldova was to end Moldovan government military operations against the separatists, by force if necessary, and that this new, harder line represented a policy shift.¹⁹ This indeed could have been the case, for Yeltsin's pro-Western foreign policy had come under stinging attack by nationalists as injurious to Russia and its long-term interests. A tough, blunt, respected professional like Lebed would have provided the government political cover on the nationalist front at a time when it sought to push Russia down a very painful and controversial economic reform path.

Broadsides From A Loose Cannon.

Unfortunately for Yeltsin, the government, Grachev, and the Defense Ministry, General Lebed also appeared to have a well-developed independent streak along with the other qualities they apparently so admired. His comments regarding Romania's participation in a Dniester settlement hinted of things to come and, in retrospect, pale in comparison to later remarks. Indeed, within a week of his June 1992 arrival in Moldova, his tendency to speak on a variety of

broad issues and to do so in a provocative manner severely complicated Moscow's Dniester policy. At his second press conference, Lebed, asserting that he was not "a military man . . . interfering in politics," but speaking "as a Russian officer with a conscience," blasted Russia's Dniester policy shortly after President Yeltsin had announced an agreement with Moldovan President Snegur: "It is time to cease to wallow in the mire of a policy which is little understood and almost unintelligible." He called Moldova a "fascist state" and its government "a fascist clique" which should be arrested and tried as war criminals for genocide against Slavs. He complained that Yeltsin, then in Munich at a G7 meeting to press for Western economic aid, was dishonoring Russia in his search for such aid:

(I)t is time we stopped going round the world with a begging bowl. Like donkeys in search of carrots. Enough.²⁰

Democrats and Yeltsin supporters howled for Lebed's head. Izvestiya opined that, in the face of this "ultimatum," "President Yeltsin should immediately dismiss a commander who utterly rejects the policy of his government."²¹ Yeltsin was advised to do so, not only because Lebed's presence would negate the recently-signed agreement, but more importantly, because it would send a signal to other potentially insubordinate officers, of whom there were more than a few:

What does the general really think of his Supreme Commander in Chief? It is not difficult for anyone who has spent even a few months in barracks to imagine. . . If Russia wants to have a civilized, predictable Army, it must secure from its generals unquestioning obedience to their duty as soldiers.²²

Other democrats echoed these comments, adding that General Lebed was insubordinate.²³ Former Gorbachev adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev warned that Lebed was the sharp edge of an anti-democratic, anti-reform conspiracy to undermine Yeltsin. Reminding his readers of General Makashov, a prominent officer who supported the failed anti-Gorbachev coup in August 1991, Yakovlev remarked that Gorbachev could and should have fired that outspoken officer for insubordination long before the coup. If he had done so, then Makashov would have lost his appeal and would not have worked against Gorbachev within the military.²⁴

The Defense Ministry carefully distanced itself from General Lebed's comments. General Mironov, its spokesman, chided Lebed for making "political assessments of the actions taken by presidents and parliaments of sovereign states" when he had many time-consuming military duties to which to attend. According to news reports on 8 July, the Defense Ministry had forbidden Lebed from future contact with the media;²⁵ two days later, however, the Defense Ministry issued a statement denying it had banned Lebed from speaking to the media.²⁶ As to which of the stories is true, perhaps the

answer came two months later when, on 1 September, Defense Minister Grachev announced, in the wake of additional critical comments from Lebed, that:

I have issued additional written instructions to General Lebed whose essence boils down to the impermissibility of political statements regardless of the form or the forum. . . . I can attribute General Lebed's transgressions to the fact that he is in a very complex position.²⁷

Perhaps in July verbal orders failed to silence Lebed.

As to the substance of Lebed's remarks, the High Command, said its spokesman, did not approve of all the statements, which, of course, raised the question of with which comments members of the High Command agreed.²⁸ Lebed's remarks garnered support not only among the Russian military, but also, not surprisingly, within Russian nationalist circles as well. An article by a Dniester Slav in the Russian communist-nationalist newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya was probably indicative of opinion among Lebed's supporters:

We call him not only Lebed [which means swan in Russian], but also golub [dove; a Russian term of endearment]. . . . After his just and courageous statement in which he called things by their real names, some kind of hope appeared. . . . There is no doubt that today, many in Moscow and Chisinau [Moldova's capital], would like to remove him. . . . I want to say that the Russian land and Russian officers are proud and will be proud of such officers as Major General Lebed. The time will come when [Russian] generals who contemplated the murder of peaceful citizens with indifference will be forgotten, but the name of General Lebed will always be remembered, as are remembered and revered . . . such [great Russian] military leaders as Suvorov, Rumyantsev, Kutuzov, Rayevskiy, Zhukov.²⁹

Such sentiments reverberated at a time when rumors were swirling of a military coup d'etat or a forced Yeltsin resignation because of economic turmoil brought on by the government's economic policies and by heavy nationalist criticism of the president's foreign policies.³⁰ The commander of Russia's Ground Forces left for Moldova three days after Lebed uttered his comments, ostensibly to check on the implementation of the recently agreed cease-fire plan, but according to one press report, he really went to "investigate the consequences" of Lebed's remarks.³¹ Two days later, a senior officer stated:

(O)fficers' assemblies in the 14th Army have assessed Gen. Lebed's statement as timely, highly necessary, and in accordance with the realities of the situation and the mood of officer personnel. Gen. Lebed is a patriot for his motherland--Russia. He expressed his opinion and that opinion meets with understanding and support among the officers of the 14th Army.³²

In short, senior military spokesmen implied that Lebed's opinions were popular not just with officers under his command, but throughout the military. Moreover, the High Command was not pleased with those who blamed the military for causing or exacerbating conflicts in former Soviet republics, nor those who raised the specter of a military coup whenever the Defense Minister disagreed with government policy. Aleksandr Golts, Krasnaya zvezda's senior political commentator, wrote:

I understand those who are not enthusiastic about

the none too diplomatic utterances of General Lebed. But it was after these trenchant words, and after the visit [to Dniester] of [Vice President] A. Rutskoy, who also can hardly be counted as an over-refined diplomat, that prospects of a peaceful settlement to the conflict emerged. The actual path toward this breaking of the deadlock was worked out before this by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. . . . The conflicts over Russia's foreign policy . . . testify to a failure in the decisionmaking system and to the fact that a readiness to take responsibility for these decisions by no means characterizes all members of the leading team.³³

Both the Defense Ministry and Yeltsin found themselves in a bind. Neither Yeltsin nor the High Command, given Lebed's popularity in both military and nationalist circles, could remove the outspoken officer out of concern for the impact that such a move could have on the military. The High Command worried about the unity and cohesiveness of the military; the removal of Lebed would probably widen fissures among officers, forfeit control of the Fourteenth Army, and weaken the chain of command. For Yeltsin, the concern was over military subordination to civilian authority; the removal of Lebed could further damage the president's standing within the military and raise the probability of a military rupture and autonomous actions by disgruntled military units. Yet, as pointed out by the president's supporters, failing to act against Lebed could send the wrong message to other potentially insubordinate officers: it would suggest that the president could be defied and embarrassed with impunity. Faced with this dilemma, Yeltsin chose not to

remove Lebed, a signal of his political weakness. He did, however, reject Lebed's routine nomination to Lieutenant General in mid-July, according to unconfirmed press reports.³⁴ Nonetheless, even this punitive step was short-lived: on 18 September, Lebed received his second star, having been promoted to Lieutenant General.³⁵

Not With My Army You Don't.

As the Dniester cease-fire took hold, Russia and Moldova began to negotiate the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army back to Russia. From the beginning, General Lebed indicated his disapproval of any withdrawal agreement. By early January 1993, he publicly charged that Russia was riding roughshod over the wishes of the majority Slav population of Dniester which wanted either significant autonomy or independence from Moldova and looked to the Fourteenth Army and Russia to protect them from any Moldovan attempt to suppress self-determination.³⁶ Meanwhile, in the months prior to these comments, both Lebed and the Defense Ministry denied that the Fourteenth Army was assisting the Dniester separatists in setting up an independent state. Comments ascribed to Lebed to the effect that he was doing so were dismissed as fabrication and as an attempt to sully the military's name and to wreck the negotiation process.³⁷

Whatever the truth, Grachev felt compelled to issue written instructions to Lebed to hold his tongue,³⁸ and rumors circulated in mid-September that Lebed would soon be removed from his post, rumors which both Lebed and the Defense Ministry denied.³⁹

Lebed also became embroiled in the internal politics of the Dniester separatists shortly after his arrival. Appalled by the corruption, arrogance, and incompetence of the separatist leadership, Lebed soon waged a campaign to have them removed from their positions. The general personally vouched for evidence against Dniester political leaders collected by one of his senior officers and presented to a special commission of the Dniester "legislature" for action.⁴⁰ The investigation and subsequent charges prompted calls for Lebed's removal by the Dniester leadership, calls to which Vice president Ruts koy responded by notifying the leadership that Lebed was "under his protection."⁴¹ This was a noteworthy move by Ruts koy who was generally considered as one of the leading Russian supporters of the Dniesterians in their quest for statehood. It also suggests that one of Lebed's admirers and protectors in Moscow was the vice president, since Ruts koy had begun to stake out a highly nationalistic position on security issues often at odds with the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Despite Grachev's admonition to hold his tongue, Lebed

consented to an interview in early January 1993. It was vintage Lebed, blunt and highly critical of Russian politics and policies.⁴² As noted above, he accused Russian policymakers who agreed to the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army of abandoning fellow Slavs to the almost certain depredations of the Moldovan government. But "Russian officers," he said, "will not shame themselves and will not hand over the region to be torn to pieces."⁴³ Dniester, he claimed, was a viable state that should not be rejected. In his personal opinion, "we must without fail hold a referendum, in the presence of international observers so that no one can later cast doubt on the results, and find out what kind of power citizens actually prefer." We will find out, he averred, that "(t)he Dniester Moldovan Republic is the people's will embodied."⁴⁴ In a late February interview, Lebed spoke even more candidly about his views on, and his likely reactions to, Russia's Dniester policy. When asked about the Fourteenth Army's withdrawal from Dniester and reminded that "you are a military man, and orders are orders,"⁴⁵ he replied:

I know the [Fourteenth] Army in terms of both its makeup and mood: no officer would take the responsibility for leaving the region to be ruined. . . We will not leave here until this territory's status has been decided and until it has been guaranteed on an international level that peace will be preserved here. This is the opinion of everyone and I share these views. Politicians can either take this into account or ignore it.⁴⁶

Lebed clearly was baldly objecting to Russian policy on Dniester, serving notice that he and his officers would refuse to carry out that policy if ordered to do so.

As if his rejection of Russian policy toward the Dniester issue were not enough, Lebed concluded his interview with, first, a blast at the policies and incompetence of Russia's political leaders:

I know one thing for sure: that great mess of ours --perestroyka--has developed into its second stage --crossfire. So far no one knows when the third stage--exchange--will take place and it is hard to say who will survive to see it. Nor is it clear if we will survive at all as a state formation. We are increasingly turning into the territory with eroded borders which for the world community is becoming a supplier of cheap manpower, cheap resources, and simply an ecological cesspit.⁴⁷

And, second, Lebed called for military action, if needed, to save Mother Russia:

And there has been enough hypocrisy about how the Army's only function is to fulfill foreign assignments. If it is decided to use the troops, then we must cast aside diplomatic capering and monkey's grimaces and save the state from unbridled rogues and adventurers who should know for certain that they will not escape justice, that they do not live in a vacuum.⁴⁸

These comments were made as the hostility between Yeltsin and reformers on the one side, and the Supreme Soviet and nationalists on the other, seriously escalated. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, not only did these antagonists fight over policies, but also over the distribution of power

between the presidency and the legislature, a fight which eventually resulted with the military storming the Russian Supreme Soviet building that October.

For his part, six months after his arrival in Tiraspol, the Dniesterian capital, General Lebed became clearly insubordinate, at least verbally strongly opposed to his government's official policy toward the region, involved in the internal politics of another country, and apparently forged relationships with the increasingly vocal and negative anti-Yeltsin and anti-reform Russian political opposition.

Yet, for all this, Lebed retained his position. His retention almost certainly derives, at least in part, from his ability to control his troops in a difficult situation, his ability to maintain the cease-fire, and his ability to put pressure on the Moldovans and Dniesterians if Moscow so ordered. But, his retention almost certainly was, in part, a negative consequence of his apparent power within the military and nationalist political circles. In short, Yeltsin, who as commander-in-chief had the undisputed authority to dismiss Lebed, in reality had no practical alternatives. If he removed Lebed, Dniester would explode, Russian nationalists would howl, and Moscow would likely have to intervene militarily in Moldova. By retaining Lebed, however, Yeltsin continued to look weak and allowed the general to continue to increase his support within the

military as well as in nationalist circles.

It is possible that the Russian Government did try to remove Lebed or that unknown persons were testing his popularity in late April 1993. According to press reports at the time, Lebed was removed from his post and on 27 April was preparing to return to Moscow with his family. Dniesterians were reported to be gathering to rally against this move.⁴⁹ A spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry denied that Lebed had been removed and praised the general for keeping the lid on events in Dniester.⁵⁰ Sources in the Defense Ministry also reportedly remarked that "this speculation about (Lebed's) retirement" was part of a political game emanating out of Moldova and Dniester.⁵¹ In the event, Lebed did leave for Moscow with his family on 28 April, probably for a vacation. A month later, Defense Minister Grachev, when asked about rumors of Lebed's removal, disclaimed any intention of removing a general who was performing his military duties very well. He then condescendingly described Lebed and his political forays as essentially harmless and a result of the general's immaturity:

On the other hand, Lebed still has some boyishness, allows thoughtless statements, including those of a political nature. He seems not to have entirely realized that servicemen should not allow political judgments. Sometimes Lebed needs correction. He tries to correct his mistakes, but sometimes he loses his temper.⁵²

It is difficult to believe that the Defense Minister

really considered General Lebed a non-threatening person who was "boyish." More likely, Grachev had to explain why he had not removed Lebed. By describing Lebed as a good general who sometimes, in anger, said things that he should not say, Grachev downplayed Lebed's significance, positioned himself as a wise Defense Minister who understood his generals, and showed that he stood by his men. In other words, Lebed's command of the Fourteenth Army, despite his insubordination, despite his verbal forays into Russian politics, and despite his actual forays into Moldovan politics, continued not because of the Defense Minister's inability to remove him.

Lebed, A Year After His Appointment.

From 7-9 June 1993, Lebed attended a conclave of all senior Russian military officers in Moscow to discuss the results of the recently-completed winter training cycle.⁵³ The basing of Russian troops abroad was also discussed, and in an address to the conference, President Yeltsin declared that Russian troop presence abroad would be governed "on new principles of basing." In this regard he mentioned the Fourteenth Army.⁵⁴ Lebed remarked in an interview a week later that "this issue had not been entirely developed" and that he understood these new basing principles would imitate "the American type."⁵⁵ While he agreed that Russian military

bases in foreign countries required a legal basis in a status-of-forces agreement between Russia and the involved countries, such agreements had to include provisions for training and a Russian-controlled airfield.⁵⁶ Once again, it appeared as if General Lebed was placing conditions upon higher authority in matters of foreign policy.

Meanwhile, rumors of General Lebed's removal recurred well into June 1993, as the general's one year anniversary as Fourteenth Army Commander approached. For his part, Lebed described such rumors as "ill intentioned," part of a campaign by local separatist authorities to get rid of him. His response remained the same: "I am not going to leave this post," nor was his Army about to withdraw.⁵⁷ Lebed also continued to intervene in local politics. He strongly supported the efforts of one of his senior officers, Colonel Mikhail Bergmen, Commandant of the Fourteenth Army's Tiraspol garrison, to remove Dniester separatist leaders on charges of corruption and incompetence. This situation was described by one report as a "war of nerves" verging on armed conflict between the Fourteenth Army and the separatist militia.⁵⁸ Lebed himself was allegedly the object of a planned assassination attempt by the separatist leadership.⁵⁹ Another report suggested that by this time Lebed "enjoy(ed) great influence among Russia's national-patriotic forces and is known as a firm fighter against corruption and economic

crimes."⁶⁰ Many now saw Lebed as the paragon of an honest, patriotic, professional military officer: in their eyes, a competent military leader who was not afraid to fight against venal, corrupt, incompetent civilian politicians for the good of ordinary Russians and Mother Russia.

The political consequences in Moscow of Lebed's behavior became quite tangled. Lebed was severely criticized by many in the extreme nationalist opposition in the Supreme Soviet. Although they agreed with his rejection of the agreement to withdraw the Fourteenth Army, they also strongly supported the separatist leadership. The leader of the strongest extremist nationalist bloc in the parliament, Sergey Baburin of "Russian Unity," called for an investigation of Lebed's "illegal activity . . . against the present leadership of the [separatist] Dniester Republic."⁶¹ Lebed thus became an issue in the increasingly dangerous conflict between Yeltsin and his reformist allies and the extreme nationalists. His removal could only exacerbate this conflict.

Lebed and the October 1993 Showdown.

As noted in Chapter 3, by early September Yeltsin decided to bring to a head the deepening crisis with his opposition by dissolving the Supreme Soviet and calling for

new elections and a referendum on his proposed new constitution. In doing so he acted unconstitutionally since the then-operative constitution gave him no power to prorogue the parliament. The president's opponents learned of his intent and occupied the Supreme Soviet building (the "White House"), so that by the time the decree dissolving parliament and calling for new legislative elections was issued on 21 September, a full-blown political crisis had developed in Russia. Many feared that Russia was sliding into civil war.

As the crisis unfolded, Lebed hunkered down. His major right-wing critics were locked in combat with Yeltsin,⁶² but, at the same time, he apparently found it difficult to support the actions of the reformers, many of whom could also be counted among his critics. Lebed would later sharply criticize Yeltsin and the reformers for precipitating the crisis and forcing the army to intervene (see below). At the time, rumors again swirled about Lebed, this time in relation to the crisis in Moscow. According to these rumors, a "third force" was gathering to save Russia. Supposedly, Lebed was a part of this force and, if it moved to save Russia, he would be tapped to become defense minister.⁶³ Lebed denied any deal to become Russia's defense minister in return for his support of some political third force: "This is a political matter and I am an Army commander."⁶⁴

Notwithstanding this comment, the general had indeed

become a political figure in Russia as well as in Moldova by the time of the October crisis. According to a poll commissioned by a popular Moscow newspaper and conducted sometime in September by a well-known Russian survey research organization, General Lebed enjoyed support among respondents rivaling that of Defense Minister Grachev.⁶⁵ In answer to the question, "Who among current Russian military leaders do you think has the greatest authority in the country?", respondents answered:

Defense Minister Grachev	13.9%
Marshal Shaposhnikov (radical reformist officer and former Soviet Defense Minister who had since 1991 advised Yeltsin on military matters)	8.3%
General Lebed	7.0%
Deputy Defense Minister General Gromov (Afghan War hero who ran for Russian vice president in 1991 on a conservative ticket)	6.0%
Other Name	1.3%
None	11.3%
Not Sure	52.2%

Although about half the respondents were unsure of who among Russian military leaders has the greatest authority and some 11% thought none had such authority, almost 20% of those who had a military official in mind picked Lebed, placing him among the ranks of Russian officers most known for their involvement in politics. This favorable opinion of Lebed

extended to another question: If you were to appoint Russia's Defense Minister, whom would you choose?:

Grachev	12.1%
Lebed	8.0%
Gromov	7.2%
Shaposhnikov	6.1%
Other Name	0.7%
None	11.8%
Not Sure	54.1%

Almost a quarter of those who had a military officer in mind when asked who should be Russia's defense minister chose Lebed, more than all others except the incumbent, Grachev. And, Lebed stood a close second among those expressing a preference.

Further, General Lebed was now heavily involved in political matters, at least at the local level. In a move that astonished many in Moscow and Moldova, Lebed stood for election in the unrecognized Dniester separatist parliament in mid-September 1993. Despite vigorous protests from the Moldovan capital demanding that Moscow restrain or remove Lebed for interfering in the internal affairs of Moldova, Russian authorities did nothing and the general won his deputy's seat.⁶⁶

After the October crisis and the rout of Yeltsin's opponents, rumors concerning Lebed again emerged. This time, gossip alleged that Lebed had supported Yeltsin's opponents by sending them arms and allowing servicemen under his command to go to Moscow to fight on the side of the nationalists. Immediately after the crisis Lebed vigorously denied that he had taken either action, although the following April he later admitted that he had been "invited to take part" in Dniester's support of the oppositionists.⁶⁷ Another newspaper reported that Vice President Rutskoy had offered Lebed a unspecified ministerial post if he would throw his support to the Supreme Soviet. Lebed reportedly (and quite believably) replied, "You can go and fuck yourself."⁶⁸ It was not he or elements of the Fourteenth Army who had materially supported Yeltsin's opponents, he asserted, but rather the close allies of the defeated nationalists, his enemies--the leaders of the Dniester separatists.⁶⁹ He did admit, however, that some servicemen under his command had gone to Moscow to support Yeltsin's opponents, but he claimed that they had officially applied for leave, or had gone to Moscow on official business unrelated to the crisis. The implication was that, while some servicemen under his command may have gone to Moscow to support Yeltsin's opponents, they had done so at their own volition and as private citizens.⁷⁰ For their part, the separatist leadership denied giving materiel support to

Yeltsin's enemies and claimed that Lebed's charges were, as usual, a provocation.⁷¹ On 19 October, the separatist parliament rejected Lebed's charges that its leadership had tangibly supported Yeltsin's opposition during the crisis.⁷²

It is difficult to ascertain the role Lebed played during the two week crisis period in October 1993 because of the paucity of available information. It is clear that he despised the Dniester separatist leaders who had close ties to Yeltsin's opponents, many of whom he probably also disliked. At the same time, he likely sympathized with the views and policies of some of Yeltsin's opponents, and it did seem that one of Lebed's strongest supporters in Moscow was Vice President Rutskoy, who lead the opposition to Yeltsin. Moreover, Lebed also had to worry about the impact of the political crisis on his troops. Many soldiers were probably sympathetic to the anti-Yeltsin opposition, due to opposition support for their plight and for Dniester separatism, and any strong attempt by Lebed to discourage reciprocal support to Yeltsin's political enemies could have split the Fourteenth Army and made it uncontrollable. Given such conflicting pressures, and the chance that Yeltsin might lose, it is likely that Lebed, like so many others in the military, thought it best to hunker down, to turn a blind eye, within limits, toward those under his command who sought actively to support Rutskoy and the other anti-Yeltsinites, and to await

the outcome of the political conflict. That he might have been disappointed in the outcome and the stupidity of the opposition was reflected in his comment about Rutskoy a week after military units stormed the Russian White House: "It would have been better for him to remain in the debris of the White House."⁷³ That the opposition was bitterly disappointed in Lebed can be gleaned from their description of him as a "Judas" and "traitor," according to one journalist.⁷⁴

After the crisis, for a while at least, Lebed maintained a lower profile, especially on political issues. Indeed, on 18 October he announced that he was resigning his seat in the separatist parliament.⁷⁵ In an interview two months later Lebed claimed that he had not campaigned for the seat and had been drafted by others. He resigned, he said, because he believed that the separatist parliament "will inevitably come to an ignominious end."⁷⁶ Later, in the spring of 1994, he claimed to have stepped down from his deputy's post because the separatist legislature had given materiel support to Yeltsin's opposition in the October crisis.⁷⁷ Whatever the real reason for his resignation, it was taken as a sign by many that Lebed had decided to become more circumspect in his criticism toward Moscow in the wake of Yeltsin's victory in the October crisis.

Lebed Escalates His Struggle Against Local Authority.

Although General Lebed was publicly less critical or silent on Russian political issues after Yeltsin's 1993 victory, he continued his campaign to oust the separatist leadership for corruption and incompetence. Two months after the crisis, Lebed publicly called for Dniesterians to rise up and remove the separatist leadership:

Think and act, people! Act before they have bridled you completely and turned you into speechless cattle! Respect your own humanity! Get rid of the crooks who are capitalizing like parasites on the results of your labor! Act, people! Act before it is too late.⁷⁸

This remarkable Leninist-like call to arms against recognized political authority (at least so recognized by the Dniesterians, if not the Moldovan Government or others) almost certainly resonated in Moscow. Here was a Russian general enjoining local people to support his efforts to overthrow political authority using rhetoric every bit applicable in Russia. That Lebed had become a significant threat to political control over the military was doubtless understood by many in Moscow. Removing him from command, and thus removing his soapbox, was apparently still politically impractical. At the same time, retaining Lebed in Tiraspol, outside Russia and several hundred miles from Moscow, kept him far from the centers of Russian political power, more nuisance than direct danger to political authority. And he

did maintain control over the Fourteenth Army, which by all accounts had "gone native," and could not only defend the separatist territory against Moldovan forces, but also could probably defeat the Moldovan Army and seize the country's capital.⁷⁹

While Lebed might call on Moldovans to rise against political authority, he apparently was unwilling to actively lead such an effort or stage an outright military coup. A month after his call to arms he denied charges by the separatist Dniester leadership that his troops were on alert or that he was planning a military coup against them.⁸⁰ Thus, a year and a half after assuming the command of the Fourteenth Army, General Lebed, although highly contemptuous of local political authority and willing to engage in politics like no other serving Russian senior officer, still had not reached the point where he could "cross the Rubicon."

Lebed To Superiors In Moscow: We're Not Going Anywhere.

In the months after October, Lebed also continued to play a large role, behind the scenes, in the negotiations between Russia and Moldova regarding the Fourteenth Army's withdrawal: he still refused to withdraw the Fourteenth Army unless negotiations yielded a plan acceptable to him. Shortly after the October crisis, he rejected calls by

Moldovan authorities to speed up the negotiations because his army allegedly was supplying ammunition and weapons to the separatists and destabilizing the situation on the ground.⁸¹ By spring 1994, he was frequently commenting in the press about the ongoing negotiations for the withdrawal of his army. In mid-March he asserted that any withdrawal had to be predicated on political conditions that would guarantee the peace and acceptable local economic conditions, and would guarantee jobs and apartments to those servicemen who chose to return to Russia. "These conditions," said Lebed, "do not exist now."⁸² He added that Moldova could become another Yugoslavia if the Fourteenth Army withdrew before a political settlement was reached. And, in a swipe at his military and political superiors in Moscow, he charged that troops had been withdrawn from other former Soviet republics in a "disgraceful record-breaking timeframe." As far as he was concerned, "(t)his was no longer acceptable."⁸³ He publicly repeated his conditions several weeks later adding that, even after a political settlement, "the Army should stay in the region for some time to make sure that political decisions are being properly implemented."⁸⁴ He agreed, though, that the Fourteenth Army "undoubtedly" should be withdrawn.⁸⁵

Lebed was probably agitated over the reported progress made in the negotiations. Moscow was, according to a journalist well-connected to military circles, increasingly

annoyed over the deadlocked negotiations.⁸⁶ The Russian Ground Forces Deputy Commander in Chief said in a mid-April interview that agreement had been reached in principle: the Fourteenth Army would be withdrawn. Some elements had already been withdrawn or disbanded out of military necessity, he asserted; as for the remainder of the army, its current composition and position were "strategically absurd."⁸⁷ He would not rule out the possibility that the remaining units would be withdrawn unilaterally; contra Lebed, he believed that such a move could "stimulate a political solution of the problem."⁸⁸ Nonetheless, no unilateral withdrawal was undertaken, and two months later Russian television reported that Moldova wanted the troops out by the end of 1995, while the Russian Defense Ministry was holding to a four-year withdrawal timetable.⁸⁹ The next, "and evidently the last," (10th) round of negotiations were scheduled for the near future and Moscow was reportedly ready "to find broad compromise with all interested parties."⁹⁰ One wonders whether the reporter considered Lebed as one of the interested parties.

Lebed On His Superiors.

Lebed opposed the emerging Russian-Moldovan agreement on troop withdrawal in part because of his strong views of

the negative trends which he saw in the military and upon his belief that the High Command and political authorities were responsible for the parlous state of the Russian Armed Forces. By early February 1994, Lebed was sharply and publicly criticizing both his military and political superiors not only for what he believed to be their failure to reverse these negative trends, but also, in his view, for exacerbating them. When asked about the state of the military and the High Command's military reform efforts on a radio program, for example, he stated:

The (Russian) Army has been pushed up a blind alley, carved up, and had mud flung at it, and this was a lengthy and systematic process. At long last it is as though they [senior Moscow officials] saw the light, not completely, but, nevertheless, they did see the light and it is as though they started to be more receptive to the Army and its problems; pay was raised and some half-hearted attempts to build housing [for servicemen] got off the ground.⁹¹

The well-spring of Lebed's strong negative views of politicians and their accomplices in the senior ranks of the military appears to have its source in the Gorbachev era. When asked in an April 1994 interview about the military's internal security mission in non-Russian Soviet republics in the last two years of Gorbachev's rule, he remarked:

Wherever I went, not once did I receive an order in writing. Not once! The telephone would ring, as a rule: Let's go to such-and-such a place, boys, it's not good there, sort it out. . . . You pull the fighters apart, and as soon as the carnage ends, a crowd of prosecutors piles onto you. . . . It was a very troubled time in this respect, telephone law

raged everywhere. Each time our former President, the incomparable Gorbachev, was "astonished." . . . This astonishment is expressed at the top: How did they [the troops] actually come to be there, did the devil put them there? They all pretend to be simpletons.⁹²

No one reading the account of the interview could miss the obvious connection to Lebed's then-current position. Indeed, he made the connection explicit, at least with regard to local politicians, when he stated:

(W)hen everything is going badly, when a mass of malcontents appears, all vile, unprofessional politicians start to operate according to the stereotype--they switch tracks. The search for an enemy--foreign, internal--gets under way. If the foreign enemy does not work, let's have an internal one. It was decided for some reason or other that I would be a suitable candidate for an enemy. But I am no candidate for whipping-boy.⁹³

Having no desire to be sacrificed to venal and incompetent politicians, General Lebed warned political superiors to "sort things out among (yourselves)--at the level of presidents, politicians, what have you. But leave the soldier alone."⁹⁴ Later in the interview, the general, in describing a successful operation against a rogue Dniester separatist military unit, noted an important characteristic that a military leader must possess in order to limit casualties or prevent bloodshed if circumstances require the use of force:

You need also, after all, to know how to deliver ultimatums. When a 125mm gun 100 meters away is staring you in the face, there is nowhere to hide--a shell from such a distance will turn the bravest into a heap of pitiable rags hanging from the

bushes.⁹⁵

Lebed was laying down some very pointed markers on civil-military relations for all to see. His comments almost certainly reflected widespread feelings within the Russian military, especially at this time when the army's 1994 budget had become a political football. According to one report, many in the military were volunteering to serve under General Lebed,⁹⁶ which suggests that both he and his views were popular in military circles. Lebed was careful never directly to threaten his political or military superiors, although he continued to wage his verbal campaign against local authorities.⁹⁷ And he still maintained that he had a normal, correct, and even friendly relationship with Defense Minister Grachev.⁹⁸

By spring 1994, General Lebed began again also to comment forcefully on other issues. He bitterly criticized the treatment of servicemen in other CIS states, claiming that these nations destroyed the military units they inherited, that "they did not do anything positive, just put the finishing touches to the process of destruction and went about it with joy, as it were, getting rid of Russians."⁹⁹ As far as he was concerned, these so-called states were merely "apanage principalities,"¹⁰⁰ a reference to the remnants of the first great Slavic empire, Kievan Rus, which, after its collapse into these quarreling, divided principalities in the

12th century, fell to the Mongols. In his view:

But on the whole all this is gibberish that must be stopped as quickly as possible. Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians--all are Slavs, people of one destiny and blood, and one faith.¹⁰¹

Again, Lebed was almost certainly expressing the views of a vast majority of Russians, including those in the military. His comments also closely paralleled the views of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who consistently criticized the division into separate states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Although a popular opinion throughout Russia, it was politically inexpedient for a senior Russian military officer to make such comments publicly. Political inexpediency rarely, if ever, however, seemed to constrain General Lebed's tongue. And it was that voice that catapulted Lebed into the political consciousness of Russians. In a poll published in mid-July 1994, Lebed was chosen by 1% of respondents who were asked for whom they would vote for president if an election were held today.¹⁰² Although such a percentage is quite small, the percentage of respondents who chose most other well-known politicians and public figures was comparable--for example, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was chosen by 3% of respondents. Only President Yeltsin and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, who headed the Duma political bloc "Yabloko," garnered double-digit responses: both received all of 12%.¹⁰³ Lebed was on the political screen.

Lebed To Yeltsin: You're A Minus To Russia.

In late July, Lebed gave another newspaper interview that immediately sparked an open effort to remove him from command of the Fourteenth Army and, consequently, propelled him into the political limelight like never before. In the interview published on 20 July by Izvestiya, probably the Russian newspaper most attentively read by the country's elite, Lebed charged that "(n)o Russian Army has been set up," and labeled the military reform plans of his military and political superiors as nothing more than "bubbling by inveterate mumblers."¹⁰⁴ Between the military reform fiasco and the 1994 military budget fiasco, it had become clear, he asserted, that the army could not rely on any of Russia's politicians: "Zhirinovskiy is a minus, Gaydar too, Yeltsin is a minus. . . . It is the same people who have swapped their [Communist] Party cards for democratic slogans."¹⁰⁵

Consequently:

In our country's life, the situation compels generals to engage in politics. In a civilized state you cannot herd the Army into politics with a stick. Our country is another matter: here any question is a question of politics.¹⁰⁶

Claiming that "I have no political forces behind me," and that he had no relationship with President Yeltsin ("What kind of relationship can I have with the President? None at

all."), Lebed warned politicians that "all policy is based on definite force," and that, "unequivocally," that force was the Russian Army.¹⁰⁷ And behind military commanders like him, he stated, was "(c)ommon sense. And . . . I am the Commander [of the Fourteenth] Army, a well-trained army, moreover." Thus, vowed Lebed, "preserving the [Russian] Army is the basis for preserving the integrity of the state," for "there is no force other than the Army to check" Russia's slide into becoming a Western colony.¹⁰⁸ When asked if the person who realizes these facts can stand to gain in the political arena, he answered:

Sure. I do not praise Pinochet in principle. But what did he accomplish? He averted the total collapse of the state and brought the Army to the fore. With his help he forced everyone to simply do their job. He brutally silenced all loudmouths. . . . Chile is now a prosperous country. . . . This confirms the theory whereby you slam your hand down on the table once, sacrifice 100 people to the Fatherland, and the issue is closed.¹⁰⁹

A more transparent case for military intervention to save the motherland could not be made. Lebed had psychologically "crossed the Rubicon" and had become the classic politicized general: he perceived the country to be in a state of collapse brought on by venal and incompetent politicians masquerading as saviors. Moreover, he strongly believed that their dirty political games were dragging down the armed forces as well, and it was only the military that could now save the country from collapse. Nor was democracy

necessarily the immediate goal for the putative saviors. In concluding his interview he averred that, in Russia:

(t)here is democracy, but the wrong kind. . . . I agree that it is wrong, but that can only be judged by someone who has had a bellyfull of democracy here.¹¹⁰

Within a week, Lebed was told that his Fourteenth Army would be disbanded by 1 September.

Game

According to press reports, Defense Minister Grachev signed the disbandment directive on 22 July, two days after Lebed's interview was published. The order stated that "(t)he 14th Army must be disbanded by 1 September. Lists of officers willing to be discharged or transferred to Russia must be submitted by 10 August."¹¹¹ This directive was read to a meeting of Fourteenth Army officers on 2 August by the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Vorobyev, who "suddenly arrived by plane from Moscow."¹¹² Lebed was not present at the meeting, having gone to Moscow on 19 July¹¹³ for scheduled leave, and it was announced that he "would not return from vacation."¹¹⁴ General Vorobyev assured the officers that Lebed had been informed about the directive on 25 July.¹¹⁵

Lebed, however, publicly made it plain that he strongly

disagreed with this directive. On 5 August, one day after the press broke the story, Lebed was back in the newspapers likening this directive to the 1991 coup against Gorbachev, and charging that "(t)hey [his military and political enemies] are pulling the Army out from under me."¹¹⁶ The next day, Lebed repeated this charge, adding this was nothing more than a pretext to "chuck me out" since "it was clear in advance" that the planned reorganization of the Fourteenth Army was untenable.¹¹⁷ He claimed that earlier discussions with the Defense Ministry concentrated only on relatively small cutbacks, not on a major reorganization of the Fourteenth Army. Perhaps referring to Vorobyev's comment that he had been informed on the 25th, Lebed stated that he had discussed the directive with his immediate superior, General Semenov, the Ground Forces Commander in Chief, to whom, Lebed claimed, "this strange directive seems to have come as a total surprise."¹¹⁸ Moreover:

No one [at the Defense Ministry] can say anything sensible. . . . If everything develops according to the scenario, [the directive] proposed by the Defense Minister, I will not stay a day in this "Mickey Mouse outfit" that is for some reason known as [the Russian] Army.¹¹⁹

Lebed left unclear what, if anything, he was doing to cancel the directive. Indeed, he seemed to imply that he had been out-flanked: as for his future, he said that he would "look into" what he could do as an unemployed general,¹²⁰ but he was not concerned because, "as you know real heroes always get

by."¹²¹ In any event, on 7 August he announced that his plans to return "soon" to Tiraspol.¹²²

Meanwhile, media reports highlighted the negative reaction of many Fourteenth Army officers to the Defense Ministry's reorganization plan. To be sure, initial reports were contradictory: some claimed that many officers would refuse to accept the authority of the Defense Ministry if the directive was carried out, while others denied any such sentiment.¹²³ Within a few days, however, many Fourteenth Army officers publicly came out against the directive and demanded the return of General Lebed. An officers' meeting on 8 August sent a message to Defense Minister Grachev requesting that the reorganization be reconsidered and that General Lebed be allowed to remain commander of the army.¹²⁴ "You inevitably come to the conclusion that all this is being done with the sole aim of stripping Gen. Lebed of his post," said the statement. "Certain circles" were out to get him, it continued.¹²⁵

The next day, Colonel Bergman, a close ally of Lebed, held a news conference in which he accused senior officers in the Defense Ministry of being bribed by the local separatist authorities to remove Lebed. The reorganization, charged Bergman, was "a plot in the Ministry of Defense."¹²⁶ Without Lebed, he claimed, the situation in the region would quickly deteriorate into war, with many of the Fourteenth Army's

weapons falling into the hands of extremists and criminal organizations. Only President Yeltsin could now save Lebed, stated the colonel, and he should do so, for Lebed had stood by Yeltsin in August 1991 and again in October 1993. In any event, someday Lebed would be president of Russia, predicted Bergman, and he would save the country from fascism and extremism.¹²⁷ As to the present, Lebed had been betrayed by his comrade Grachev, according to the colonel, and many in the Fourteenth Army would not stand for it:

They were old friends but money decides everything. How Grachev could do this I don't understand. If Lebed goes, I will lead a partisan group.¹²⁸

Less than a week after General Vorobyev flew to Tiraspol to announce the reorganization, events seemed to spin out of control. As soon as the Defense Ministry's directive became public, the High Command, sensing the danger of its move, hastened to put its own spin on what it was doing and why. Before he even left Tiraspol on 4 August, Vorobyev complained that the directive was being incorrectly reported: the Fourteenth Army was not being disbanded; its command structures were being reorganized and downsized to better reflect its actual size, and General Lebed "was not dismissed as Army Commander or offered a new job."¹²⁹ This reorganization "to optimize the command structures of (the Fourteenth Army)" had been in the planning stages "for over a month," according to an official Defense Ministry

statement.¹³⁰ The Fourteenth Army was no longer an "army" by traditional size and staffing standards; it was much smaller, a division plus a number of units attached to it, rather than the usual several divisions, and therefore required a significantly smaller staff.¹³¹ Regarding Lebed's position, "(t)he question of the appointment or removal of Army Commanders is decided not by the Defense Minister, but by the President," stated the deputy Chief of the Defense Ministry's press office.¹³² By 9 August General Vorobyev had a different spin, claiming that he went to Fourteenth Army Headquarters to work with the army's senior officers in developing a reorganization plan for the army.¹³³ He asserted that the General Staff, Ground Forces Staff, and the Fourteenth Army's Command Staff, including Lebed, had been working on this issue for about a year. "Nobody has left (Lebed) in the dark about measures being carried out in the army," said Vorobyev on 11 August.¹³⁴ Vorobyev claimed that various options were discussed when he met with the Fourteenth Army's officers; one, that an "operations group" (a temporary military unit created to deal with a specific task) be formed out of the army's command structure, was selected as a basis for further actions.¹³⁵ "If General Lebed," Vorobyev stated on 11 August, "wished to come to Tiraspol and direct the process of adjusting the Army's command structures . . . he would be allowed to do so."¹³⁶ But, continued Vorobyev, "Whether he will stay to command the Russian formations, I cannot say."¹³⁷

For his part, Lebed kept his 7 August promise and returned to his headquarters on 13 August.¹³⁸

Before Lebed returned, however, the results of the 10th round of withdrawal negotiations, held from 9-11 August, were announced. It was agreed that Russian troops in Moldova would be withdrawn within three years of the ratification by both sides of the agreement.¹³⁹ The Dniester separatists, however, were not pleased with the terms and had walked out in protest before the talks ended.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, the agreement did not require a prior political settlement of the dispute between the Dniester separatists and the Moldovan Government, but rather declared that the withdrawal and settlement would be "synchronized and completed simultaneously."¹⁴¹

. . . . Set

Despite the Defense Ministry's backpedaling to extricate itself from criticism that it had tried to remove the Fourteenth Army Commander in an unprincipled manner, Lebed made it clear after he returned to Tiraspol that he would take no prisoners. Moreover, he made it plain that he rejected the recently concluded agreement on the Fourteenth Army's withdrawal. And he wasted no time in going on the offensive, holding a news conference on 14 August, the day after his return.¹⁴² Describing the directive to reorganize

his army "a crime," Lebed announced that he would neither be "an obedient performer" nor an "accomplice to a preplanned crime." This reorganization, said Lebed, would reignite war in the region and ensure that many of the Fourteenth Army's weapons would fall into the hands of extremists and criminals. For the time being, he announced, the army's reorganization "has been frozen."¹⁴³ Lebed refused to speculate on why the decision to reorganize the army had been taken and who was behind this plan. Although Defense Minister Grachev had signed the directive and presumably read it, "it (would be) interesting to know who made the proposal and whether it was agreed with the President. But I do not know this."¹⁴⁴ Nonetheless, according to one journalist present at the news conference, Lebed clearly believed that the directive was aimed at removing him and he hoped that public pressure would force Grachev to revoke the directive.¹⁴⁵ If, however, the High Command insisted that its directive be followed, Lebed announced that he would resign, and as far as his future, including in politics, was concerned, "something will turn up."¹⁴⁶ Lebed also had sharp words for the recently announced agreement on Russian troop withdrawal. If Russia started pulling out its troops before a political settlement was reached, war would almost certainly result, he charged. "We should," said Lebed,

preserve the status quo. All those who want to unleash war should be viewed as mad dogs and we should treat them accordingly.¹⁴⁷

The following day, President Yeltsin weighed in publicly for the first time. When asked to comment on speculation that General Lebed was being forced out of his command, Yeltsin responded that he "understands what's what" and:

I well remember and will never forget the role played by the 14th Army Commander in preventing large-scale bloodshed in the Moldova region in 1992. . . . The fact that the situation there is now under control is testimony to his great role. . . . Any artificial aggravation of the situation by any actions or decisions whatsoever (is inadmissible). . . . This is totally out of line with Russia's interests. The price will be too high.¹⁴⁸

General Lebed immediately praised Yeltsin's "common sense" comments and pledged to keep the situation in Dniester under control.¹⁴⁹ "A high-ranking Russian Defense Ministry official . . . (a)sking to remain anonymous" commented that:

If the President did say that, it means that Lebed will remain head of the 14th Army, while the directive reforming its command structure will be suspended.¹⁵⁰

It appeared that the Defense Ministry did indeed throw in the towel and either rescinded, reinterpreted, or simply decided to ignore its own directive. In an article in Krasnaya zvezda the day after Yeltsin's comments about Lebed, the general received praise for his steadfast devotion to the well-being of his troops, especially as it related to their withdrawal and future livelihoods.¹⁵¹ While generally applauding the Defense Ministry's plan to reorganize the

Fourteenth Army as a rational move, the author admitted that General Lebed had his "own vision" on how to go about reorganizing the army as it withdrew over a three year period. Any differences, however, were only "details" that would be solved by Lebed and the Ground Forces High Command, wrote the author.¹⁵²

As both the Ground Forces and the Defense Ministry leadership continued to learn, the devil, in this case General Lebed, was in the details. Several days after the Defense Ministry publicly extended its olive branch to Lebed, the general again rejected the agreement between Russia and Moldova. In an interview with the Interfax News Agency Lebed commented that the Fourteenth Army could not withdraw until a political settlement had first been reached.¹⁵³ Further, he considered it likely that Russia's parliament would not ratify the agreement for precisely this same reason. It was possible, he thought, that "a final solution to the conflict" will take a lot of time, perhaps not until another generation wrestles with it.¹⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Army, pledged the general, will keep the peace. Lebed acknowledged that he was aware that he was going against official policy but noted that, as a practical matter, it was he who would have to deal with the almost certain negative consequences which would result from the agreement.¹⁵⁵ Despite Yeltsin's support for him, Lebed apparently felt no compunction in criticizing a

policy to which Yeltsin had personally and publicly given his approval.

Criticism, however, did not mean outright insubordination. A few days after his sharp negative comments on the withdrawal agreement, Lebed, in another interview tied together the agreement and his removal. Concerning his removal, Lebed implied that his superiors in Moscow had conspired with his local, and corrupt, political enemies. He was "the abscess" which "must be lanced," but his enemies botched it. "They have chosen the clumsiest way of doing this, by disbanding the army command. They waited for me to go off on leave. They acted behind my back."¹⁵⁶ Lebed pledged that he "will not allow the army to be torn asunder." He intended to remain the army's commander "for the [duration of] the army's existence."¹⁵⁷ At the same time he noted that the army would exist for three years, thus suggesting that, while highly critical of the withdrawal agreement, he was prepared to accept it.

. . . and Match To Lebed.

Nonetheless, Lebed's continuance as Fourteenth Army Commander apparently was still not desired by his military superiors. The High Command's desire to get rid of him without further trouble soon led to one of the most absurd

series of events involving Lebed and, finally, the complete rout of his military and political adversaries. According to a correspondent citing confidential sources on 21 August, General Lebed was to return to Moscow where he "expected to get a new, much higher appointment."¹⁵⁸ The next day, 22 August, Lebed flew to Moscow where General Kolesnikov, Chief of the General Staff, offered him either the job of Defense Minister of Tajikistan(!), a former Soviet republic in the throes of civil war, or command of the Russian Peacekeeping Forces in that country.¹⁵⁹ Lebed refused, asserting that his departure would cause the Fourteenth Army to spin out of control, and returned to Tiraspol.¹⁶⁰ Russian media reported that the Tajik president had asked Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin "to lend Lebed to them," to which the Prime Minister agreed.¹⁶¹ A Tajik Government spokesman, however, denied that Tajikistan had requested General Lebed, and newspapers speculated that the Defense Ministry had failed again in its attempt to remove the maverick general. It was also reported that Lebed intended to visit President Yeltsin, then on vacation in Sochi, to discuss the situation with him.¹⁶²

In the event, Lebed flew not to Sochi, but suddenly back to Moscow on 25 August where he met with Defense Minister Grachev the next day.¹⁶³ Lebed's and Grachev's meeting took place in full view of television cameras which

were allowed to film the event. The purpose of this openness almost certainly was to dispel the stories that a rift existed between the High Command and Lebed and that Lebed's superiors were seeking to punish him for his outspokenness. In actuality it appeared more like a surrender ceremony in which the loser, General Grachev, accepted the terms of the victor, General Lebed.

The encounter aired that night.¹⁶⁴ Lebed allowed as to the fact that, "of course . . . we must take sensible cuts. This will be done. This has been planned. I am grateful to the Defense Minister for his understanding. . . . The conflict . . . is over, let us say." For his part, Grachev commented that "this hullabaloo, shouting, and speculation . . . to the allegedly rebellious General Lebed . . . there is nothing of the sort here." Regarding Lebed's transfer to Tajikistan:

Grachev: I had an idea--in agreement with the President of Tajikistan . . . to offer to Aleksandr Ivanovich [Lebed], a combat general, my reliable helper, the post of Defense Minister of Tajikistan. But Aleksandr Ivanovich refused this offer.

Lebed: I have a habit of finishing what I have started. I will serve in Tiraspol.

Grachev: This is what Aleksandr Ivanovich and myself have agreed: we will not offer him any new posts for now. In fact, he should finish what has been started.

The generals then reminisced about their long relationship in the Airborne Forces. Grachev concluded: "now he is a

Lieutenant General. Maybe he will replace me in the nearest future. Indeed, anything can happen."¹⁶⁵

After his meeting with Grachev, Lebed related, "(t)he Minister listened to my report attentively and made a number of decisions, notably on a sensible reduction of the [Fourteenth] Army's administrative staff." Commonsense had prevailed, announced Lebed to his troops: "The army stays, the army commander stays."¹⁶⁶

The day after his meeting with Lebed, Grachev published in the military press an official statement "On the Situation Around the 14th Army."¹⁶⁷ He complained that the Russian press had "raised a furor . . . in the spirit of sensationalism," that the media was guilty of fomenting rumors that the High Command was out to get Lebed under the guise of reorganization, and that the press had given "the public a distorted impression of the true state of affairs." Moreover, Grachev charged that "certain political forces are seeking to use the artificial ballyhoo . . . to whip up passions in society."¹⁶⁸ Thus he "consider[ed] it necessary to state" first, that the Defense Ministry was not acting unilaterally to remove the Fourteenth Army from Moldova: this was government policy. Second, the reorganization of the Fourteenth Army was predicated upon "foreign policy decisions" which, "I wish to stress in particular, are still being finalized, and it cannot be ruled out that certain

modifications will be made to them by the President, the Government, and Parliament." Third, the High Command "entirely shares" Yeltsin's high opinion of Lebed and is aware that a withdrawal of Russian troops must be based on a political settlement.¹⁶⁹

So What Was This Battle All About?

It seems clear that Lebed's 20 July interview, in which he lambasted his military and political superiors while praising Chile's General Pinochet as a military role model, sparked a concerted effort to remove him from command. What is less clear is who precisely was behind this effort. Yeltsin's public comments in support of Lebed suggest that he was not consulted in advance and would probably not have approved such an effort out of concern for the domestic political and Moldova policy consequences. Certainly Lebed had made strong enemies out of the Dniester separatist authorities, accusing them of corruption and incompetence as he maneuvered to remove them. And extreme nationalists and other anti-Yeltsin Russian political figures considered Lebed a traitor for not intervening on their side in the October showdown. It is possible, therefore, indeed likely, that both groups were pressing the High Command to reassign Lebed to some backwater post or force the general into retirement.

In the early stages of this story, many speculated, or charged, as did some senior officers of the Fourteenth Army, that this pressure, perhaps sweetened by bribes, had been the proximate cause for the move against Lebed. Reports also circulated of meetings between senior Russian military officers and the Dniester separatist leadership.¹⁷⁰

Whatever pressure or inducements were brought to bear on the Defense Ministry, it is also clear that General Lebed had enemies in the upper echelons of the Russian military. First, he was an outsider. An Airborne officer who never attended the General Staff Academy, Lebed did not belong to the traditional military elite. General Vorobyev, the deputy Ground Forces Commander whose visit to Tiraspol to announce the Fourteenth Army's reorganization set off this remarkable story, could not recall a situation where a general who did not graduate from the General Staff Academy had command of an army. Upon his removal as army commander, Lebed needed to "take a little training" at the Academy, according to Vorobyev.¹⁷¹

Second, Lebed apparently had aligned himself with those officers, led by Defense Minister Grachev, pressing for a major reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces which would downplay the traditional central roles of tanks, artillery, and mass in favor of mobility (airborne) and investment in new technology weapons. This was (and remains) a battle for

the future of the Russian military and, as such, has sparked strong passions and intra-military political alignments.¹⁷²

Third, Lebed's outspokenness and actions which bordered on insubordination would be intolerable in any professional military and earn him the enmity of his superiors. Although competent and well liked by his men, Lebed fostered, by his actions and comments, a weakening of the military chain of command, which, if left unpunished, could spread and ultimately cause the collapse of the already staggering military.

Fourth, Lebed's intervention in local politics as well as his critical comments directed at Russian political authorities signaled his politicization. For some in the High Command this alone would be intolerable inasmuch as it lessened the military's professionalism in their eyes. For others, Lebed would be seen as a dangerous officer, who, because of his popularity in the military, might be tempted to act against higher military or civil authority. At the very least, they might have felt that his presence could bring down upon the military unwanted negative consequences, such as a further weakening of support from political authorities.

Last, there was the Grachev factor, a factor which appeared to cut both ways. Lebed's professional history was

intertwined with Grachev's, from their earliest days as cadets at the Ryazan Airborne Assault School. Lebed was Grachev's protégé and was used by Grachev when he needed a trusted, competent colleague. Thus Lebed was Grachev's intermediary to Yeltsin in the August 1991 coup, and it was Lebed whom Grachev sent to Moldova in June 1992 to stop a war into which Russia was on the verge of being drawn. Yet Lebed's actions and critical remarks put Grachev in a very difficult position. Since Lebed was Grachev's protégé, the Defense Minister could be blamed by both senior military and civilian officials for the general's perceived failings. And, if he failed to act against Lebed, Grachev risked severely weakening the chain of command. But at the same time, Lebed's popularity throughout the officer corps made it difficult for Grachev to move against him.

In all likelihood, Grachev acquiesced in an effort to move Lebed to a less dangerous posting, such as the General Staff Academy, planned and engineered by Lebed's enemies within the High Command. When Lebed fought this move and raised the stakes, Grachev backed down, especially after Yeltsin's public warning. He then tried to entice Lebed into leaving by offering him the high-level post in Tajikistan. But Lebed would have none of it. He held his ground and forced the High Command to back down.

Postscript (and Prelude?)

Lebed's ability to stand his ground almost certainly came, and would continue to come until his eventual forced retirement in the summer of 1995, from two sources. First, he probably had allies in the High Command who argued his case. Given the ambivalence or paralysis of Grachev, Lebed's allies would have more bureaucratic room to maneuver to protect him. Second, Lebed's popularity within the military inhibited actions against him. Polls up through August 1994 indicated that Lebed was respected by many in the military, not just among his troops in the Fourteenth Army.¹⁷³ According to one poll, 70% of officers and students at Moscow military schools preferred Lebed to Grachev as Defense Minister even before the High Command tried to remove Lebed from his post after his infamous July 1994 interview.¹⁷⁴ By 18 August, Lebed's name was being bandied about in rumors as being on a short list for Defense Minister if Grachev got the ax.¹⁷⁵ Even Zhirinovskiy spoke approvingly of the general--no friends they--and some reports began to speak of building support for Lebed for president.¹⁷⁶ A year later, when Lebed decided not to fight another concerted attempt to remove him, the general openly aligned himself with a nationalist-conservative political organization, the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), and, in retirement, decided to run for legislative office. By the fall of 1995, Lebed decided to

run for the presidency even as he was running for a seat in the Duma. In December 1995, he won the Duma seat, and subsequently used that position, and his ties to the KRO, to mount a presidential campaign. Although he lost to Yeltsin in the June 1996 presidential elections, Lebed garnered enough support to maneuver Yeltsin into appointing him National Security Adviser. From that perch, Lebed began to position himself as Yeltsin's successor. Not surprisingly, Lebed's outspoken bluntness as security adviser threatened his new Kremlin colleagues who banded together and convinced Yeltsin to remove him from that post on 17 October 1996. In response, Lebed vowed that his political enemies had not seen the last of him.

So, Who Is He?

This chapter began with the question: who is retired General Lebed? A Russian MacArthur? Eisenhower? DeGaulle? The detailed look at his career from 1992-1994, and his later forays into politics, strongly suggest that he resembles DeGaulle, to the extent anyone could be said to resemble that French national icon. Perhaps what most stands out in this regard is Lebed's authoritarian conception of democracy, if such an oxymoron could exist. His many pronouncements reflect a strong bent for law and order and the paramouncy of

the rights of the state over the rights of any individual or interest group. He also appears to have a dim view of democracy in action, tending to see political struggles in Manichean terms and politicians as generally venal, corrupt, and incompetent. In this respect, Lebed more or less fits Huntington's conception of the "military mind:" Hobbesian in outlook, hierarchic-communal in preference, historical in approach, and statist in belief.

Lebed undoubtedly considers himself a (now-retired) professional military officer. He also undoubtedly believes that he has always acted like one. In terms of civil-military relations, the above review clearly shows that, while he was insubordinate to both his civilian and military superiors, he never called for, nor instigated, military revolt against civilian authority. He may have praised Chile's Pinochet, but he never acted like him. Lebed never took the praetorian path described by Nordlinger, nor does he appear to be the corporate officer described by Perlmutter (far from it!). It seems clear that Lebed's concept of military professionalism excludes military intervention in politics along the lines theorized by Huntington.

But was Lebed's professionally-based inhibition to challenge civilian authority with force really just that simple? Finer's theory of civil-military relations would suggest that Lebed was inhibited by a number of reasons:

professionalism, fear of the consequences, lack of opportunity, and the internalization of the idea that Yeltsin--for all his faults--was the legitimate civilian leader of Russia. This was perhaps best manifested in Lebed's view of, and actions during, the violent October 1993 showdown between the Supreme Soviet and President Yeltsin.

And can it be accurately said that Lebed refrained from threatening his civilian superiors? While he did not attempt to supplant or displace them, his actions while Fourteenth Army commander do have more than a whiff of blackmail about them. Thus, from Finer's perspective, Lebed went beyond the accepted role of military officers in mature political cultures (attempts to influence civilian authority) into what could be considered the first level of unacceptable military intervention in politics.

It cannot be fairly said, however, that Russia has a mature political culture, at least as that category is understood by Finer. Russia's political culture can be better described as developed, and as Finer pointed out, militaries in developed political cultures do not shy away from blackmail. Beyond blackmail, however, militaries in developed political cultures rarely go. Thus in the end, it must be noted that Lebed, despite his flirtation with blackmail, chose to enter politics as a retired general seeking office through a democratic process--elections.

¹Yeltsin, The Struggle For Russia, 82-85.

²Ibid., 87.

³Ibid., 86-87.

⁴Andrey Yarushin, ITAR-TASS, 28 June 92. FBIS-SOV-92-126, 23, and "Grachev Took the Parliament Twice. But He Cannot Be Blamed For It," Komsomolskaya pravda, 23 Oct 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-205, 23-24.

⁵Viktor Litovkin, "14th Army: New Commander--New Tactic Of Neutrality," Izvestiya, 29 June 92, p2. Russian Press Digest.

⁶"Why the 'Thunder' Did Not Rumble--The Generals Did Not Like the Undertaking," Moskovskiye novosti, 17-24 July 94, p8.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid. According to a press account on the two-year anniversary of the failed coup, Lebed reportedly remarked that he did not consider himself either among the defenders of the White House or among those who actively participated in the coup. See Valeriy Demidetskiy and Andrey Palariya, ITAR-TASS, 19 Aug 94. FBIS-SOV-94-161, 14. This comment probably reflects Lebed's ensuing two years of frustration with political authorities.

⁹Demidetskiy and Palariya, and Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 88-89. Lebed has publicly said that his book is not so much a memoir as it is "a conversation with the reader." In it, Lebed said, he ponders Russia's fate and what Russians could do to raise their living standards to a level befitting a great country. See Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy'," Komsomolskaya pravda, 6 Apr 94, p7. JPRS-UMA-94-13, 27-30, and Svetlana Gamova, "Aleksandr Lebed: Life Itself Compels Generals To Engage In Politics," Izvestiya, 20 July 94, p1,4. FBIS-SOV-94-140, 9-12.

¹⁰Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 89-92, and "Why the 'Thunder' Did Not Rumble."

¹¹Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 92, and "Why the 'Thunder' Did Not Rumble."

¹²Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, 99-100.

¹³"Generals Disentangle," Pravda, 30 June 92, p1. ITAR-TASS Press Review, and Viktor Litovkin, "14th Army: New Commander."

¹⁴Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy.'"

¹⁵Viktor Litovkin, "14th Army: New Commander."

¹⁶Interfax, 30 June 92. BBC Summary Special Supplement: Moldova and the Dniester Conflict, SU/1422/C1/1.

¹⁷"Utro" Television Program, Central Television Channel One and Orbita Networks, 5 July 92.

¹⁸R. Zampov, et. al., "Boris Yeltsin: I Haven't Changed A Bit," Komsomolskaya pravda, 3 July 92, p1-2. Russian Press Digest.

¹⁹A. Kakotkin, "War With No Special Cause," Moscow News, 2 July 92.

²⁰Quoted in Vladimir Nadein, "General Lebed Delivers Ultimatum To Russian President," Izvestiya, 8 July 92, p1. FBIS-SOV-92-132, 32-33.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³See for example Nadein, "General Lebed Delivers Ultimatum," and Emil Pain, "Talks Over Trans-Dniestria Have Not Led To Peace But There Is A Glimmer Of Hope," Izvestiya, 6 July 92, p2. Russian Press Digest.

²⁴Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Repeat Of Past," Moscow News, 12 July 92, p5.

²⁵"Vesti" News Program, Russian Television Network, 9 July 92. FBIS-SOV-92-132, 33-34.

²⁶O. Tekhmenev, "Lebed Permitted To Speak," Komsomolskaya pravda, 10 July 92, p1.

²⁷Aleksandra Lugovskaya, "General Lebed In the News Again," Izvestiya, 1 Sept 92, p2. BBC Summary Moldova: SU/1475/B/1, 2 Sept 92.

²⁸Interfax, 7 July 92. BBC Summary Moldova: SU/1428/C2/1, 9 Jul 92. Emphasis mine.

²⁹G. Nefedova, "It Is Us They Are Killing," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 28 July 92, p1.

³⁰A. Uglanov, "The Opposition Collects A Million. Resignation A Threat To Yeltsin," *Argumenty i fakty*, 25-26, July 92, p2., and Vadim Barykin, "Russian Security And Defence Chiefs Deny Coup Involvement," Russian Information Agency, 8 July 92.

³¹Roman Zadunayskiy, *ITAR-TASS*, 7 July 92.

³²Barykin, "Russian Security And Defence Chiefs Deny Coup Involvement."

³³Aleksandr Golts, "Laocoon In Smolensk Square," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 July 92, p2. FBIS-SOV-92-143, 29-31.

³⁴"He Went Too Far . . .," *Moskovskiy komsomolets*, 18 July 92, p1. FBIS-SOV-92-142, 19.

³⁵Mayak Radio Network, 18 Sept 92. FBIS-SOV-92-183, 27.

³⁶Boris Sverdlov and Lyudmila Feliksova, "Wolves and Sheep In One Bunch," *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 6 Jan 93, p7. FBIS-SOV-93-005, 6-10.

³⁷"Russian Defence Ministry Protests About Media Speculation," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 Oct 92, p2. Russian Information Agency, 2 Oct 92, and Aleksandra Lugovskaya, "General Lebed In the News Again."

³⁸Aleksandra Lugovskaya, "General Lebed In the News Again."

³⁹Interfax, 11 Sept 92. FBIS-SOV-92-178, 21, and "Novosti" News Program, *Ostankino Television Network*, 11 Sept 92. FBIS-SOV-92-178, 21.

⁴⁰Interfax, 18 Dec 92. BBC Summary Moldova: SU/1570/B/1, 22 Dec 92, and Natalia Prikhodko, "Russian Officers Reveal Leaders Of Trans-Dniestria," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 Dec 92, p3. Russian Press Digest.

⁴¹Mayak Radio Network, 6 Dec 92. FBIS-SOV-92-235, 8.

⁴²Sverdlov and Feliksova, "Wolves and Sheep In One Bunch."

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid. See also Interfax, 1 Feb 93. FBIS-SOV-93-020, 27-28, and ITAR-TASS, 25 Feb 93. FBIS-SOV-93-037, 42.

⁴⁵Svetlana Gamova, "A. Lebed: 'The Day The Peacekeeping Force Leaves the Dniester Region, I Will Start Preparing For War In Earnest,'" Izvestiya, 26 Feb 93, p5. Russian Press Digest.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Sverdlov and Feliksova, "Wolves and Sheep In One Bunch."

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Radio Rossii Network, 28 Apr 93. FBIS-SOV-93-080, 13.

⁵⁰Radio Rossii Network, 28 Apr 93. FBIS-SOV-93-080, 13.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Viktor Akimov, Interfax, 27 May 93. FBIS-SOV-93-102-A, 8-11.

⁵³ITAR-TASS, 10 June 93. FBIS-SOV-93-110, 31.

⁵⁴ITAR-TASS, 10 June 93, and Viktor Akimov, "Problems and Opinions," Interfax, 17 June 93.

⁵⁵Viktor Akimov, "Problems and Opinions."

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷ITAR-TASS, 10 June 93, and Viktor Akimov, "Problems and Opinions."

⁵⁸Gennadiy Sobolev, "Dniester Region: Triangle Of Equilibrium. Why A Whirlwind Of Political Passions Is Continuing To Rage On the Left Bank," Rossiyskiye vesti, 10 June 93, p7. FBIS-SOV-93-112, 64-66.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Viktor Akimov, "Problems and Opinions."

⁶¹Interfax, 25 June 93.

⁶²Aleksandr Tago, "Tiraspol and Kishinev Are Following Events In Moscow. And They Are Waiting For the Outcome Of the Confrontation In Russia," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 Sept 93, p3.

⁶³Yuliya Ulyanova, "General Aleksandr Lebed: Appointment? This Is the First I Heard Of It," Rossiyskiye vesti, 29 Sept 93, p1. Russian Press Digest.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵"Will General Grachev Become Marshal? The Defense Minister Picks Up Strength," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 2 Nov 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-210, 31-32.

⁶⁶Aleksandr Tago, "Tiraspol and Kishinev Are Following Events In Moscow."

⁶⁷Valeriy Demidetskiy, "Russian Troops Commander In Moldova Demands Peace Guarantees," 7 Apr 94. Russian Information Agency.

⁶⁸Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy.'"

⁶⁹Svetlana Gamova, "General Lebed Elucidates Who Fought In Moscow From the Dniester Region," Izvestiya, 12 Oct 93, p2. FBIS-SOV-93-197, 76.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Interfax, 19 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-204, 60.

⁷³Svetlana Gamova, "General Lebed Elucidates Who Fought In Moscow."

⁷⁴Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy.'"

⁷⁵Interfax, 18 Oct 93. FBIS-SOV-93-199, 79-80.

76A. Platitsyn, "I Shall Remain the People's Champion," *Nezavisimaya Moldova*, 18 Dec 93, p3.

77Valeriy Demidetskiy, Interfax, 7 Apr 94. FBIS-SOV-94-068, 52.

78A. Platitsyn, "I Shall Remain the People's Champion."

79D. Mosiyenko and R. Khotin, "The Dniester Region Could Become A Second Yugoslavia, Thinks Aleksandr Lebed, the Commanding General Of the 14th Russian Army," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 16 Mar 94, p10. JPRS-UMA-94-012, 26-27. According to Lebed, over half his officers were born in the Dniester region.

80Anatoly Kholodyuk, "Russian General In Dniester Region Denies His Army Alerted," 17 Jan 94. Russian Information Agency, 18 Jan 94.

81Anatoliy Kholodyuk, ITAR-TASS, 3 Nov 93. FBIS-SOV-93-212, 75. Moldovan officials had long been charging that the Fourteenth Army supported the separatists; this was one reason they wanted the Army to withdraw. Lebed admitted that when he arrived in June 1992 during the fighting between separatist and government forces, elements of the Army were helping the separatists. He claimed to have ended such activity and that the Fourteenth Army had become a force for stabilization. Nonetheless, given that most enlisted and officers of the Fourteenth Army were from Dniester, it strains credulity to think that, despite Lebed's feud with the separatist leadership, elements of the Army were not assisting the separatists in building up their military power. This could also have been official Russian policy, a more or less covert program to arm and train the separatists would discourage Moldovan attempts to militarily defeat the separatists and encourage them to settle differences through negotiations. Lebed would be the perfect scapegoat and vehicle for plausible deniability: if such a policy were uncovered, Moscow could point to Lebed--given his reputation--for accusers to blame. Hence, Lebed's longevity in command could also be ascribed to the fact that he, despite his verbal blasts, was faithfully executing policy.

82D. Mosiyenko and R. Khotin, "The Dniester Region Could Become A Second Yugoslavia."

83Ibid.

84Valeriy Demidetskiy, Interfax, 7 Apr 94.

⁸⁵Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy.'" "

⁸⁶Pavel Felgengauer, "Russia 'Does Not Need' the Dniester Line. Yet So Far Efforts To Withdraw Troops From Moldova Have Failed," Segodnya, 16 Apr 94, p3.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Aleksandr Gerasimov, Independent Television Network (NTV), 8 June 94. FBIS-SOV-94-110, 18.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹"Panorama" Radio Program, Mayak Radio Network, 3 Feb 94. FBIS-SOV-94-024, 25-26.

⁹²Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy.'" "

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶"Bearing Alpha" Television Program, Severnaya Korona Television, 3 Apr 94.

⁹⁷For Lebed's continued war with local separatist authorities during this time see Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy;'" Valeriy Demidetskiy, ITAR-TASS, 12 May 94. FBIS-SOV-94-093, 15, and Anatoliy Kholodyuk, "A Number Of Secret Documents Have Been Made Public In the Dniester Region," Pravda, 18 May 94, p2. FBIS-SOV-94-097, 46. Most observers in Moldova had concluded by this time that Lebed was conducting his campaign against local authorities under instruction from Moscow. See Yuriy Selivanov, "Into Whose Hands Does the Withdrawal Of the 14th Army Play? Attitude Of Russian Troops In Moldova May Change In the Most Unpredictable Way," Segodnya, 13 May 94, p4. FBIS-SOV-94-094, 17-18.

⁹⁸Arkadiy Khantsevich, "'I Am An Unsuitable Candidate For Whipping-Boy.'" "

99 "Panorama" Radio Program, Mayak Radio Network, 3 Feb 94.

100 Ibid.

101 D. Mosiyenko and R. Khotin, "The Dniester Region Could Become A Second Yugoslavia."

102 "Viewpoint" Report, Interfax, 14 Jul 94.

103 Ibid.

104 Svetlana Gamova, "Aleksandr Lebed: Life Itself Compels Generals To Engage In Politics."

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid. Ellipses in original.

111 Aleksandr Minkin, "The Swan [Lebed]-Hunt Begins. 14th Army Ordered To Die," Moskovskiy komsomolets, 4 Aug 94, pp1, 2. FBIS-SOV-94-151, 56.

112 Ibid.

113 Arkadiy Khantsevich, "Grachev Gives Cause For the Army To Be Called A 'Mickey-Mouse Outfit.' Our Corespondent Contacts 14th Army Commander A. Lebed," Komsomolskaya pravda, 6 Aug 94, p1. FBIS-SOV-94-152, 8. Lebed stated that he went on leave on 22 July. It is likely that he left on 19 July for Moscow, but did not begin his vacation officially until the 22nd. See Dmitriy Solovyev, Reuter, 14 Aug 94.

114 Aleksandr Minkin, "The Swan-Hunt Begins."

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¹¹⁶Svetlana Gamova, "Dniester Region Is Left Without the 14th Army, and General Lebed Is Left Without A Job," Izvestiya, 5 Aug 94, pp1, 2. FBIS-SOV-94-151, 3.

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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The Military Mood By the Fall of 1994: Angry And Scared, But Not Interventionist

Feeling betrayed by most of its political allies, believing that it was victimized by its political enemies, and concluding that it had been ignored or ridiculed by those very senior politicians it had saved in October 1993, the Russian military, by the fall of 1994, had developed a deep bitterness toward political authority, a dislike of democratization and marketization--in a word, democracy--and an extreme cynicism toward developing political processes in Russia. These attitudes were most apparent in a poll of military officers conducted over the summer of 1994.

The poll, entitled "Military Elites In Russia 1994," was conducted by the German social and market research firm Sinus in collaboration with Russian military sociologists associated with the "Civic Peace" social movement.¹ The survey was conducted throughout Russia, involving 615 officers with the ranks of lieutenant colonel (346), colonel (221), major general (30), lieutenant general (13), and colonel general (5). All branches of the Russian Armed

Forces were represented: the five MOD branches--Ground Forces (210), Air Forces (103), Air Defense Forces (51), Strategic Rocket Forces (49), and the Navy (99), as well as Ministry of Internal Affairs (53), and Border Guard (50), troops. Ethnic Russians made up 78% of the respondents; overall, 93% were Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian). By age, 42% were under 40, 40% were 40-45 years old, and 18% were older than 45. In terms of longevity and occupation, 85% had served in the armed forces 20 or more years; some 36% identified themselves as line officers ("commanders"), 24% as technical specialists ("engineers"), and 37% as former political officers now specializing in personnel ("humanities") issues. By income, 89% claimed a monthly income greater than 76,000 rubles; of these, 65% answered that their monthly income fell between 76,000 and 150,000 rubles. (During the time the survey was conducted the ruble/dollar exchange rate was roughly R2000/\$1², with the "subsistence minimum" level set at 84,100 rubles.³) By far, this survey is the most comprehensive poll released of Russian military officers' attitudes by August 1994; whatever polling the Defense Ministry has done or does, few of these results make their way into the public domain. Moreover, the respondents surveyed represent the core of the military: field- and general-grade officers with many years of service. Consequently, we have a remarkable opportunity to judge the impact on civil-military relations of the events discussed in

the previous chapters.

Military Officers And The High Command.

First, military officers were, not surprisingly, unhappy with their lot in life, although they appeared to be coping. On rating most "quality of life" issues such as medical service, living conditions, promotions, leisure opportunities, and education opportunities for their children, most respondents answered almost equally between neither good nor bad, or bad. On the issue of pay, however, a large majority--over 60%--said their situation was bad, and in all quality of life categories except pay, those who considered their situation good numbered, on average, in the 15-20% range (for pay, the number was about 2%).

60% believed that civilians had neither a good nor bad attitude toward them as officers per se, while 27% felt that civilians had a good attitude toward them. Nonetheless, only 11% thought that military officers overall commanded a high reputation within society; indeed, only 4% thought generals were highly regarded by society. If true, military prestige had suffered a tremendous drop in the preceding few years. Despite the various splits within the military, 2 out of 3 officers professed to have a good attitude toward fellow officers, while almost 25% had neither a good nor bad

attitude. Taken together, these data suggest that officers probably felt somewhat alienated from the population at large but not alienated from each other. This could have fed into an "us versus them" mendacity and helped to offset internal fissiparous tendencies--a situation critical to the development of negative corporatism within the military, per Fuller.

Despite holding a generally good opinion toward each other as officers, most officers expressed little trust in Defense Minister Grachev. Only some 22% said they trusted the Defense Minister, while over 50% did not. Few respondents, however, blamed the Defense Ministry (12%), General Staff (7%), or Grachev personally (4%) for mistakes in military policy since 1985. Most of the blame was ascribed to Russian President Yeltsin (30%), the government (21%), and former Soviet President Gorbachev (19%). Moreover, 61% of officers thought that the Defense Ministry exerted too small an influence on Russian military policy, and close to 60% thought that military reforms had been for the worse. Taken together, these data strongly suggest that many in the military believed that Grachev and the High Command were not doing enough to protect the armed forces from ill-considered reforms nor were they doing enough to advance the interests of the military. Moreover, Grachev was probably seen by many in the military more as Yeltsin's man

than as a professional officer (that is, one of them) working to protect and advance military interests, both corporate and individual.

On the other hand, General Lebed had garnered the trust of close to 60% of officers, as compared to 20% who expressed distrust. General Boris Gromov, the hero of the Afghan War and then-deputy Defense Minister, was also trusted by most respondents: 55% expressed trust as opposed to less than 20% who did not. Even more indicative of Lebed's and Gromov's appeal within military circles: both officers were perceived as positive role models for officers, of equal stature to military icon Marshal Zhukov. Each of the three were named by 9% of respondents as someone in the Soviet or Russian Army "who could serve you as an example."

To be sure 30% answered that no such heroic person existed and 27% were unsure of whom to name, but no other officers came even close to 9%, and it is remarkable that significant minorities saw Lebed and Gromov approaching Zhukov as a positive role model. Zhukov, of course, had been the military hero of World War II, an accomplishment to which neither Lebed nor Gromov could be compared. But, as Russian officers surely knew, Zhukov, as Defense Minister, had played a key role in helping Nikita Khrushchev consolidate his power from 1953-1957, and a highly public role in defending the military from the encroachments of the then-civil authority,

the Communist Party. Zhukov, in essence, fought for a professional military free from the onerous controls of party ideologues while the party was in a relatively weakened state due to internecine leadership struggles. Once Khrushchev no longer needed the Marshal's support in strengthening his position as General Secretary, he had removed Zhukov as Defense Minister, and by 1962 Zhukov's enemies were claiming at the XXII Party Congress that they had nipped the Marshal's Bonapartist tendencies in the bud.⁴ As noted by Kolkowicz:

With the ouster of Marshal Zhukov the Soviet military had lost a charismatic leader, a fearless spokesman, and even more important, an officer who embodied the military virtues cherished by the officer corps and whose primary loyalties lay with the military establishment. During his brief tenure as Minister, Zhukov had imbued the officers with pride in their profession and a feeling of distinction and authority.⁵

Practically 1 out of 5 mid- and senior-grade officers saw in Lebed or Gromov such similar qualities.

Military Officers And Democracy.

An analysis of the data suggests that most field- and general-grade officers care little for democratic processes, at least as they understood the concept. Law and order trumped all other values: 62% of the survey's respondents agreed with the statement that "within the next years Russia needs an 'iron hand' policy, without authoritarian rule we

will never come out of the existing chaos." A negative view of democratic principles was expressed just as strongly: 64% agreed that "western-type democracy will not do any good for the peoples of Russia: it leads only to corruption and disorganization."

Notwithstanding this preference for order over democracy, most officers in the survey--71%--thought that a "presidential republic" (42%) or a "parliamentary republic" (29%) would best serve Russia. Some 23% preferred more authoritarian systems. Also most officers in the survey--77%--thought that the "values of democracy and human rights" should be upheld by Russia "more resolutely than before." It is unclear, however, what respondents had in mind when asked about "values of democracy and human rights." In response to another question about whether economic reforms should continue, 57% answered "yes, but gradually, reinforcing social protection." And 56% disagreed with the statement that Russia's economic rebirth depended on a "drastic reduction of military expenses," although some 60% thought a reduction in the size of the armed forces necessary or desirable. Taken together, these answers suggest that Russian officers placed an important emphasis upon economic rights (right to a job, medical insurance, etc.) within their concept of democratic values. In this, they probably mirrored society as a whole. It could therefore be surmised

that appeals to support democracy would leave most Russian officers ambivalent. If such appeals were based upon the need to uphold democratic processes, they would likely have little attraction among officers. If, however, officers were to be asked to support "human rights" or "democratic values," then odds would be greater that those making such an appeal would find support within the armed forces. If appeals for such support included law and order objectives, many officers would probably actively give their support.

Military Officers, Yeltsin, And The Government.

Put simply, most military officers thought that Yeltsin was doing a poor job as president and commander-in-chief. According to the poll, only 17% approved of his job performance, while 59% disapproved and 24% were unsure or did not answer the question. Regarding trust in the president, over 50% did not trust Yeltsin, some 30% expressed trust, and something less than 20% were unsure. Such results approximated Yeltsin's standing in society as a whole. On the more specific topic of military policy, when asked "who bears the major responsibility for the mistakes made in military policy since 1985," 30%, a plurality, said Yeltsin. 38% felt that Yeltsin's office, that is, he and his aides, had too much influence over military policy. 32% thought,

however, that the president and his aides had too little influence, thus indicating that the military was almost equally split on this question. While only 11% thought that Yeltsin "stands for the interests of the Army," Yeltsin fared better than the Duma (5%), and the government (3%) in this regard. Almost half, 49%, of respondents thought that none of them stood for the military's interests, suggesting that many in the military thought they had no true supporters within the executive or legislative branches.

Military Officers, Politics, And Politicians.

At the time of the poll, military officers had little trust in leading politicians whether they were in the government or not. The government's senior official, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin fared slightly better than Yeltsin, but only because many officers remained unsure of him: some 30% said that they did not trust him, about 35% expressed trust, and 35% said unsure. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the moderate reform bloc Yabloko, garnered the most trust: about 45% said they trusted him while 25% indicated otherwise. Some 45% did not trust Communist Party leader Zyuganov, as compared to 30% who did. Radical reformist Gaydar, leader of Russia's Choice, earned mistrust from about 60%, while about 23% professed trust. Liberal Democratic Party leader

Zhirinovskiy was not trusted by 70% of the respondents, while only about 15% expressed trust. Bitter Yeltsin foes such as former Vice President Rutskoy, former Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov, and retired General Makashov, all of whom played leading roles in the October 1993 crisis, were not trusted by large numbers of respondents. Only Rutskoy had what could be considered an appreciable level of trust at 30% or so. Strong Yeltsin supporters also showed high levels of mistrust. For example, Yeltsin loyalist and military adviser, the late General Dmitri Volkogonov (a prominent pro-Yeltsin military figure until his death in 1996) was conspicuous: some 2 out of 3 officers were distrustful and only about 15% expressed trust. Taken together, these figures suggest that military officers had serious misgivings toward those considered radicals on both ends of the political spectrum and were more comfortable with moderate reformers.

Yet even comfort with moderate reformers such as Yavlinskiy did not necessarily translate into strong political support for the moderate reformist bloc. When presented with a list of the major parliamentary parties and political coalitions and asked if they would, for each party or coalition, vote for it or absolutely not vote for it in elections for the Federal Assembly, about 40% of the military officers participating in the poll indicated that they would

vote for Yabloko, but slightly over 50% said they would not. These were the "best" numbers received by any of the parties or coalitions, although the Communist Party and, to a lesser extent its rural counterpart the Agrarian Party, fared almost as well. Some 70% could not bring themselves to vote for pro-Yeltsin, pro-reform Russia's Choice, while 20% indicated that they could. The extremist nationalist Liberal Democratic Party did especially poorly: some 80% said that they by no means would vote for the party, while about 15% said they would. It appears that the high hopes placed by many in the military on Zhirinovskiy and his party had been dashed by the summer of 1994, probably because of the LDPR's inability to protect military equities, particularly in the 1994 defense budget debate and its failure to translate electoral success into policy influence.

Indeed, 63% thought the then-current political situation in Russia bad or very bad, 35% considered it not very good, and only 1% professed satisfaction. 32% thought the political situation would be worse in a year, 42% thought it would be the same, while 17% thought it would be better. Such numbers suggest a complete loss of faith in the political system and political leaders, and support the anecdotal evidence which pointed to an officer corps not only alienated from its civilian superiors but also wracked by hostility toward civilian authority and despair for Russia's

future. Moreover, many officers had come to see the Soviet period as preferable to the then-current situation: 70% agreed (51% "fully") with the statement that the "disintegration of the Soviet Union is a disaster for our country." And 44%, not a majority, but certainly a healthy minority, agreed that the demise of the Soviet Union should have been prevented "by all means, including use of military force." Although 50% disagreed with this statement, the fact that nearly as many agreed suggests that despair for the future had led many officers to consider even a corrupt, Soviet system to offer better hope.

This despair further registered in responses to questions about Russia's economic situation and about likely events in Russia over the next two years. 98% thought Russia's economic situation to be bad or not very good; 38% thought it would be worse in a year, 43% the same, and 13% better. Concerning likely events over the next two years, 75% believed that mass spontaneous actions and strikes were probable. Over 50% expected a Chernobyl-like catastrophe at a nuclear power station as well. Respondents split about 45% unlikely, to 40% likely, on the likelihood of achievements in a market economy. On the political front, just under 50% thought democracy would strengthen over the next two years, while 45% thought dictatorship probable. Only 15% believed that fascist forces would seize power, however, and only 20%

thought that Russia would return to socialism. And about 22% thought a military coup quite or highly probable, 70% thought it unlikely, and 8% were unsure. All of this paints a picture of an officer corps which, by the summer of 1994, feared the likelihood of political and social anarchy on the near horizon, had little faith that the country's economy would improve, and remained unsure whether Russia was moving toward democracy or dictatorship.

Given that most officers (62%) thought that an "iron hand" and "authoritarian rule" was Russia's only salvation from chaos, it is not surprising that over 20% believed that a military coup was probable. Still, few thought that the military should be used in political struggles. About 27% approved of the military defending the president or the legislature from their respective political enemies. Taken together with the data on Yeltsin's job performance and attitudes toward other politicians and parties, these responses suggest that it will be extremely difficult for civilian authorities to successfully order the military again to intervene as happened in October 1993. For all its alienation and despair, the Russian officer corps remains highly reluctant to intervene militarily. This reluctance extends even to military intervention to put down separatism within Russia--56% did not approve of the use of military force in the struggle against separatism. Nonetheless, in

the summer of 1994 1 in 5 officers saw a military coup on the horizon, suggesting that a small, but significant, number of officers expected elements of the military to overcome their reluctance and move against the civilian government.

Since the Fall of 1994: More Of the Same.

If the poll discussed above accurately reflects attitudes in the officer corps, by the fall of 1994 most Russian military officers apparently believed that the best path for Russia would combine the principles of social democracy, order, and gradualism. A key point here would be the interplay of order and gradualism among officers. If order means authoritarian rule for most officers, as the poll suggests, it is conceivable that at some point societal disorder would overcome the desire for gradualism and spark support within the armed forces for military intervention in politics. Barring such a situation, and although officers were also bitter, disenchanted with political parties and figures, and sure that the demise of the Soviet Union had been a disaster, their political beliefs can hardly be called revolutionary.⁶ Events of the last two years would appear to bear this out.

As noted at the outset, this work was meant to explore early developments in Russian civil-military relations during

the period when radical economic reform was government policy and Russia's elites were fighting, literally, over fundamental political questions. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate at this time to note briefly the current state of Russian civil-military relations. On one level, it appears that not much has changed: many in uniform still struggle to make ends meet, and warnings abound that servicemen have reached the breaking point and are willing to move against civilian authority; the size of the military budget remains the subject of government debate and the object of the High Command's derision and deep concern; the costly ill-fated intervention in Chechnya has dissipated residual good feelings in society about the military; Russian politics suffers from fundamental disagreements among contending parties as well as a sickly and disengaged president; and crime, corruption, and disorder are rife throughout the country.⁷ It would seem that, at least on the basis of our paradigms, the military should have intervened long ago to save the nation, itself, and the livelihoods of servicemen.

On another level, Russian democracy appears to be developing successfully, albeit fitfully. Legislative elections were held as scheduled in December 1995, as was the presidential election in June/July 1996. Yeltsin has jettisoned the most reactionary advisers from his inner circle, and has removed ministers, such as Defense Minister

Grachev in June 1996, who have failed to achieved measurable improvements in areas under their cognizance. And while economic hardships remain endemic, there have been no major strikes, social disorders, or territorial revolts against Moscow's authority (even among ethnically non-Russian political entities in the wake of the disastrous military intervention in Chechnya). Political competition, at least at the national level, is extensive and raucous, thus assuring a role in politics for all who wish to participate. As noted in Chapter 5, retired General Lebed, for one, decided to participate. Indeed, a 4 November 1996 poll by Russia's most respected polling organization, the All-Russia Center For Research On Public Opinion, showed that Lebed had become the most trusted politician in the country. He is also thought to be the most popular political figure among military personnel. Even he, however, refuses to countenance an extra-constitutional move against civilian authority, despite his recent comment that the Russian state "is not a country, it's a circus." Instead, he is preparing the political ground to run for the presidency in 2000.⁸

Thus, the contradictions that have marked Russia's early post-communist era remain extant some five years after the Soviet Union's collapse. And through it all neither the military nor any of its subordinate elements have moved to displace or supplant civilian authority. The above chapters

show that, according to our paradigms, especially those of Finer and Nordlinger, the mood, motives, and opportunities for military intervention have been in place since the summer of 1994. That said, we must also conclude that, in terms of the questions posed at the outset of this work, early post-communist Russian civil-military relations have been marked by relative stability. The military may have lost faith in politics and politicians; many officers may be living on the edge of poverty; and the military's corporate interests may have been directly challenged--and yet it appears that most in the military have not questioned the legitimacy of the government or of Russia's evolving political system to the extent that they would be willing to act against civilian political authority.

At the same time, it also appears that the military's acceptance of civilian legitimacy has certainly eroded. As noted in Chapter 3, the High Command refused to support President Yeltsin's plan to introduce presidential rule in April 1993 and also resisted the president's order to intervene against his political opponents in October 1993 until it seemed that civil war could result from non-intervention. And even when the military finally intervened, assault groups were cobbled together from a variety of military units in order to achieve the requisite number of dependable servicemen. Finally, the Defense Minister, a

strong Yeltsin ally, felt compelled to demand that President Yeltsin order the intervention in writing before ordering the military to act. We can therefore conclude that the government may be considered legitimate among officers and servicemen, but most in the military have apparently decided that they will not obey what they determine to be illegitimate orders. This distinction between the acceptance of government legitimacy and the determination to decide what is or is not a legitimate order indicates that the acceptance of civilian supremacy over the military has very much eroded. This erosion, combined with continued weak support for Yeltsin or his government within military circles, highlights a worrisome trend in Russian civil-military relations.

Paradigmatic Uncertainty.

The Russian military's constant refrain that it is improper for the military to intervene in politics and its actions and inaction at critical times in 1993 and 1994 suggest that Huntington's thesis, that professional militaries are non-interventionist precisely because they are professional, holds for the Russian military. Many Russian officers clearly believe, as Huntington posited, that a military officer who becomes directly involved in politics becomes less a professional military officer. As put by the

Russian chief of military personnel in late 1993, those military officers who wish to delve into politics should resign their military commissions for it is not possible to be both a military officer and a politician. But is it really such a simple dichotomy? Perhaps in the black-and-white framework of choosing to run for, and occupying, political office while remaining an active-duty military officer. But what about other, less clear situations, such as those discussed in the above chapters? The discussion above also clearly showed that other factors inhibited a military move against civilian authority. Most notable were a communist-era tradition of non-involvement in politics (although important exceptions, such as Marshal Zhukov's political machinations, did occur), deep political divisions within the military, and fears that military involvement could lead to the military's collapse and even spark civil war.

As noted in Chapter 1, Nordlinger concluded that the most powerful motives for intervention, that is, the motives which are often translated into action, are the military's perception that its existence is at stake and the perception of servicemen that their livelihoods are threatened. Without doubt, these motives have been present in the Russian case since 1993. Nordlinger also posited that professionalism does not necessarily inhibit military intervention. Thus

while Huntington's thesis would explain why the Russian military has not intervened, but does so on a monocausal basis, Nordlinger's thesis, based on historical analysis, would have the Russian military well past the time when it should have intervened.

Perlmutter's thesis that modern militaries are "fusionist" and thus ineluctably drawn into politics would not appear to fit the Russian case, at least, to the degree that we have a good understanding of events in Russia. He posited that the key questions were how and to what degree a military intervenes, not if and why, and added that a military's agreed relationship with civilian authority (clientship) is the crucial determinant of the nature of civil-military relations. Clientship, in turn, is dependent upon the "military mind," that is, officers' acceptance of a patron (legitimacy), power relationships, and an appropriate level of societal stability. In Russia's case, with the exception of former Defense Minister Grachev and few others, not many in the military consider Yeltsin or the government a patron. As noted above, many in the military accept Yeltsin's legitimacy to rule based on the fact that he is president, not from loyalty to Yeltsin or to any particular political party. In short, the military has not intervened not because Yeltsin and his government are patrons. Nor has it apparently sought out another patron. It has tried to

remain neutral and apolitical.

Finer's thesis, that military professionalism can inhibit or induce military intervention, and that such intervention--why, when, and how--heavily depends upon the level of a country's economic and political sophistication, appears a good fit for the Russian example. As Finer pointed out, a military is often inhibited from political intervention when its leaders do not believe that it has the wherewithal to manage a sophisticated society and when the legitimacy of civilian control is deeply ingrained in a country's polity. Both of these inhibitions are present in the Russian case: as noted above, the Russian High Command has feared that military intervention against political authority could bring about the collapse of the nation and military due primarily to the deep political divisions within the society and armed forces. And polls and anecdotal evidence clearly indicate that few among Russia's citizens are willing to support or even countenance a military move against civilian authority.

At the same time, the professionalism of the Russian military should have provided a strong inducement to intervene, per Finer's paradigm. A highly professional military, perceiving itself to be the servant of the nation, not of political authorities, believing its very existence is at stake because of the venal and incompetent decisions of

politicians, and convinced that politicians are misusing the armed forces by ordering them to conduct internal security, pacification, or repression operations, often overcomes its inhibition to intervene. In the Russian case, there can be little doubt that the above intervention-propelling factors exist. But, as of the fall of 1996, the Russian military's inhibitions to intervene have been stronger than the inducements.

As noted in Chapter 1, Finer concluded that the interplay of inhibitors and inducements to intervene is, in the end, highly scenario dependent. The "most important factor" determining an officer's decision to intervene in politics is the depth to which the principle of the supremacy of civilian power has been internalized. It is on this point, perhaps, that the case of the Russian military may be best explained. Here, the evolution of retired General Lebed may be most instructive. The tradition of non-intervention coupled with communist-era indoctrination about the Communist Party's political supremacy may have set a barrier to military intervention at a height which the inducements to intervene have yet to overcome. If so, two key questions arise: at what "inducement level," if any, would the barrier be breached?; and, are the inducements additive and thus eroding the barrier so that at some point an event, in and of itself not a particular strain on the armed forces (at least

no more so than earlier strains), pushes the military, or elements of it, to cross the Rubicon?

Despite the seeming correlation between the Russian case and Finer's paradigm, the answer to this question may be beyond the explanatory abilities of any of the paradigms. The transition from communist authoritarianism to Russian democracy, in a word, democratization, has significant differences from earlier transitions in other countries. As pointed out by Gail Lapidus, the scope and depth of the simultaneous transformation to a democratic state and a market-based economy, the need for nation- and state-building while carrying out radical political and economic reform, and the existence of sharp ethnic conflict, all mark Russia's attempt at democratization.⁹ Such a combination of factors simply have not existed in past transformations to democracy by other countries. Consequently, the transformation of civil-military relationships almost certainly will be marked by a uniquely Russian approach. If so, then Russian history may offer a better guide to understanding developments in Russian civil-military relations than paradigms of political science which seek to establish general theoretical principles across countries, cultures, and militaries.

The Past As Prologue?

Perhaps one of the more intriguing aspects of this study is the return of the new Russian military to its philosophical and professional Tsarist roots. Long before the collapse of the Soviet Russian state, the military's communist rulers allowed and fostered the glorification of Tsarist Russia's military heroes, victories, and traditions. Since the demise of communism, the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces has stressed the pre-revolutionary roots of the military in a campaign to establish a national and corporate identity for an organization which, after the failed August 1991 anti-Gorbachev coup, suddenly found its country deposited on the ash heap of history and itself being carved up into separate armies. Those roots, some of which had earlier been incorporated into the Soviet Armed Forces, include a distinct corporate identity and approach to civil-military relations.

According to G. H. N. Seton-Watson and contrary to accepted wisdom, the Imperial Russian military had traditionally played a leading role in Tsarist politics and society. Imperial Russia was a "barracks state" in which it was difficult to parse out military influence on, or within, the government. Moreover, during political crises, the military, especially elite units physically located near the center of power, played a role in imperial power struggles.

That said, the military had internalized the autocratic philosophy which undergirded the Tsarist state--it never challenged the authority of the Tsar and was an obedient instrument of the state. The Imperial Russian Army's loyalty to the principle of autocracy never wavered, with the important exception of the 1825 Dekabristi Uprising, and there never appeared a "man on a white horse" until August 1917. By then, loyalty to the Tsar and autocracy had been replaced by loyalty to the nation. In this environment, Russia's first military savior appeared on the scene. When General Lavr Kornilov became convinced that politicians were destroying Mother Russia and betraying her to the enemy, he set out to overthrow the Provisional Government in August 1917. Russia's first and only man on a white horse, however, ignominiously failed when his army melted away despite his popularity among the troops.¹⁰ From Seton-Watson's perspective, therefore, the Imperial Russian Army did have influence, and did intervene, in politics at critical points, but, per Finer's paradigm, it had no tradition of blackmailing, displacing, or supplanting civilian political authority through threats or actual forceful military intervention.

William J. Fuller Jr. investigated why this was so in his 1985 work Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914. According to Fuller, the Imperial Russian officer

corps of the 19th and early 20th centuries was not very professional. In particular, it was not a unified entity: fault lines existed among the services, within the military hierarchy, and between classes. Fuller posited that the Imperial Russian Army in this period was marked by negative corporativism, that is, a corporate identity which only existed in relation to perceived menaces from the distrusted outside world.¹¹ Thus, Imperial Army officers were not linked by shared pride, self-esteem, or a sense of mission, but exclusively on the basis of "shared fear."¹² Negative corporativism was engendered and fostered by the military's history of internal security operations and long-running bureaucratic struggles with the Finance Ministry over the military budget. By the early twentieth century, these two phenomena provided the basis for "the most bitter civil-military conflicts in the Russian Empire."¹³

In the revolutionary years of 1905-07, the military saved the Imperial government from collapse when it followed orders and put down rebellion and suppressed anti-government political activity. The High Command, though, very reluctantly intervened in the internal political tumult. While it did not oppose military operations against rioters or those in open revolt, it had strong antipathy toward a political deterrence mission being pushed by civilian authorities which stressed the garrisoning of troops in small

units throughout the country and subjected them to the orders of local political authorities. The High Command rightly saw this as a severe brake on its efforts to professionalize the military. Despite the military's complaints, reluctance, and political maneuvering to avoid undertaking this mission, civilian authorities prevailed. The War Ministry also feared officers' involvement in political affairs, even on behalf of military issues, because senior officers believed that such involvement would radicalize the officer corps. The High Command lashed out at officers' political movements of the right and left, such as the Young Turks movement (which wanted more Duma control over the Army), neo-Panslavists (who elevated Slavdom to a higher principle than Tsardom), and the Voennyi golos group (which saw the Tsar as a figurehead, at best, and stood for constitutionalism and military professionalization).¹⁴

The Imperial War Ministry wanted the Army to be "above politics." On 16 December 1905 it issued War Department Order 804, assented to by the Tsar, which forbade servicemen from joining any group formed for political goals, attending meetings in which politics was discussed, or taking part in political demonstrations. Later, Order 626 expanded the prohibitions to attending nonpolitical discussions of political groups and expressing opinions in the press if contrary to government policy.¹⁵

Over time, the War Ministry's pursuit of professionalization and bureaucratic autonomy in the military's field of expertise led to a substitution in the Army's highest goal: the preservation of the Army supplanted the survival of the Romanovs or empire. By February 1917, the High Command and most front commanders not only failed to intervene to put down local military mutiny, rebellion, and civil disorder in the capital, Petrograd, but pressed Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate to the Provisional Government.¹⁶ In effect, the military's senior officers threw in their lot with those who mutinied and rebelled.

Thus, the relevant lesson from Russia's past may be that localized military unrest predicated on wage arrears and penurious living conditions, perhaps joining with labor unrest, could provide the spark for larger military rebellion. This may be especially true if the government were to order military units to suppress mutiny or civil disorder. In such a scenario, military inhibitions militating against intervention may finally erode to the point that the inducements propel military intervention. Russia, therefore, could experience a cascading coup against central authority as military units, social groups, and local political authorities rebel. Absent such a scenario, however, it appears that the High Command and most in the Russian military will remain on the political sidelines,

tending to their own efforts to survive Russia's political and economic transformation.

¹Military Elites In Russia 1994, (Munich/Moscow: SINUS Moscow Social and Market Research Ltd., 1994)

²Marshall I. Goldman, Lost Opportunity: Why Economic Reforms in Russia Have Not Worked (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1994), 115.

³In April 1994 the official poverty line was at 66,536 rubles. Although inexact, it is clear that a significant percentage of professional military officers lived at or near poverty levels. For a discussion on poverty in Russia, see Alastair McAuley, "Inequality and Poverty," in David Lane, ed., Russia in Transition, 177-190. Both the exchange rate and subsistence level, moreover, are averages and do not account for the much higher cost of living in northern parts of the country, especially Siberia, where many military personnel are stationed. Since 1992, this is usually reflected in a blizzard of press reports beginning in late August bemoaning the parlous situation of servicemen stationed in the north. Most often, these reports conclude that, if any Russian units were to mutiny, those in the north would likely be among the first.

⁴Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 113-135.

⁵Ibid., 135.

⁶Indeed, in some respects these beliefs mirror those of the well-known 19th century German political philosopher Eduard Bernstein, who was vilified by Lenin for his evolutionary and gradualist approach to the establishment of a socialist state.

⁷See for example Ivan Ivanyuk, "Many Promises, But So Far Little Money," Krasnaya zvezda, 25 Oct 96, p1, and Aleksandr Golovanov, "The Russian Defense Minister Gave An Exclusive Interview to Komsomolskaya pravda. Igor Rodionov: 'By A Miracle We Kept Control Of The Army'," Komsomolskaya pravda, 20 Nov 96, p2.

⁸See for example Fred Hiatt, "Lebed To The Rescue?," The Washington Post, 25 Nov 96, pA21; "Trust In Yeltsin Has Fallen Sharply," AP News Service, 13 Nov 96; David Hoffman, "Poll Finds Yeltsin Still Ill Politically," The Washington Post, 14 Nov 96, pA27; "Lebed Is Russia's Most Trusted Politician--Survey," Reuter, 10 Oct 96; and Oleg Savalyev, "Russians Like Clarity," Segodnya, 9 Oct 96, p2.

⁹Lapidus, The New Russia, 3.

¹⁰G. H. N. Seton-Watson, "Russia: Army and Autocracy," in Howard, Soldiers and Governments, 101-114.

¹¹William C. Fuller Jr., Civil-Military Conflict In Imperial Russia, 1881-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 26-27.

¹²Ibid., 28-29.

¹³Ibid., 77.

¹⁴Ibid., 207-208.

¹⁵Ibid., 192; 207-209.

¹⁶Ibid., 216.

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